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Abstract 
This study investigates the effectiveness of sector timing on the JSE by evaluating 
the likely outcomes from switching between the resource and financial-industrial 
indices using Monte Carlo simulations over the period from 31 January 2002 to 31 
December 2016. A market timer is assumed to have varying forecasting accuracies 
when switching between the sector indices on the JSE.  This study is motivated by 
the market segmentation phenomenon on the JSE (i.e. resources can be viewed as 
a separate market driven by different economic forces compared to other sectors); 
and argues that there exists "potential gains" for sector rotation strategies rather than 
a buy and hold strategy in the All Share Index (ALSI).   
  
The primary objective of the paper is to evaluate "potential gains" from “simulated” 
scenarios (rather than actual or hypothetical) sector timing strategies; and determine 
what level of forecasting accuracy a market timer must possess to outperform a buy 
and hold strategy in the ALSI. The sector timing strategies are implemented using 
the Financial (FINI), Industrial (INDI) and Resource (RESI) sector indices. The 
secondary objectives evaluate the impact of transaction costs and rebalancing 
frequencies on potential gains. The transaction costs evaluated are 1 percent and 2 
percent every time there is a switch from one index to another, and vice-versa. It is 
assumed that 1 percent transaction costs represent large institutional investors and 2 
percent transaction costs represent individual investors and small funds. In addition, 
the rebalancing frequencies evaluated are annual, quarterly and monthly.  
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The main results of the study illustrate that when the maximum transaction costs of 2 
percent and monthly portfolio revisions are taken into consideration, significant 
forecasting accuracy (i.e. 70 percent joint forecasting accuracy or more) is required 
to outperform a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI. However, when 2 percent 
transaction costs are taken into account for both annual and quarterly market timers, 
a market timer requires a moderate level of forecasting accuracy (i.e. 60 percent joint 
forecasting accuracy) to outperform a buy and hold strategy. Results also revealed 
that it is more important to improve the ability in timing the industrial-dominant 
market on the JSE than both the resource-dominant market and the financial-
dominant market. This outcome is attributed due to the fact that the industrial index 
is the better performing index out of the three sector indices 
 
The results from sensitivity analysis show that the more frequently a market timer 
revises his/her portfolio, the greater the potential gains. However, when taking into 
account transaction costs, the results from sensitivity analysis also illustrate that the 
more frequently a market timer revises his/her portfolio, transaction costs are 
incurred on a greater number of transactions, thus reducing the overall potential 
gains. Consequently, transaction costs also caused the required forecasting 
accuracy to outperform a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI to increase. 
 
Keywords: potential gains, sector timing, market segmentation, transaction costs, portfolio 
revision frequencies, market timer, Monte Carlo simulations, JSE, sensitivity analysis 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) begins with a premise that all major security 
exchanges are excellent examples of efficient markets (Fama, 1965). Fama (1970) 
defines an efficient market as having numerous rational investors competing in 
predicting future asset’ prices, and where current essential information is freely 
available to all market stakeholders. The competition that is present between 
investors in an efficient market leads to a situation where at any point in time, asset 
prices reflect information based on both prior events and events that are expected to 
occur in the future. Thus, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) by Fama (1970) 
maintains that all assets are perfectly priced such that their market prices are good 
estimates of their intrinsic values at any point in time. 
 
The EMH is centred on the following assumptions; all market participants perceive 
available information in the same manner and attempts made to obtain returns that 
are superior to the market would fail. The EMH divides capital markets into three 
forms of efficiency. Firstly, the weak-form EMH states that investors cannot use 
historical asset prices and volume data to determine future probable prices. 
Secondly, the semi-strong form EMH asserts that investors cannot use publically 
available information to outperform the market in a consistent manner. Lastly, the 
strong form EMH asserts that investors cannot use private information to outperform 
the market in a consistent manner. 
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INTRODUCTION 1-2 
 
 
The weak-form EMH concurs with RWH in stating that investors cannot outperform 
the market by utilising past prices and volume data as all information is already 
included in current asset prices. Samuelson (1965) is of the same opinion, stating 
that an investor cannot use past prices to predict future probable prices, and the 
changes in the series of asset prices are both independent and fluctuate randomly. 
On the contrary, proponents of technical analysis are of the belief that patterns of 
past price behaviours tend to recur in the future, and therefore could potentially be 
predicted. 
 
According to Sharpe (1975), an investor who intends on outperforming the market, 
would either implement the selection of securities within a given class or allocation of 
assets to specific classes of securities. The latter strategy’s most productive form is 
to purchase cash equivalents when bear markets are anticipated and to switch into 
risky assets when bull markets are anticipated, also known as market timing. 
According to Sharpe (1975), the rationale for market timing is to predict movements 
in capital markets as the basis of short-term shifts in and out of securities or asset 
classes in order to beat the buy and hold strategy in a particular asset class. 
 
Local studies conducted by Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse (1987), Firer, Sandler and 
Ward (1992), Waksman, Sandler, Ward and Firer (1997) and De Chassart and Firer 
(2004) indicate that the potential gains of a market timing strategy on the JSE are 
indeed attractive. However, high levels of predictive accuracy are required to 
outperform the buy and hold strategy, which are unattainable to most investors. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
INTRODUCTION 1-3 
 
 
According to Van Rensburg and Slaney’s (1997) and Van Rensburg’s (2002) 
empirical studies on market segmentation on the JSE, there exist different sets of 
macro-economic forces that drive the performance of different sectors on the JSE. 
Based on Van Rensburg’s (2002) factor analytic procedure, the resource sector 
(RESI) and financial and industrial (FINDI) sectors are used as observable proxies in 
his sector based two-factor Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model used to explain 
asset returns on the JSE. Van Rensburg (2002) suggested that the FTSE/JSE All 
Share Index (ALSI) previously used as the market proxy in the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) does not adequately explain the returns of the various sectors on the 
JSE. The unique market segmentation phenomenon on the JSE implies that the 
performance of different sectors on the JSE could potentially be cyclical, which 
provides ample room for sector timing strategies on the JSE. This motivates this 
study to determine whether potential gains are available to market timers who 
employ sector-timing strategies on the JSE. 
 
The sector timing strategies evaluated in this study have the potential to enhance 
investment performance by capturing the time-varying dimensions of risk inherent in 
the various sectors. South Africa is regarded as one of the global leaders in the 
mining sector, making up a substantial proportion of world production in natural 
resources. In 2012, South Africa had the fifth largest mining sector globally in terms 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) value, with mineral reserves estimated at R20.3 
trillion (Kearney, 2012). The South African economy was driven by the expansion of 
gold and diamond mining. 
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The raising of capital to fund mining was also the catalyst for the development of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in November 1887 (Falkena, Fourie and Kok, 
1986). As the security exchange evolved, capital was raised for manufacturing, and 
so the JSE expanded from the mining sector to the industrial sector. According to 
Peters (2015), companies such as SABMiller were one of the first industrial 
companies to list their shares on the JSE. Today, South Africa has an established 
industrial sector with a variety of industries such as chemicals, agro-processing, 
automotive, information and communication technology, metals, electronic, textiles, 
clothing and footwear. The industrial sector increased from R180 053 million in 1993 
to R282 215 million in 2010 and contributed 15.20 percent to South Africa's GDP in 
2013, which made the industrial sector the third biggest contributor to the South 
African economy (Oosthuyse, 2016).  In addition, according to Statistics South Africa 
(www.statssa.gov.za), the industrial sector remained the third largest contributor to 
the country’s economy in 2016, contributing 15 percent to South Africa's GDP.  
 
Similar to the industrial sector, the financial sector was born out of the gold rush in 
the late 1800’s. Over the period from 1970 to 2000, South Africa’s economic and 
political climate experienced dynamic changes; the financial sector had to move from 
market protection policies toward free-market principles (Gondo, 2009). In 2008, the 
South African economy faced another challenge after being hit by the global financial 
crisis, which caused a slowdown in economic growth. According to a report by the 
National Treasury (2011), the financial sector survived the 2008 financial crisis 
relatively less harmed compared to other major financial markets, 
(www.treasury.gov.za). 
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In 2008 and 2009, the financial sector still contributed 1.50 percent and 0.20 percent 
to the country’s growth, respectively, even when South Africa’s overall growth was at 
negative 1.50 percent (Young, 2013). In addition, the financial sector accounted for 
21.60 percent of South Africa’s GDP in 2016, which made the financial sector the 
second biggest contributor to the country’s economy, (www.treasury.gov.za). 
 
Overall, the trading of shares in the financial, resource and industrial sectors on the 
JSE have grown exponentially, reaching a high of 1 025 million shares changing 
hands in 2015; the highest trading volume in 16 years (Peters, 2015). Resource 
firms were the main contributor to the increase in equities, with 746 million shares 
traded on the day, of which, approximately 97 percent was for the purchase of 
Merafe Resources stock.  Following the resource sector, life insurance companies 
had 31 million shares traded, with 21 million Old Mutual shares being traded (Peters, 
2015). 
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1.2 Overview 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether there are potential gains available 
to investors who apply sector-timing strategies on the JSE, over the period from 1 
January 2002 to 31 December 2016. Moreover, the study aims to determine the 
minimum level of forecasting accuracy required for a market timer to benefit from 
sector timing strategies on the JSE. The study also seeks to determine the sensitivity 
of potential gains to varying levels of transaction costs and portfolio revision 
frequencies. The research data is constituted of the monthly closing values of the 
following tradable indices on the JSE; FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 index (INDI), 
FTSE/JSE Financial 15 index (FINI), FTSE/JSE Resources 20 index (RESI), 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 index and the Secured Transfer of Electronic Information Call 
Deposit Index (STEFI). 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theories underlying this research such as the 
EMH and its various forms, as well as the RWH and its relation to the weak-form 
EMH. The chapter goes on to explore the various approaches used by investors to 
outperform the market as well as the criticism of prospect theory over the expected 
utility theory as decision making frameworks used by investors. Finally, the chapter 
provides a review of behavioural finance that serves as an alternative theory to 
traditional finance theories such as the EMH; and discusses the behavioural biases 
affecting investors that often lead to market inefficiencies and even market crashes. 
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Chapter 3 reviews empirical literature on the potential gains from market timing 
strategies, over the period from 1975 to 2016. The results from these studies 
evaluate the level of accuracy required to obtain potential gains from successfully 
timing the market on the JSE and other international security exchanges. The 
performance of market timing strategies were often benchmarked against a buy and 
hold strategy in empirical literature. The research shows the effect forecasting 
accuracies have on potential gains while accounting for transaction costs and 
portfolio revisions associated with the ability to time the market successfully. 
 
Chapter 4 presents an overview of the research objectives of the study as well as the 
data employed and the methodology used in order to achieve these objectives. The 
methodology comprises of three major tests. The first test evaluates the potential 
gains available to a market timer switching between equity and cash depending on 
whether bull and bear markets are forecasted on the JSE. The second test evaluates 
potential gains available to a market timer applying a sector timing strategy on the 
JSE. The third test evaluates the sensitivity of potential gains available to a market 
timer to two key variables, namely, transaction costs and portfolio revision 
frequencies. The chapter concludes by outlining the potential biases that may 
influence the results of this study and possible remedies. 
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Chapter 5 presents the results of the first test, which illustrates the potential gains 
available to a market timer who possesses perfect forecasting ability compared to a 
market timer who has imperfect forecasting ability. Moreover, the chapter evaluates 
the minimum forecasting accuracy required to obtain potential gains when switching 
between bull and bear markets. The impact of various transaction costs and portfolio 
of revision frequencies on potential gains to a market timer will also be evaluated.  
 
Chapter 6 depicts the results of the second test, which is to determine the potential 
gains from sector timing for both perfect and imperfect sector timing, using three 
sector-timing strategies. The three sector timing strategies involve switching between 
RESI and INDI, RESI and FINI and lastly switching between FINI and INDI. In 
addition, the chapter also illustrates the impact of transaction costs and portfolio of 
revision frequencies on potential gains to a market timer applying a sector timing 
strategy. Chapter 7 highlights all the findings from the tests conducted by this 
research and provide recommendations based on the insights found by this 
research.  
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1.3 Contributions 
The tests carried out in this research and the acquired results thereof, contribute to 
current literature in the applications of sector timing strategies in multiple ways. 
Although Hsieh (2013a) recognises the significance of sector timing due to the 
unique market segmentation phenomenon in the Taiwanese market, to the author’s 
knowledge no study has considered the dominance of the resource sector when 
evaluating potential gains from sector timing strategies on the JSE. Noteworthy 
empirical literature in South Africa are limited to Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse (1987), 
Firer, Sandler and Ward (1992), Waksman et al. (1997) and De Chassart and Firer 
(2004) who evaluated the potential gains from market timing on the JSE while 
switching between equity and cash in bull and bear markets, respectively.  
 
Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse (1987) employed three different indices on the JSE and 
two cash equivalents over the period from 1967 to 1986. Firer, Sandler and Ward 
(1992) evaluated the potential gains available to a market timer switching between 
the ALSI and the All Gold index on the JSE for the period from 1967 to 1989. 
Waksman et al. (1997) evaluated the potential gains on the JSE when applying a 
market timing strategy that uses derivative instruments for the period from 1963 to 
1992.  
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Lastly, De Chassart and Firer (2004) evaluated the potential returns and risks 
associated with three market-timing strategies on the JSE for the period from 1925 to 
1998. However, the abovementioned studies failed to explore sector timing on the 
JSE. Therefore, this research expands on the tests to explore the potential gains of 
sector timing on the JSE, using five different indices, and provides updated research 
over the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2016.  
 
Contributions also come from the integration of methodologies employed by Chua, 
Woodward and To (1987), Kester (1990) and Hsieh (2013a) in this research. Sharpe 
(1975) pioneered the study of potential gains from market timing, based on the 
probability analysis of possible outcomes for imperfect market timing strategies 
between bull and bear markets. Chua et al. (1987) improved Sharpe’s (1975) 
methodology by using various permutations of bull and bear market timing 
forecasting accuracies, and evaluated the potential gains available to a hypothetical 
market timer, employing Monte Carlo simulations. Hsieh (2013a) also used Monte 
Carlo simulations to evaluate potential gains from sector timing in Taiwan. In 
addition, Droms (1989) and Kester (1990) investigated the potential gains from 
switching between different categories of stocks subject to various levels of 
transaction costs and portfolio revision frequencies. 
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Similar to the studies conducted by Droms (1989) and Kester (1990), this study 
addresses the limitations of the research conducted by Sharpe (1975) by applying 
assumptions that are more realistic to the frequency of portfolio revisions and levels 
of transaction costs. This study assumes transaction costs of 1 percent and 2 
percent, as 1 percent is representative of large institutional investors and 2 percent is 
representative of individual investors and small funds.  In addition, empirical 
evidence suggests that investors who apply a market timing strategy tend to revise 
their portfolios more frequently. Therefore, this study assumes that a market timer 
revises his/her portfolio on an annual, quarterly and monthly basis. Overall, this 
study provides insight into the potential gains available to a market timer applying a 
sector timing strategy on the JSE based on assumptions that are more realistic. 
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2 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
An approach where investors study the past behaviour of asset prices to predict 
probable future prices is referred to as technical analysis. In an attempt to evaluate 
whether there is independence in the series of price changes, Kendall and Hill 
(1953) examined the time-series behaviour of 22 economic series employing data 
from the Actuaries’ Index of Industrial Share Prices on the U.S. Stock Market over 
the period from 1883 to 1934. The results from the study revealed that series of price 
changes were entirely random and independent from previous asset prices. 
Samuelson (1965) is of the same opinion that an investor cannot use historical asset 
prices to predict future probable prices, and defines random walk hypothesis as the 
changes in prices of assets being independent and fluctuate randomly. In essence, 
changes in asset prices cannot be used to predict future probable prices as price 
changes do not have any memory.   
 
According to Fama (1970), an efficient market is one where assets are fairly priced 
and fully reflect all available information; therefore, an investor cannot outperform the 
market in a consistent manner. Fama (1970) proposed the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) which divides an efficient market into three forms. These forms of 
efficiency include the weak-form EMH, semi-strong form EMH and strong-form EMH. 
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The weak-form EMH concurs with random walk hypothesis, which asserts that 
investors cannot outperform the market by utilising past prices and volume data as it 
is already incorporated in current asset prices. Semi-strong form EMH is interpreted 
as a market where investors cannot use publicly available information to outperform 
the market in a consistent manner. The strong-form EMH, states that investors 
cannot use private information to outperform the market in a consistent manner. 
Private information is referred to as inside information that has not been made 
publically available and by using it would be illegal and known as insider trading. Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) are of the belief that investors are risk averse and 
rational in their decision making. On the other hand, behavioural finance as an 
alternative school of thought asserts that investors are irrational and prone to make 
systematic errors.  
 
Prospect theory pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) criticises the expected 
utility theory to be a normative model of rational choice and a descriptive model of 
economic behaviour. Prospect theory describes several classes of choice problems 
in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. 
Prospect theory views decision making under risk, which can be portrayed as a 
choice of prospects or gambles. Behavioural finance further seeks to understand the 
behaviour of investors when faced with certain risks, and how they react to uncertain 
events when new information arises. 
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2.2 The concept of an efficient market 
Random walk hypothesis states that a series of price changes have no memory, 
therefore, trends of past prices cannot be used to predict future probable prices. The 
random walk hypothesis inaugurates with a premise that asset markets are good 
examples of an efficient market (Fama, 1965). An efficient market is defined as a 
capital market with a large number of rational investors who actively compete but fail 
to outperform their rivals by consistently generating risk-adjusted returns (Fama, 
1965).  These rational investors use current information which is available to all 
participants in an attempt to predict future probable prices of assets.  
 
The logic behind random walk hypothesis is that if information is  available to all 
participants in a capital market, and the information is immediately reflected in asset 
prices, then the following day’s price change will only reflect the news of that day and 
is independent of the price changes today (Malkiel, 2003). Random walk hypothesis 
opposes technical analysis whereby stating that future prices of an asset are no 
more predictable than a path series of random cumulated numbers. In statistical 
terms, random walk hypothesis states that successive changes in asset prices are 
independent and are identical distributed random variables (Malkiel, 2003).  
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In the instance where new information becomes available, market participants react 
rapidly to the spread of news, thus it is incorporated in asset prices immediately. In a 
market where there are many sophisticated and active investors capable of 
identifying discrepancies between the market prices and intrinsic values of assets, 
the market becomes efficient as investors assist in narrowing the gap between 
market prices and intrinsic values through their trading activities. This implies that the 
market conforms closely to the random walk hypothesis. Therefore, if random walk 
hypothesis is a true representation of capital markets, then the various technical 
price indicators and charting tools which are used by technical analysts to forecast 
future prices of assets are invalid and of no value to investors.  
 
Contrary to the random walk hypothesis, technical analysts are of the opinion that 
there is dependence in a series of successive price changes, and maintain that the 
patterns of historical price behaviours tend to recur in the future. Otherwise stated, 
asset prices do not follow a ‘random walk’ and price changes cannot be independent 
over time. Therefore, by analysing historic price trends and volume data, investors 
could develop an understanding of the the past behaviour of price series to predict 
probable future prices assets and outperform the market. 
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According to Fama (1965), there are two approaches that are used to test the 
random walk hypothesis. The first approach tests whether the patterns in past asset 
prices are repetitive and can thus be predicted by technical analysts. An example of 
such tests includes Kendall and Hill’s (1953) study on the time series behaviour of 22 
economic series over the period from 1883 to 1934 using data from the Actuaries’ 
Index of Industrial Share Prices on the U.S. Stock Market. The results from Kendall 
and Hill’s (1953) study illustrated that there were no significant serial correlations 
within the economic time-series and minuscule lag correlation between the economic 
time-series, implying that asset prices are unpredictable. Consequently, if the 
statistical tests support the fact that asset prices are independent then the use of 
technical tools, which are primarily based on the history of past prices, cannot be 
used to outperform the market in a consistent manner.  
 
The second approach used to test the random walk hypothesis, is the evaluation of 
various technical trading rules as to determine whether it yields risk-adjusted returns 
greater than the returns generated by a buy and hold strategy. An example of such 
tests include Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992), who evaluated two technical 
rules on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) over the period from 1897 to 1986. 
The two technical trading rules included the trading-range break and the average-
oscillator. With the average-oscillator technique, buy and sell signals were generated 
by moving average crossovers. On the other hand, the trading-range break 
technique generates indicators as security prices hit new highs and lows. These 
trading rules were evaluated by their abilities to forecast future asset price changes. 
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Evaluation of the two techniques over a period of 10 days indicated that the risk-
adjusted returns are significantly greater than that of a buy and hold strategy. The 
results favour predicting future changes using technical trading rules. However, 
Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) stated that transaction costs were not 
included in the study, which could have significantly decreased the risk-adjusted 
returns. 
 
In addition to technical analysis, investors could attempt to outperform the market by 
employing fundamental analysis, also known as intrinsic value analysis. The 
assumption of the fundamental analysis approach is that at any point in time an 
asset has a given intrinsic value, which is dependent on the earning potential of the 
asset. In the case of an equity, the intrinsic value of a company’s security is 
dependent on fundamental factors such as, inter alia; annual earnings, economic 
events, the quality of management, the outlook for the industry, managerial 
commentary as well as stock splits. These fundamental factors are publicly available 
information which could be found in company announcements or financial 
statements. In order for a fundamental analyst to outperform the market in a 
consistent manner, he/she should possess the ability to determine whether the 
market price of an asset is undervalued or overvalued, in comparison to its intrinsic 
value.  
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Fama (1965) suggests that, if market prices tend to move towards intrinsic values, 
attempting to determine the intrinsic value of an asset is equivalent to predicting the 
future price of that asset.  In order for a fundamental analyst to outperform the 
market in a consistent manner, he/she should be able to identify inconsistencies 
between market prices and intrinsic values of assets quicker than other analysts. As 
previously mentioned, the presence of many analysts in a market assists in 
narrowing inconsistencies between market prices and intrinsic values through their 
competitive trading activities. Therefore in an efficient market, market prices of 
assets would adjust immediately to the changes in intrinsic values (Fama, 1965).  
 
Fama (1970) developed the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) based on the 
framework of the levels of information efficiency in the market. Firstly, when a market 
is efficient of a weak-form, all historical prices and volume data are reflected in asset 
prices. Thus, technical analysis would be futile, as an investor will not be able to 
utilise historic asset prices and volume data to outperform the market in a consistent 
manner. Secondly, a market is efficient of a semi-strong form, if all asset prices 
efficiently adjust to information that is publicly available. Therefore, fundamental 
analysis would be fruitless when the market is efficient of a semi-strong form.  Lastly, 
when a market is efficient of a strong-form, investors cannot outperform the market 
in a consistent manner using both public and private information as it would have 
already been incorporated in the asset prices. In a strong-form efficient market all 
relevant information includes private information which only company insiders would 
know; the use of any insider information would be illegal.  
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According to Fama (1991: 383), “the primary role of the capital market is the 
allocation of the economy’s capital stock”. Ideally, a perfectly efficient market is 
where asset prices should provide investors with accurate indications for resource 
allocation. This allows firms and individual investors to make intelligent investment 
decisions based on securities that represent ownership of the firm’s activities. This 
operates under the assumption that asset prices fully reflect all available information 
at any given point in time. Therefore, a market where asset prices fully reflect all 
available information is defined as efficient.  
 
An efficient market is where investors are actively competing in asset markets, 
causing a rise in new information on intrinsic values to immediately reflect in market 
prices.  In an efficient market, investors are presumed to be rational and risk averse 
in evaluating the probable outcomes of investment alternatives. An investor is 
perceived to be risk-averse when he/she is given two investment options which yield 
similar expected returns but different risks, and prefers the investment with the lower 
risk. Moreover, risk-averse investors will accept assets or a portfolio with a high 
expected return for a given level of risk, as well as accept a lower risk for a given 
level of expected return. 
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The concept of risk aversion branches from the expected utility theory which is 
illustrated by the conventional utility curve in Figure 2.1 below.  Utility is defined as 
the satisfaction one acquires from an additional consumption of a good. In this case 
it would be the satisfaction that an investor gets from an additional unit of wealth 
created from his/her investment. Using the asset position as an indication of wealth, 
the positive slope indicates that as the asset increases, the utility of an investor 
increases, but at a diminishing rate as the curve is concave and the curve flattens. 
Essentially, as an investor increases his/her wealth, his/her utility increases, however 
at a rate less than the increase in wealth. According to Rabin (2000), this implies that 
an investor will reject a risky venture without adequate compensation for the 
additional risk taken. An investor stands to lose more in a fair gamble than he stands 
to gain. Thus, investors will not accept fair gambles because they will lose 
satisfaction of utility (Rabin, 2000).  
 
Figure 2.1: Marginal Utility Curve, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figure adapted from Bodie and Kane (2008: 267) 
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2.3 Behavioural Finance and Prospect Theory 
A fundamental of modern finance is built on the EMH as it assumes that investors 
are rational utility-maximisers and that the market is efficient and reflects all relevant 
information in assets (Fama, 1965, 1970 and 1991). On the contrary, behavioural 
finance assumes that markets are informationally inefficient and that investors are 
irrational (Ritter, 2003). The premise of behavioural finance is that conventional 
finance ignores how investors make decisions in reality. In addition, behavioural 
finance states that the market is inefficient due to investor’s cognitive biases such as 
overconfidence, overreaction, representative biases and other errors when making 
investment decisions. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) question the principles 
underlying the expected utility theory; and introduce prospect theory to describe 
investment decisions influenced by cognitive psychologies.  
 
2.3.1 Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tverky’s (1979) prospect theory states that when individuals are 
faced with risk, their behaviours tend to be inconsistent with the basic principles of 
the expected utility theory. Prospect theory examines the decision making process of 
individuals under uncertainty based on cognitive psychology as opposed to investor 
rationality. As discussed in Section 2.2, expected utility theory states that individuals 
tend to be risk-averse when making investment decisions.  
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that when faced with a choice of several risky 
investments, individuals exhibit behaviour that displays loss aversion, which is 
inconsistent with the basic principles of the expected utility theory.  As a result, an 
alternative theory was developed, which introduces the concept of loss aversion and 
suggests that individuals would prefer to avoid losses than acquire gains. 
Furthermore, prospect theory mentions that certain behaviours are displayed by 
individuals whilst making an investment decision. 
 
In order to demonstrate the concept of loss aversion, prospect theory proposes that 
individuals view the gains and losses of an investment relative to a specific reference 
point which may represent the price of an asset. In comparison to the conventional 
utility curve in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2 below shows the utility derived from an 
investment that can be seen in the value function, which is both asymmetric and S-
shaped. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), utility depends on changes in 
wealth from current levels; and not on the level of wealth as explained by the 
expected utility theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that the value 
function is defined on deviations from the reference point, whereby deviations are 
concave for gains and convex for losses, and also steeper for losses than for gains. 
In other words, the sorrow felt by individuals when losses are incurred outweigh the 
pleasure felt when gains are incurred. This is known as the concept of loss aversion, 
which contradicts the expected utility theory, where an individual would be indifferent 
to the reference point.  
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Figure 2.2: A hypothetical value function, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
 
Source: Figure adapted from Kahneman and Tversky, (1979) 
In Figure 2.2 above, the reference point denotes that there is no change in current 
wealth. To the right of the reference point the function is concave for gains, implying 
that the marginal utility from additional gains increases at a decreasing rate, which is 
consistent with the expected utility theory. To the left of the reference point, the curve 
is convex and suggests that the marginal utility for losses is decreasing. Due to the 
fact that the curve is steeper for losses, the disutility obtained from incurring a loss is 
greater than the utility derived from making an equivalent gain. Expected utility 
theory implies that individuals may become risk averse as wealth increases, 
however, the convex curvature to the left of the value function causes individuals to 
be risk seeking as opposed to being risk averse with regards to losses.  
Value 
Losses Gains 
Reference Point 
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Shefrin and Statman (1985) state that loss aversion is the consequence of seeking 
pride and avoiding regret by investors. As a result, investors tend to sell securities 
which have increased in value (winners) too soon and hold shares which have 
decreased in value (losers) for too long. This tendency is referred to as the 
disposition effect. In addition to loss aversion, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also 
state that individuals will underweight the probability of a positive outcome occurring 
compared to a negative outcome that is obtained with certainty; also known as the 
certainty effect. For example, an individual would choose a guaranteed option of 
$2 000 to an alternative that has a 70 percent probability of paying out $3 000 and a 
30 percent probability of paying out nothing. The expected value of the individuals 
ideal choice is $100 ($2000 – 0.7*$3000), which is lower than the alternative choice.  
 
In contrast to the certainty effect, the reflection effect occurs when an individual’s 
preferences are reversed i.e. the 70 percent probability of losing $3 000 is preferred 
to the option of an individual guaranteed losing $2 000. Similar to the option posed in 
the positive domain, the expected loss is still $100 more than the alternative choice. 
Although the reflection effect illustrates that an individual is risk seeking when there 
is a high probability of loss, Kahneman and Tversky, (1979) also show that 
individuals tend to be risk-averse when there is a small probability of loss. This can 
be demonstrated by the price individuals pay for insurance, which far exceeds the 
expected cost of the event actually occurring (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
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Prospect theory also points out an error made by individuals when he/she rejects 
components that are common to all prospects. In other words, if the same choices 
are presented in different forms, individuals will display different preferences each 
time a choice is made. This is known as the isolation effect. Another cognitive error 
illustrated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), an investor will often separate 
individual investments in their portfolio in order to track the gains and losses made 
by each investment. This practice introduced by Thaler (1985), known as mental 
accounting, ignores the importance of portfolio diversification. 
 
2.3.2 Behavioural biases 
Behavioural finance is described by Ritter (2003)  as a concept whereby financial 
markets are studied by making use of models that are not limited by arbitrage 
assumptions nor Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) EUT. Furthermore, two 
concepts are applicable to behavioural finance, namely; cognitive psychology and 
limits to arbitrage. The first concept, cognitive psychology refers to an individual’s 
ability and tendency to be able to make a coherent decision (Ritter, 2003). Several 
psychological literature explain that investors are inclined to make systematic errors 
in the way they think, in which they are overconfident and put too much weight on 
recent experiences. Limits to arbitrage, is predicting instances in which arbitrages 
will be effective in, and when they will not be.  
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Behavioural finance utilises models where investors are not completely rational; 
either due to the investor’s preferences or due to their incorrect beliefs. Therefore, 
many investors are thought of as poor Bayesian decision makers, due to their 
mistaken beliefs (Hirshleifer, 2001). Proponents of behavioural finance is of the belief 
that not all investors are rational and their decision making process is subject to 
behavioural biases. There are several biases which largely affect the way investors 
make investment decisions as outlined below.   
 
Heuristics 
Hirshleifer (2001) maintains that people share similar heuristics, which leads to a rule 
of thumb being applied to decision making when investors are faced with uncertainty. 
According to Peerbhai (2011), this process may work well in certain situations, 
particularly when one is faced with time limitations, however when heuristics fail to 
produce a proper judgement, it could result in cognitive biases, especially in 
instances where things change. This could potentially lead to suboptimal decisions. 
An example of this is when an investor is faced with multiple options (N) to invest 
his/her retirement money; he/she would simply use the 1/N rule (Ritter, 2003). 
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Overconfidence 
According to Ritter (2003), investors tend to be overconfident in their abilities.  
Additionally, investors do not always analyse information available to them, instead 
they rely on their own judgement when making decisions. According to Grind (2013), 
overconfidence is related to pride, stating that investors hold too high opinions of 
themselves. Ritter (2003) stated that men tend to be more overconfident than 
women. As a result, they traded more, whereby they did worse than women 
investors. 
 
Framing 
Ritter (2003) defines framing as the idea of how a concept is presented to 
individuals, which was implemented in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect 
theory. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), framing is when an individual’s 
decision is affected by how choices are posed. Sewell (2010) states that, individuals 
react differently to a particular choice, depending on how it is presented.  An 
example of framing is where an individual may be risk averse when an investment 
option is posed in terms of the risk surrounding possible gains. However, he/she may 
be risk seeking when an investment option is posed in terms of the risk surrounding 
losses. In other words, investors may act as risk averse in terms of gains and risk 
seeking in terms of losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
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Mental accounting 
Mental accounting is where individuals tend to separate decisions which in principal 
should be mutual (Ritter, 2003). An example of such is where an investor would have 
an investment portfolio where he/she would take a conservative approach and invest 
in cash equivalents which are low-risk investments for his/her child’s education. On 
the other hand, an investor may also have another investment portfolio in high risk 
investments such as equities. A rational approach would be viewing the investor’s 
investments as part of an overall portfolio with the risk-return profiles of each 
portfolio into a combined framework (Phung, 2014).  
 
Conservatism 
Conservatism bias is where individuals tend to react slowly to new information that 
becomes available (Ritter, 2003). In other words, individuals do not react 
immediately to the new information and tend to adhere to the way things have 
always been done. An example of conservatism is that when new information 
becomes available, investors tend to underreact due to their conservatism bias. 
However, over the long run investors would eventually react to the new information, 
thus, causing momentum as investors overreact to the information (Ritter, 2003). 
 
Disposition effect 
According to Ritter (2003), the disposition effect refers to where investors tend to 
avoid paper losses and seek paper gains. An example of such is where an investor 
purchases a security at $30. The security then decreases to $22 before rising to $28. 
An investor would not sell the security unless it increases above $30 (Ritter, 2003). 
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Representativeness bias 
Representativeness bias is where individuals are of the opinion that a small sample 
is a representative of a broad population (Ritter, 2003). This is known as the ‘law of 
small numbers’. Individuals may infer patterns too quickly based on past experiences 
and extrapolate apparent trends far into the future. An example of such is where the 
past performance of security has been doing well; investors may assume that the 
security will continue to do well without evaluating the fundamentals and determining 
if it will continue to do well (Ritter, 2003). 
 
Regret avoidance 
According to Bailey and Kinerson (2005), regret avoidance is where individuals may 
have previously made a decision that did not produce favourable results, so they 
would avoid the feeling of regret by not making the same decision again. An example 
of such would be where an investor regrets a particular investment, which reduced 
his/her tendency to make a similar investment (Bailey and Kinerson, 2005).   
 
Availability Bias  
Investors tend to overreact to recent events that have occurred in the market and 
base their decisions on the recent occurrences (Phung, 2014). An example of 
availability bias is where the prices of securities dropped significantly during the 2008 
financial crisis. Therefore, investors will choose not to invest in the security market 
as they believe that the probability of another market crash is considerably high 
(Phung, 2014).  
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Herd Behaviour  
Herding behaviour is defined as investors who imitate others when making 
investment decisions (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). In other words, an investor 
is considered to be herding when their actions are influenced by other investors 
whom they are observing. In order for an investor to imitate others, he/she would 
have to be conscious of and be influenced by other investor’s actions (Bikhchandani 
and Sharma, 2001). Intuitively, an investor would be considered herding if he/she 
were to make an investment without knowing other investors’ decisions, however, 
changes their decision when he/she finds out other investors have decided not make 
the particular investment. Comparatively, an investor is also considered herding 
when he/she acquires knowledge that investors are investing in a particular 
investment, and then changes his/her decision from not investing to making the 
particular investment. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) state that herding by 
investors causes volatility, destabilises markets and increases the fragility of the 
financial system.  
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2.4 Overreaction Hypothesis 
According to De Bondt and Thaler (1985), overreaction hypothesis is based on 
investors’ psychological behaviour and implies that investors overreact to 
unanticipated information. Additionally, investors put too much weight on dramatic 
news which in turn affects their behaviour and investment decisions. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) explain that overreaction causes investors to overweight the arrival of 
new information and underweight historical information.  De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
explored a simple stock market investment strategy motivated by work in cognitive 
psychology on intuitive prediction. The investment strategy was based on the notion 
that investors are poor Bayesian decision makers. Bayes rule proposes that the 
reaction to an event is predictable, as it describes the degree of the reaction to new 
information which is considered to be appropriate and truthful. However, Kahneman 
and Tversky (1982) opposes Bayes rule by stating that individuals react differently. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) state that due to an overreaction by investors to the 
arrival of new information such as earnings, security prices may deviate temporarily 
from their underlying fundamental values. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) examined the 
overreaction hypothesis on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), using monthly 
returns data over the period from 1926 to 1982. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) formed 
portfolios consisting of the 50 most extreme winners and 50 most extreme losers, 
which were measured by cumulative excess returns over successive five-year 
formation periods.  
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Results indicated that the loser portfolios outperformed the market on average by 
19.60 percent; while winner portfolios on average underperformed the market by 5 
percent over the 50 year period. This result supports the findings of Basu (1977), 
whereby securities with low P/E ratios outperformed securities with high P/E ratios. 
Basu (1977) stated that securities with low P/E ratios tend to be undervalued due to 
negative future prospects about the company based on recent bad earnings or 
negative news relating to the company. Comparatively, securities with high P/E 
ratios are overvalued due to positive future prospects based on recent positive 
earnings or positive news related to the company. Using two simple hypotheses, De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) found considerable evidence. The first hypothesis is that 
extreme movements in security prices will be followed by subsequent price 
movements in the opposite direction. The second hypothesis is that the greater the 
initial price movement, the greater the subsequent price adjustment. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) are of the belief that these hypotheses are a violation of the weak-form 
EMH.  
 
Page and Way (1992 and 1993), investigated the overreaction hypothesis on the 
JSE over the period from July 1974 to June 1989, using a similar methodology to 
that of De Bondt and Thaler (1985). Results revealed that the winner portfolio 
underperformed the market by 4.50 percent; while the loser portfolio outperformed 
the market by 10 percent. Additionally, results revealed that the loser portfolio 
outperformed the winner portfolio on average by 15 percent. Thus, the findings on 
the JSE are consistent with the results found by De Bondt and Thaler (1985).  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 2-22 
 
 
Page and Way’s (1992 and 1993) results indicated that the loser portfolio yielded 
abnormal returns around 15 months after portfolio formation. Moreover, results 
illustrate that the longer the examination period the greater the loser portfolio will 
outperform the winner portfolio. 
 
Schiereck, De Bondt & Weber (1999) evaluated the profitability of value-based 
contrarian (long-term) investing and price momentum (short-term) trading strategies 
using data on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) over the period from 1961 to 
1991. According to Schiereck et al. (1999), a contrarian strategy is where securities 
that previously performed poorly (losers) for the past 2 to 5 years were purchased 
and securities that previously performed well (winners) were sold. On the contrary, 
momentum strategies is the purchase of securities that have previously performed 
well and selling securities that previously did poorly. Overall results revealed that 
contrarian strategies earn an excess return of about 8 percent per year in 
comparison to momentum strategies.  
 
Forner and Marhuenda (2003) conducted a study on the Spanish stock market for 
the period from January 1963 to December 1997. The study aimed to determine the 
performance of contrarian (long-term) strategies and momentum (short-term) 
strategies, whereby both loser and winner portfolios were developed, respectively. 
Results revealed that a 5 year contrarian strategy achieved significant positive risk–
adjusted returns. This illustrated that over the examination period loser’s 
outperformed winners, and thus, one can observe stock market overreaction.  
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Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) conducted a study on the JSE over the period from 1 
January 1993 to 31 March 2009. Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) attempted to find 
evidence of investor overreaction on the JSE as well as to determine whether mean 
reversion is cyclical. In addition, Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) examined the 
performance of a possible reverse relative strength strategy. The top and bottom 20 
shares were selected in order to form winner and loser portfolios, respectively. The 
results revealed that loser portfolios outperformed winner portfolios 36 months after 
the portfolio was formed. Results revealed that the Momentum 60 (MOM60) loser 
portfolios outperformed the market by 34.06 percent, while the winner portfolios 
underperformed the market by 11.32 percent. In addition, mean reversion was 
documented to be greater for loser portfolios as compared to winner portfolios. Hsieh 
and Hodnett (2011) concluded that reversals are more prone to occur after a crash, 
and a reverse relative strength strategy may be a profitable strategy during financial 
downturn.    
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2.5 Major bubbles in history 
According to Jimenez (2011), a bubble or mania occurs when the price of an asset 
or product increases within a specific market, above its average market price, at a 
dramatic scale and on a current basis. In the last two decades the world has 
experienced two of the greatest economic bubbles in history, known as the Dot Com 
bubble and the Securitisation bubble (Jimenez, 2011).  Other well-known bubbles 
also include The Tulip mania, South Sea bubble, The Great Crash of 1929 and 
Hesei Boom.  
 
2.5.1 The Tulip Mania 
The first bubble or mania occurred in Netherlands in 1637 in the tulip market. The 
tulips gained major popularity when a virus known as mosaic caused the tulip to look 
like flames. A market was created where tulips could be purchased in advance by 
means of future contracts, which allowed buyers to make a down payment with 
delivery taking place at a future date. Initially only merchants speculated the future 
prices of tulips, purchasing significant amounts of tulips in advance for the 
subsequent season. Originally, only the wealthy purchased tulips, however, as the 
price of tulips increased, many people started speculating prices of tulips, including 
the poor. This caused the price of tulips to rise due to the increase in demand. The 
price of tulips began to increase excessively as of December 1636 up until before 
the crash which occurred in early February 1637. According to Jimenez (2011), in 
January 1637 the price of a tulip had increased twenty fold. Due to the overreaction 
in the market, the price of a tulip was 6000 Florins, while the average salary of a 
citizen was 150 Florins. 
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In February 1637, the first major sales of tulips began; causing panic in the market, 
and thus the large sales of tulips began. The government attempted to halt the sales 
of tulips through re-purchases and positive propaganda, however, their attempt was 
futile. Eventually, a tulip was worth the equivalent to that of an onion, and a few tulips 
could be purchased for just 1 Florin. The collapse in Netherlands lead to economic 
distress from which Netherlands took years to recover (Garber, 1990). It was 
concluded that the tulip bubble essentially lead to the market crash in 1637 which 
was due to irrational exuberance.  
2.5.2 South Sea Bubble 
The South Sea bubble revolved around the South Sea company, established in the 
year 1711 by Lord Treasurer Robert Harley and John Blunt. According to Temen and 
Voth (2004), Robert Harley created a trading company to fund the British 
government debt after the Spanish war. Thus, the company was given trading rights 
as a trade-off to take over government debt. South Sea bought 10 million pounds of 
government debt in exchange for a monopoly to trade to the South Seas. The 
company created positive propaganda resulting in a dramatic increase in share 
prices. In 1720, the directors offered to fund the government’s entire debt of 31 
million pounds, which initiated the speculation of the security price (Temin and Voth, 
2004). Furthermore, on the 7 April 1720 the ‘Bubble Act’ was introduced which 
prevented other companies from competing with South Sea which essentially 
increased the security from 130 pounds to 300 pounds, creating a huge demand for 
the security (Jimenez, 2011). Within a span of a month, the security increased to 550 
pounds and ultimately increased to approximately a 1000 pounds; which was no 
indication of the true fundamentals of the company.  
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South Sea began lending money to investors who wished to purchase shares. 
However, investors could not afford to make payment on the loans and had to sell 
shares. In addition, banks and other financial institutions who lent money went 
bankrupt as investors could not repay their loans. The news of South Sea security 
being sold came to the attention of the public which lead to a decline in stock prices 
due to a spread of panic. Within a month the market value of South Sea declined by 
103 million pounds (Jimenez, 2011). 
2.5.3 The Great Crash of 1929 
Galbraith (1954) states in his book titled the ‘The Great Crash 1929’, the U.S. stock 
market bubble formed due to the rapid expansion of the 1920’s market. Additionally, 
Galbraith (1954) states that the irrationality of investors ignoring the fundamentals of 
securities and brokers’ loans that leveraged investors were causes of the bubble. 
According to Jimenez (2011), the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) grew at an 
annual rate of 4.70 percent and the unemployment rate grew at an average of 3.70 
percent per annum over the period from 1922 to 1929. These great economic 
conditions resulted in large scale industrial and commercial enterprises emerging. 
Both new and old corporations started issuing stocks to finance development. In 
addition, commercial banks moved into investment banking, creating affiliates; which 
grew from 10 to 114 between 1922 and 1931 (Peach, 1941). Carosso (1970) stated 
that during the same period investment trusts grew from 40 to 750. According to 
Carosso (1970), many of the new investors who entered into the security market 
lacked experience, thus causing the bubble.  
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According to White (1990) and Pierce (1986), the trend between security prices and 
dividends were shared over the period from 1922 to 1927, however, between 1928 
and 1929 security prices increased much more above dividends. Malkiel (1973) 
stated that between 3 March 1928 and 3 September 1929, the percentage increases 
in major securities traded on Wall Street ranged from 87 percent to 434.5 percent. 
According to White (1990), a crucial factor of the 1929 crash was the credit system, 
and that the credit was not cheap. The bubble can be explained by first stating that 
there was a change in the business cycle, whereby a recession may have been 
plausible. In July 1929 the Federal Reserve’s index declined and in August and 
September other indices began to drop. According to Jimenez (2011), the data 
arrived at the market with increases in interest rates in both US and European 
countries. These occurrences caused investors to panic, leading to the collapse of 
the security market.   
2.5.4 Japan: 1980’s Asset Price Bubble (Hesei Boom) 
Hamada (2003) explains that during the 1980’s, Japan experienced a period of 
continued growth and stable inflation. However, during the period from 1987 and 
1990, the 1980’s Asset Price bubble (Hesei Boom) occurred due to fundamentals 
which were not in relation with real estate prices, security prices and land prices. 
According to Jimenez (2011), there is a certain similarity between the Hesei Boom 
and the ‘Great Crash of 1929’. The similarities include the aggressive behaviour of 
financial institutions, inadequate risk management by financial institutions, progress 
of financial deregulation, protracted monetary easing, introduction of the capital 
accord, taxation and regulations biased towards accelerating the rise in prices, 
euphoria and overconfidence to name but a few.  
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Shiratsuka (2003) stated that these causes were the factors that augmented the 
bullish expectations in the economy and triggered the bubble. Additionally, interest 
rates were low despite economic expansion which contributed to cheap credit that 
leveraged agents. The security market and real estate market collapses occurred 
when a decline in profitability took place and investors revised their expectations. 
2.5.5 Dot Com Bubble 
A study conducted by Weale and Amin (2003) outlined that the Dot Com bubble 
occurred around 1999 to 2001 peaking on the 10th of March 2000, in which new 
technological innovations were introduced to the market, with high hopes of creating 
many profitable opportunities for investors. During the 1990’s, software companies 
performed extremely well. The reasoning behind the sudden over-investment in 
internet firms was attributed to investment analysts declaring these stocks to be 
huge growth potentials and profitable investments. Thus, behavioural biases such as 
herd behaviour and overconfidence, lead to investors making an over-investment in 
internet firms. According to Geier (2015), during 1996 to 2000, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) index grew from 
600 to 5000 points. Many investors realised that technology stocks developed into a 
speculative bubble and thus they began to sell their securities. When the bubble 
burst and investors realised their misjudgment and irrationality, they began pulling 
out of the shares, leading to the market crashing.  
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2.5.6 The Housing Bubble 
A well renowned real estate bubble is that of the recent bubble that led to the 2008 
global financial crisis. This crisis was a catastrophic event that was caused by the 
bursting of the housing bubble (Holt, 2009). Outlined below are the various 
contributing factors which lead to the bursting of the housing bubble. 
Low mortgage interest rates 
The combination of low interest rates followed by high mortgage rates led to the 
build-up and subsequent burst of the bubble. The decline in the interest rate was 
probably due to herd behaviour. Home seekers noticed others acquiring mortgages 
and decided to benefit from this as well. The low interest rates and low monthly 
repayments were the incentive behind the high demand for loans even though home 
prices were increasing. The Federal Reserve saw this as an incentive to lower 
interest rates further to feed the demand of the population whilst actively contributing 
towards economic growth (Holt, 2009). 
 
Low short term interest rates 
The low short term interest rates contributed to the housing bubble in two ways. 
Firstly, short term interest rates were lower than long term interest rates. Long term 
interest rates crippled homeowners as they battled with repayments because the 
values of their properties were less than the value of their mortgages (Holt, 2009). 
Secondly, leveraging was encouraged i.e. to borrow at the low interest rate and 
reinvest at higher yielding long term investments. This was aimed at mortgage-
backed securities which increased the amount that was available to loan out as 
mortgages, and as a result increased the price of homes.  
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Relaxed standards for mortgage rates 
Criteria for obtaining a mortgage loan were highly standardised prior to the bubble. It 
required a thorough screening of whether income was sufficient to meet monthly 
repayments as well as the condition of paying 20% of the mortgage as a deposit.  
However, new governmental policies were introduced in the mid-1990’s which 
contributed towards the drop of standards for mortgage loans. In addition, borrowing 
was no longer limited to local markets as home-owners could search the internet to 
find more affordable mortgage providers. Due to the higher competition, all mortgage 
providers lowered their mortgage fees to attract home-seekers.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter explored the various models within the traditional finance paradigm 
which made the assumption that investors act rationally by taking into consideration 
all available information when making decisions. As a result, markets conform to the 
efficient market hypothesis, and asset prices reflect the true intrinsic value. 
Moreover, traditional finance paradigms assume that investors are rational and 
respond rapidly to new information by making appropriate adjustments to security 
prices to restore market equilibrium.  
 
Fama (1965) stated that, asset prices follow a random walk pattern and are 
unpredictable. Additionally, the research in this study has also illustrated the origins 
of behavioural finance and the development of this theory in order to understand the 
implications of investors’ irrationality when making investment decisions in financial 
markets. Behavioural finance phenomena outlines the impact of human emotions 
and cognitive errors on the investment decision process, ultimately leading to 
arbitrage opportunities and miscalculations on the markets as opposed to traditional 
paradigms such as the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH).  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Market timing refers to an attempt to predict the future movements of markets or 
asset prices in order to identify their timing points. De Chassart and Firer (2004) 
define market timing as a switch between asset classes in anticipation of major 
turning points in the market. Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) takes an opposing 
view to the practice of market timing, stating that the movements in asset prices are 
random and thus are unpredictable. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) of Fama 
(1970) explains that it is impossible to beat the market consistently due to market 
efficiency; meaning that security prices reflect all relevant information in the market 
at any given time. Empirical studies on market timing strategies investigate the levels 
of predictive accuracy required to benefit from market timing and examine the 
practicality of market timing strategies. This chapter reviews the literature on the 
potential gains from market timing by examining various local and international 
studies over the period from 1975 to 2016. International studies by Sharpe (1975), 
Droms (1989), Kester (1990), Hsieh (2013a) and Hallerbach (2014) to name a few 
review the potential gains of market timing in the global markets. Local studies such 
as Waksman, Sandler, Ward and Firer (1997), De Chassart and Firer (2004), and 
Ward and Terblanche (2009) evaluate the level of accuracy required to time South 
African markets and potential gains available to a market timer on the JSE. The 
above mentioned literatures also considers the superiority of a market timing 
strategy over that of a buy and hold strategy and how forecasting accuracy affects 
potential gains from market timing in both bull and bear markets; while accounting for 
transaction costs associated with the ability to time the market successfully. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
Sharpe (1975) pioneered the study of potential gains from market timing by actively 
switching between U.S. Stock and Treasury bills over the period from 1929 to 1972. 
Sharpe (1975) defines potential gains as the incremental returns of a market timing 
strategy above that of a buy and hold strategy. Results reveal that over the period 
from 1929 to 1972 a perfect market timing strategy yields an average return of 14.86 
percent per annum compared to 10.64 percent yielded by a buy and hold strategy 
over the same period. Moreover, the standard deviation for a perfect market timing 
strategy is 14.58 percent compared to 21.06 percent yielded by a buy and hold 
strategy.  
 
The results show that a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy yields a 
greater return with less risk when compared to that of a buy and hold strategy. 
However, in reality, it is unlikely that a market timer possesses perfect forecasting 
accuracy; therefore it is more reasonable to assume that a market timer possesses 
imperfect forecasting accuracy. According to Sharpe (1975), it is more realistic to 
evaluate potential gains from less than perfect market timing by assigning various 
forecasting accuracies using a bivariate probability model. A hypothetical market 
timer was assigned various levels of forecasting accuracy in order to evaluate the 
minimum level of forecasting accuracy required to outperform a buy and hold 
strategy (Sharpe, 1975). The forecasting accuracy begins at 50 percent (i.e. no 
forecasting accuracy) increasing up until where the investor has 100 percent 
forecasting accuracy (i.e. perfect forecasting accuracy).  
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On a risk-adjusted basis, results revealed that a market timer requires a minimum 
forecasting accuracy of 74 percent in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy. 
Sharpe (1975) also stated that attempting to time the market will not yield potential 
gains of more than 4 percent per annum on average. Sharpe (1975) concluded that 
the potential gains from market timing are indeed appealing, however in reality; the 
forecasting accuracy required for an effective market timing strategy is unlikely to be 
achievable and should be avoided altogether.   
 
Jeffrey (1984) evaluated the potential gains available to a market timer who revises 
their portfolio on a quarterly basis, using data on the S&P 500 and Treasury bills for 
the period from 1926 to 1982. The results revealed that a market timer who 
possesses perfect forecasting accuracy would yield a maximum return of 10.80 
percent per annum above that of a buy and hold strategy in the S&P 500. 
Alternatively, if a market timer had imperfect forecasting accuracy and continuously 
timed the market incorrectly, he/she would underperform a buy and hold strategy by 
17.60 percent. Using a loss/gain ratio, Jeffrey’s (1984) study also illustrated that a 
market timer was 2.2 times more likely to underperform a buy and hold strategy than 
to outperform it. The loss/gain ratio also revealed that the risk undertaken by a 
market timer was not proportionate to the potential rewards. Jeffrey (1984) 
concluded that there were more bull markets than bear markets in the examination 
period. However, if a market timer missed a few of the bull periods, he/she would be 
better off with a buy and hold strategy, even if he/she correctly timed the market on a 
consistent basis. 
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Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse (1987) replicated Jeffrey’s (1984) study in order to 
evaluate the forecasting accuracy required to time the market within a South African 
context. The study accounts for asset choices, transaction costs and portfolio 
revision frequencies on the overall performance of a market timer on the JSE. Firer, 
Ward and Teeuwisse (1987) employed three different indices on the JSE and two 
cash equivalents over the period from 1967 to 1986. The three indices employed 
were the All Share index (ALSI), Industrial Holdings index and the Banks and 
Financial Services index. Additionally, the Treasury bill and Bankers Acceptances 
were employed as the cash equivalents. Results illustrated that a market timer who 
possesses perfect forecasting accuracy when switching between Treasury bills and 
the ALSI yielded on average potential gains of 5.50 percent per annum. Alternatively, 
if a market timer always incorrectly timed the market, he/she would have 
underperformed a buy and hold strategy by 17.70 percent, resulting in a win/loss 
ratio of 3.2. The results concur with Jeffrey (1984), whereby the downside risk 
substantially outweighs the upside.  
 
Results also revealed that a market timer required a forecasting accuracy of 69 
percent in order to have an equal opportunity of either outperforming or 
underperforming a buy and hold strategy. Moreover, results revealed that a market 
timer required a forecasting accuracy of 86.90 percent in order to outperform a buy 
and hold strategy.  
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Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse (1987) also used the compression ratio in order to 
evaluate the risk that is associated with applying a market timing strategy. The 
compression ratio indicates the number of good periods a market timer may forego, 
relative to the total number of periods, before the returns are below that of a buy and 
hold strategy. The results revealed that the average compression ratio was 14 
percent. The compression ratio indicated that if a market timer incorrectly forecasted 
14 percent of the bull periods, he/she would be worse off than that of an investor 
applying a buy and hold strategy. Therefore, similar to the results of Jeffrey (1984), a 
few great periods influence the total returns of a market timing strategy. 
 
Chua, To and Woodward (1987) utilised data on the Canadian Stock Exchange and 
Treasury bills from 1950 to 1983 in order to evaluate the forecasting accuracy 
required to outperform a buy and hold strategy. As opposed to Sharpe (1975), Chua, 
et al. (1987) did not assume that a market timer has equal forecasting accuracy in 
both bull and bear markets. In order to evaluate the potential gains available to a 
hypothetical market timer on the Canadian Stock Exchange, Chua et al.  (1987) used 
a series of Monte Carlo simulations of various bull and bear market forecasting 
accuracies. There were 10 000 iterations simulated for each variation of bull and 
bear forecasting accuracies. Additionally, win/loss ratios were computed for each 
variation of bull and bear timing accuracies in order to evaluate the probability of a 
market timing strategy outperforming a buy and hold strategy.  
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Chua, et al. (1987) stated that the win/loss ratio, when compared to a standard 
median estimate, provides more useful information as it overlooks the frequent 
situations in which the market timer and an investor applying a buy and hold strategy 
are holding securities. A win/loss ratio of less than 1 illustrates that a market timer 
has less than 50 percent probability of outperforming a buy and hold strategy. 
Similarly, a win/loss ratio of greater than or equal to 1 indicates that a market timer 
has a 50 percent probability or more of outperforming a buy and hold strategy.  
 
Results revealed that a market timer required a joint forecasting accuracy of 80 
percent in both bull and bear markets in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy. 
The win/loss ratios illustrated that the significant gains forgone in the bull markets far 
outweighed the benefits of avoiding losses in the bear markets. In addition, if a 
market timer can only forecast bull markets accurately 50 percent of the time, then 
he/she should not participate in market timing. Furthermore, a market timer will yield 
returns less than that of a buy and hold strategy, even if he/she is able to forecast 
bear markets perfectly. Chua, et al. (1987) concluded that it is more important for a 
market timer to forecast bull markets correctly than it is to forecast bear markets 
correctly. 
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Droms (1989), extending on Sharpe’s (1975) study, evaluated the potential gains 
available to a market timer switching between the S&P 500 and Treasury bills for the 
period 1926 to 1986. Droms (1989) criticised Sharpe’s (1975) study in that he only 
evaluated the potentials gains from annual timing. Therefore, Droms (1989) 
evaluated the potentials gains from annual, quarterly and monthly market timing. In 
addition, Droms (1989) implemented three sub periods. Firstly, the post-World War II 
period, this was from 1946 to 1986. The second sub period was from 1969 to 1986 
and the third sub period was from 1973 to 1986. Results revealed that for the post 
World War II period, a market timer who possessed perfect forecasting accuracy 
yielded on average potential gains of 4 percent per annum, similar to that of Sharpe 
(1975). For the period from 1973 to 1986, a market timer who possessed perfect 
forecasting accuracy outperformed a buy and hold strategy by 4.69 percent per 
annum. For the period 1926 to 1986, a perfect market timing strategy would have 
yielded potential gains of 6.47 percent per annum.  
 
Droms (1989) results also indicated that a market timer who did not possess perfect 
forecasting accuracy required the following forecasting accuracies in order to 
outperform a buy and hold strategy; 60 percent bull forecasting accuracy and 30 
percent bear forecasting accuracy, 70 percent bull forecasting accuracy and 40 
percent bear forecasting accuracy, 80 percent bull forecasting accuracy and 50 
percent bear forecasting accuracy and 100 percent bull forecasting accuracy and 
any bear market forecasting accuracy.  
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The results also revealed that if a market timer did not possess a minimum of 60 
percent bull forecasting accuracy, he/she would underperform a buy and hold 
strategy even if they possessed perfect bear forecasting accuracy. Droms (1989) 
results concurred with that of Chua et al. (1987) study, stating that it is more 
important for a market timer to forecast bull markets correctly than it is to forecast 
bear markets correctly. The results overall revealed that without considering 
transaction costs, the more frequent a market timer revises their portfolio the greater 
the potential gains available to a market timer and the level of forecasting accuracy 
required decreases. However, when taking transaction costs into account, the 
potential gains available to a market timer decreases and the required forecasting 
accuracy increases.  
 
Clarke, FitGerald, Berent and Statman (1989) employing the same data used by 
Sharpe (1975), investigated the level of information a market timer requires in order 
to outperform a buy and hold strategy, by developing a single factor model. The 
single factor model developed included the changes in Gross National Product 
(GNP) as the predictor of stock returns.  Clarke, et al. (1989) employed the single 
factor model that gives the market timer the option to switch between Treasury bills 
and stocks on the S&P 500. The level of information required to outperform a buy 
and hold strategy was not researched in previous empirical studies, as prior literature 
focused on determining the level of forecasting accuracy required for an effective 
market timing strategy in the various global markets. In addition, previous empirical 
studies assumed that market timers did not have access to information relating to 
forecasting market trends.  
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Results revealed that there are significant potential gains achieved when applying a 
market timing strategy based on indicators that are generated by the single factor 
model. Moreover, a market timer applying the market timing strategy could obtain 
greater returns at a lower risk than that of a buy and hold strategy. Clarke et al. 
(1989) concluded that a market timer, who even possesses a modest level of 
information, has a substantial advantage over a buy and hold investor. 
 
The results of previous empirical studies were all based on market timing with stock 
market indices that are dominated by large caps. Kester (1990) on the other hand, 
evaluated potential gains from market timing with large caps, cash equivalents and 
included small caps over the period from 1934 to 1988 in the U.S. stock market. 
According to Banz (1981), small caps are referred to as companies with relatively 
low market capitalisation that outperform companies with high market capitalisation 
on a risk-adjusted basis. Kester (1990) also evaluated the sensitivity of potential 
gains to two key variables, namely, frequency of portfolio revisions and transaction 
costs. The transaction costs assumed by Kester (1990) for various market timers are 
0.25 percent, 0.50 percent, 1 percent and 2 percent. Additionally, the portfolio 
revisions evaluated were annual, quarterly and monthly which are similar to that of 
Droms (1989).  
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Results revealed that the potential gains available to a market timer with perfect 
forecasting accuracy who revises their portfolio on a monthly basis, switching 
between small caps and Treasury bills and incurred transaction costs of 0.25 percent 
yielded potential gains of 28.26 percent. Results also revealed that a market timer 
who revised their portfolio on a quarterly basis and incurred transaction costs 0.25 
percent required a forecasting accuracy of 56 percent in order to outperform a buy 
and hold strategy. However, for a quarterly market timer, the required forecasting 
accuracy increases to 62 percent when transaction costs increase to 0.50 percent 
and 70 percent when transaction costs are 2 percent.  
 
The results from sensitivity analysis indicate that transaction costs are an essential 
factor for a successful market timing strategy. Kester (1990) stated that when more 
accurate and less restrictive assumptions are taken into account, with regards to  the 
frequency of portfolio revisions and transaction costs, the potential gains available to 
a market timer substantially increases. Kester (1990) concluded that a market timer 
yields greater potential gains when switching between small caps and Treasury bills 
than a market timer switching between large caps and Treasury bills. 
 
Shilling (1992), used data from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and 
Treasury bills in order to evaluate the potential gains from market timing for the 
period from January 1946 to December 1991. Shilling (1992) used a different 
methodology to previous empirical studies whereby he evaluated shorting securities 
in bear markets.  
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According to Shilling (1992), shorting securities in a bear market could potentially be 
a value-adding strategy. The 50 strongest months over the examination period were 
classified as bull markets. Whereas the 50 weakest months were used as bear 
markets. Results revealed that an investor, who applied a buy and hold strategy and 
reinvested their dividends, yielded a mean return of 11.20 percent per annum. 
Results also revealed that a market timer who missed 50 of the strongest months 
underperformed a buy and hold strategy by 7.20 percent per annum. Comparatively, 
an investor who applied a buy and hold strategy, and was out of the market for the 
50 weakest months, he/she would yield an annual return of 19 percent. 
 
Shilling (1992) also illustrated that if a market timer shorted securities in the 50 
weakest months, he/she would yield a return of 26.90 percent per annum compared 
to a buy and hold strategy which yields 11.20 percent per annum. Shiller (1992) 
stated that if a stock falls by 50 percent and an investor is invested in the market, the 
stock has to double in order for the security to revert back to the original market 
price. However, if a market timer was out of the market when security prices decline, 
he/she would have twice the money to invest when they foresee a bull market. 
Shilling (1992) concluded that it is indeed profitable to be in securities in bull 
markets. However, it is even more profitable to short securities during bear markets, 
even if many of the major bull markets are entirely foregone. 
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Firer, Sandler and Ward (1992) updated the Firer, Ward and Teeuwisse (1987) study 
of market timing on the JSE. Firer, et al. (1992), used data obtained from the All 
Share index (ALSI), All Gold index and Treasury bills on the JSE for the period from 
1967 to 1989. Firer, et al. (1992) investigated the effect of a major stock market 
crash such as the one of 1987 on market timing strategies. The study assumed 
annual, quarterly and monthly portfolio revisions with an average transaction cost of 
1.38 percent. Results revealed that a market timer who possesses perfect 
forecasting accuracy when switching between the All Gold index and Treasury bills, 
he/she would outperform a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI by 34 percent per 
annum. However, if a market timer always incorrectly timed the market, he/she 
would underperform a buy and hold strategy by 31 percent per annum.  
 
Results also revealed that on average, a market timer is required to make a switch 
approximately 45 percent of the periods, regardless of the timing intervals. 
Furthermore, if a market timer had missed two of the best years, he/she would 
underperform a buy and hold strategy. Firer et al. (1992) stated that a market timer 
required a forecasting accuracy between 87 percent and 90 percent in order to 
outperform a buy and hold strategy. Comparatively, in order for a market timer to 
equal that of a buy and hold strategy, he/she requires a forecasting accuracy 
between 65 percent and 79 percent accuracy. Firer et al. (1992) concluded that the 
crash of 1987 had little impact on the probability of successfully using a market 
timing strategy to outperform a buy and hold strategy.  
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Waksman, Sandler, Ward and Firer (1997) evaluated the potential gains on the JSE 
when applying a market timing strategy that uses derivative instruments for the 
period from 1963 to 1992. Two timing strategies were considered; a bear timing 
strategy and a bull timing strategy. When a market timer purchases put options to 
protect securities from market downturns, it is referred to as a bear timing strategy. 
Whereas, a bull timing strategy is when a market timer purchases call options when 
a bull market is forecasted. Black-Scholes Option Pricing and Fair Value Models 
were employed to price both call and put options on both the All Share index (ALSI) 
and the ALSI future. Results revealed that perfect bull and bear market timing 
strategies yield mean returns of 38.10 percent and 35.40 percent respectively, above 
that of a buy and hold strategy. Comparatively, a traditional market timing strategy 
yields a mean return of 43.20 percent.  
 
Results also revealed that a market timer who purchased one month put options on 
the ALSI when a bear market was anticipated, he/she requires a 50 percent 
forecasting accuracy in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy. Overall, results 
revealed that market timers, who make use of derivatives on the JSE, reduce the 
downside risk and decrease the required forecasting accuracy. Waksman et al. 
(1997) concluded that, market timers who possess high degree of forecasting 
accuracy may obtain extraordinary results when applying bull and bear market timing 
strategies on the JSE.  
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De Chassart and Firer (2004) study investigated the potential returns and risks 
associated with three market timing strategies on the JSE for the period from 1925 to 
1982. The three market timing strategies evaluated in the study included traditional 
market timing, bull market timing and bear market timing. Traditional market timing 
involves purchasing securities when a bull market is forecasted and switching into 
money market instruments when a bear market is forecasted. A bull market timing 
strategy involves holding money market instruments and purchasing call options on 
the market index when a bull market is forecasted. Lastly, a bear market timing 
strategy involves holding the market index and purchasing put options when a bear 
market is forecasted. Results illustrated that a traditional market timing strategy 
yielded the lowest return out of the three strategies. The bear market timing strategy 
yielded the greatest return, however, the level of risk was almost double that of a 
traditional market timing strategy.  
 
On a risk-adjusted basis, all three of the timing strategies require a minimum 
forecasting accuracy of 55 percent in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy, 
which is significantly lower than the previous empirical studies. Results also indicate 
that during bull markets, a market timer requires greater forecasting accuracy. 
Comparatively, during bear markets the required forecasting accuracy is below 50 
percent. In other words, a market timer does not require any forecasting accuracy in 
order to outperform a buy and hold strategy. De Chassart and Firer (2004) 
concluded that the volatility of the returns and in essence the risk of a portfolio can 
be reduced by applying any of the three market timing strategies, when compared to 
that of a buy and hold strategy.  
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Muller and Mutooni (2007) investigated various equity style timing strategies on the 
JSE from December 1986 to May 2006. An equity style is defined as an investment 
philosophy followed by certain investors who believe that their style of investing will 
add value, (Christopherson and Williams, 1997). According to Barberis and Shleifer 
(2003), style investing is the study of asset prices, in which some investor’s 
categorise a broad set of assets in the financial market and move these assets 
among various styles depending on their risk or performance. The various equity 
style investment strategies investigated by Muller and Mutooni (2007) are value, 
growth, market orientated and size investing. According to Muller and Mutooni 
(2007), market orientated investors do not have a strong preference for a specific 
equity style investment strategy, however, they prefer to hold a well-diversified 
portfolio. According to Banz (1981), the size effect refers to smaller firms achieving 
higher average returns than larger firms.  
 
The results of Muller and Mutooni (2007) indicated that a market timer, who 
possesses perfect forecasting accuracy when applying an equity style investment 
strategy, would yield an average return of 43 percent per annum. In addition, a 
market timer who was only able to determine five major turning points would have 
yielded a return of 26.30 percent per annum. A market timer who always timed the 
market incorrectly would have yielded a negative return of 5.20 percent per annum. 
In contrast, a buy and hold strategy in either the Industrial index or the All Share 
index (ALSI) would have yielded a return of 13.50 percent and 12.80 percent per 
annum respectively.  
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Muller and Mutooni (2007) indicated that over the period from 1986 to 2006, growth 
stocks underperformed value stocks on the JSE. Moreover, the economic model 
used to forecast style turning points revealed that timing the style spreads is possibly 
a more profitable strategy than a buy and hold strategy.   
 
Ward and Terblanche (2009) evaluated the potential return and risk associated with 
applying a market timing strategy which uses portfolios of ‘Rand-play’ and ‘Rand-
hedge’ shares.  It is assumed that a market timer switches between the ‘Rand-play’ 
and ‘Rand-hedge’ shares, based on the fluctuations in the exchange rates on the 
JSE.  According to Ward and Terblanche (2009), three exchange-rate sensitive 
portfolio sets were identified. The three portfolios were the Investec-z ‘Rand-hedge’ 
and ‘Rand-play’, BKH ‘Rand-hedge’ and BKH ‘Rand-play’ and lastly the Nominal 
Effective Rand Exchange Rate (NEER) ‘Rand-hedge’ and NEER ‘Rand-play’.  
 
A market timer would increase the weight of ‘Rand-hedge’ shares when the rand was 
expected to weaken and the weights of ‘Rand-play’ were increased when the rand 
was expected to strengthen. The market timing strategies between the portfolios 
were evaluated on a monthly basis over the period from 1998 to 2008. Results 
indicated that a market timer who possesses perfect forecasting accuracy and 
invested R1, he/she would have yielded a R250 return for both the Investec-z and 
BKH portfolios. However, if a market timer always incorrectly timed the market, 
he/she would have yielded R0.08 and R0.25 respectively.  
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A market timer who invested R1 when switching between the NEER portfolios, 
he/she would have yielded a maximum of R63 and minimum of R0.25. 
Comparatively, an investor applying a buy and hold strategy and invested R1 in the 
ALSI would have yielded R4.09 over the same period. Results also revealed that a 
market timer requires a minimum forecasting accuracy of 75 percent to outperform a 
buy and hold strategy, similar to that of Sharpe (1975). However, the forecasting 
accuracy required by a market timer may drop to as low as 40 percent to equal the 
return of a buy and hold strategy. The overall results suggest that a market timing 
strategy may outperform a buy and hold strategy by approximately 35 percent per 
annum. Similar to that of previous empirical studies, Ward and Terblanche (2009) 
concluded that the success of a market timing strategy is strongly dependent on a 
market timer’s forecasting accuracy.  
 
Hsieh, Hodnett and Van Rensburg (2012) developed market timing strategies that 
protected a market timer from bear markets by decreasing equity exposure or by 
using a derivative overlay to create a synthetic cash position. Hsieh, Hodnett and 
Van Rensburg (2012) focused on creating these protection-based market timing 
strategies which are resistant during market crashes such as the oil crisis which 
occurred in 1973, the Dot-com bubble of 2001 and the global financial crisis of 2008.  
There were two market timing strategies developed in order to protect a market timer 
from bear markets. The first strategy is the filter rule strategy which triggers and 
releases protection that is based on drawdowns (DD) and draw ups (DU) of the fund 
value which is projected from the fund’s latest peak and trough.  
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The second strategy developed was the exponential moving average (EMA) strategy 
which triggers and releases protection that is based on the crossover of the fast 
moving average (FMA) and the slow moving average (SMA) of the fund value. Both 
these strategies were tested on the Morgan Stanley Capital International World index 
(MSCI World) over the period from 1 January 1970 to 31 December 2008. When 
comparing the historical risk-return characteristics of the two strategies, results 
indicated that the signals generated by the optimal filter rule strategy were less 
accurate than the signals that were generated by the optimal EMA strategy. 
Additionally, the optimal EMA strategy had a Sharpe ratio of 42.84 percent compared 
to the optimal filter rule strategy which had a Sharpe ratio of 38.26 percent. Hodnett, 
Hsieh and Van Rensburg (2012) concluded that the outperformance of the optimal 
EMA strategy is attributed to the risk reduction resulted from timely predictions 
regarding peaks and troughs, therefore, resulting in the optimal EMA strategy being 
more resilient during market crashes.  
 
Hsieh (2013a) investigated the effectiveness of sector timing by assessing probable 
outcomes when switching between the financial and electronic indices on the 
Taiwanese Stock Exchange over the period from 16 December 1999 to 19 
December 2012. The hypothetical sector timing strategy evaluated monthly switching 
between financial and electronic indices based on the prediction of sector-
dominance in the upcoming month. Transaction costs of 1 percent were assumed 
every time a market timer switched between the indices. Additionally, various 
permutations of forecasting accuracies between the two indices were evaluated 
using Monte Carlo simulation.  
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Results overall revealed that it is more important to forecast the financial dominant 
market than it is to forecast the electronic dominant market. The win/loss ratios 
indicated that a market timer requires a significant forecasting accuracy in order to 
benefit from the sector timing strategy. Moreover, when transaction costs are taken 
into account, a market timer requires a high degree of forecasting accuracy in order 
to outperform a buy and hold strategy. Hsieh (2013a) concluded that there are 
potential gains available to market timers who possess significant forecasting 
accuracy.  
 
Hsieh (2013b) investigated the effectiveness of market timing between prior winners 
and prior losers in the global equity markets using data from the Dow Jones Sector 
Titans Composite constituents over the period from 1 January 1999 through to 31 
December 2009. Hsieh (2013b) employed various permutations of persistence and 
mean reversion prediction accuracies based on Monte Carlo simulations. 
Persistence is referred to as where securities are overbought and oversold due to 
investors’ overreaction causing it to go in an upward or downward trend. Mean 
reversion is where the market price of a security reverts back to the intrinsic value. 
Results revealed that a market timer who possesses perfect forecasting accuracy 
and does not incur transaction costs, yields potential gains of 5.99 percent per 
annum. However, when taking into account transaction costs of 1 percent, the 
potential gains decreases to 5.32 percent per annum.  
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Results also revealed that the maximum drawdown for a perfect market timing 
strategy, taking into account transaction costs of 1 percent, is -28.34 percent 
compared to a buy and hold strategy of -42.31 percent. Results overall revealed that 
there are potential gains available to market timers with moderate forecasting 
accuracy. Hsieh (2013b) concluded that it is more important to predict the timing of 
mean reversion correctly than persistence in the global equity market.  
 
Hallerbach (2014) applied Grinold’s (1989) Fundamental Law of Active Management 
(FLAM) in order to evaluate the minimum success ratio required to outperform a buy 
and hold strategy, over the period from January 1926 to December 2010. In order to 
evaluate the minimum success ratio to outperform a buy and hold strategy in a fixed-
income portfolio, Hallerbach (2014) simulated three market timing strategies, using 
Monte Carlo simulations.  The first simulated strategy evaluated monthly switching 
between the S&P 500 and Treasury bills. The second simulated strategy evaluated 
monthly switching between U.S. long-term government bonds (GB) and Treasury 
bills, and the last simulated strategy evaluated monthly switching between GB and 
U.S. long-term corporate bonds (CB). According to Hallerbach (2014), FLAM is a key 
analysis tool for active strategies and not an operational tool; therefore it is designed 
to provide insight into active management.  
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Hallerbach (2014) defines a success ratio as the probability of a market timer 
correctly forecasting an increase in an asset for the upcoming period, as well as the 
magnitude of the returns of the asset for the upcoming period. The overall results 
revealed that a monthly market timer switching between the S&P 500 and Treasury 
bills requires a success ratio of approximately 60 percent to equal a buy and hold 
strategy on a risk-adjusted basis. Comparatively, a market timer switching between 
GB and Treasury bills and a market timer switching between CB and GB requires a 
success ratio of 55 percent and 51.60 percent respectively. 
 
As opposed to previous empirical studies, Khokhlov (2016) evaluated the practicality 
of three different strategies for portfolio rebalancing suggested by Perold and Sharpe 
(1988) over the period from 2007 to 2015. The three strategies evaluated were a buy 
and hold strategy, constant weights (CW) and constant-proportion portfolio insurance 
(CPPI), over three different time periods. The three strategies all started off with a 
split of 60 percent invested in securities and 40 percent in a risk-free asset. SPY 
exchange traded fund was used as a proxy for the risky asset (securities) and the 
TLT exchange traded fund as a proxy for the risk-free asset. Khokhlov (2016) used 
Monte Carlo simulations on actual prices and transaction costs. Moreover, Monte 
Carlo simulations were used to evaluate the behaviour of strategies over various 
time periods (60 months, 36 months and 18 months), the returns of the strategies 
and the effect of transaction costs on the strategies.  
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Results overall revealed that over the short-term (18 months) that any strategy may 
be chosen as there were no statistical significance in the mean returns. However, 
over the long-term (36 months and 60 months), CPPI outperformed CW and CW 
outperformed a buy and hold strategy. Khokhlov (2016) also stated that in the study 
that transaction costs were not a factor when choosing a strategy, however, the 
transaction costs considered were 0.10 percent and 0.50 percent. An increase in 
transaction costs would have decreased the returns of the CPPI and CW strategies. 
In conclusion, a buy and hold strategy makes yields the lowest return out of the 
strategies over the long-term, and there is a 95 percent probability that CPPI will 
outperform both CW and a buy and hold strategy. Moreover, it is more important for 
a market timer to forecast bull markets correctly than it is to forecast bear markets 
correctly when applying the CPPI strategy. 
 
Opposed to previous empirical studies, Dichtl, Drobetz and Kryzanowski (2016) did 
not only evaluate the potential gains from market timing based on risk and return 
measures, but also evaluated the effectiveness of a market timing strategy using 
expected and non-expected utility models. The two models used were the Quiggin’s 
(1982) anticipated utility concept and Tversky’s and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative 
prospect theory respectively. Using bootstrap-based simulations, Dichtl et al. (2016) 
seek to determine whether market timing is potentially desirable to some investors or 
whether it is not an advisable strategy over a buy and hold strategy in a constant mix 
portfolio. The constant mix portfolio consisted of 71 percent of capital invested in 
securities and 29 percent in cash equivalents.  
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3.3 Conclusion 
The empirical evidence from the studies in this chapter reveals that a market timer 
requires a high level of forecasting accuracy in order to outperform a buy and hold 
strategy. Most studies indicate that a market timer requires 70 percent or more 
forecasting accuracy in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy, which according 
to Sharpe (1975) is unattainable to most investors. In addition, the empirical 
evidence from the studies reveal that there are potential gains available to market 
timers who apply a market timing strategy and that it is indeed attractive. However, 
the success of a market timing strategy is highly dependent upon their forecasting 
ability. According to Jeffrey (1984, 102), ‘no one can predict the markets ups and 
downs over a long period, and the risk of trying outweigh the rewards’. Additionally, if 
a market timer misses the bull periods, they could substantially decrease their 
potential gains.  The empirical studies also reveal that it is more important to forecast 
bull markets correctly than it is to forecast bear markets correctly. Moreover, if a 
market timer cannot forecast bull markets with considerable accuracy, he/she should 
rather avoid market timing. Results also reveal that the more frequent a market timer 
revises their portfolio, then the more the forecasting accuracy decreases and the 
potential gains available to a market timer increases. However, when taking into 
account transaction costs, the forecasting accuracy required increases and the 
potential gains decrease. In conclusion, considering all empirical studies in this 
chapter, there are potential gains available for market timers who have considerable 
forecasting accuracy. Moreover, the success of market timing is largely dependent 
on low transaction costs and the more frequently a market timer revises their 
portfolios.  
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4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Van Rensburg and Slaney’s (1997) as well as Van Rensburg’s (2002) empirical 
studies on market segmentation on the JSE illustrated that there are various macro-
economic forces that drive the performance of the different sectors on the JSE. 
According to Van Rensburg and Slaney (2002), the mining sector is influenced by 
various macro-economic variables that may not necessarily affect the industrial and 
financial sectors. For example, the performance of gold mining shares depends on 
gold prices that are primarily influenced by political and economic events that are 
detached from the South African economy. The authors suggested that the 
FTSE/JSE All Share Index (ALSI), which was commonly employed as the market 
proxy in the application of asset pricing and asset allocation, cannot adequately 
explain the returns of securities from different sectors on the JSE.  
 
Van Rensburg and Slaney (1997) stated that, in contrast to many global security 
markets, gold and diamond-mining companies dominate the JSE in terms of their 
market capitalisations. However, according to the data provided by the National 
Treasury (2017), post 1990, South Africa’s industrial and financial sectors have 
developed vastly and displayed potential to compete in the global economy. The 
financial, real estate and business service sector accounted for 21.60 percent of 
South Africa’s GDP in 2016. Additionally, in 2016, the industrial sector contributed 15 
percent to South Africa's GDP, making it the third largest contributor to South Africa’s 
economy.  
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Due to the cyclical performance of the sectors on the JSE, there are potential gains 
that a market timer could possibly obtain through sector timing. Potential gains from 
sector timing are defined as the returns of a sector timing strategy in excess of a buy 
and hold strategy in the ALSI. Motivated by the implication of the market 
segmentation phenomenon on the cyclical nature of the prominent sectors on the 
JSE, this research undertakes to determine whether there are potential gains 
available to a market timer applying a sector timing strategy on the JSE. To the 
author’s knowledge in the presence of writing, there are no empirical studies on the 
potential gains from sector timing on the JSE. Prior significant studies by Firer, Ward 
and Teeuwisse (1987), Firer, Sandler and Ward (1992) and De Chassart and Firer 
(2004) evaluated the potential gains from market timing on the JSE while switching 
between equity and cash in bull and bear markets, respectively. Additionally, 
Waksman, Sandler, Ward and Firer (1997) investigated the potential gains from 
market timing on the JSE using derivative instruments for the period from 1963 to 
1992. However, the above-mentioned studies did not explore sector timing on the 
JSE. Therefore, the studies on market timing could be expanded to explore potential 
gains from sector timing on the JSE. 
 
According to Fama (1970, 1991), in a perfectly efficient capital market, any attempt 
to outperform the market consistently by picking and choosing securities would be 
futile. Additionally, Fama (1970, 1991) stated that when a market is efficient of a 
weak-form, investors cannot use past asset prices and volume data to predict future 
probable prices. Thus, potential gains from market timing strategies provide 
evidence against the weak-form EMH.  
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The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether the market segmentation 
phenomenon on the JSE provides potential opportunities for profitable sector timing 
strategies. The study adopts the methodologies of Chua, Woodward and To (1987), 
Kester (1990) and Hsieh (2013) to evaluate potential gains available to market timers 
on the JSE. Sharpe (1975) pioneered the study of potential gains from market timing 
based on probability analysis of possible outcomes for imperfect market timing 
strategies between bull and bear markets. Chua et al. (1987) improved Sharpe’s 
(1975) methodology by using various permutations of bull and bear market timing 
forecasting accuracies for a hypothetical market timer, and evaluated the potential 
gains using Monte Carlo simulations. Kester (1990) investigated the potential gains 
from switching between large caps, small caps and Treasury bills subject to various 
levels of transaction costs and revision frequencies in order to determine the 
sensitivities of potential gains to changes in these two variables. Hsieh (2013) 
revised the methodology of Chua et al. (1987) in order to evaluate the potential gains 
from sector timing in Taiwan. This chapter also describes the rationale behind the 
database and sample selection, as well as the challenges and biases that may 
potentially affect the research. 
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4.2 Problem Statement and Research Objectives 
Kester (1990) states that in a perfectly efficient market, attempts to earn abnormal 
returns from security selection will not result in superior investment performance in a 
consistent manner. In addition, attempting to predict market movements incurs non-
recoverable transaction costs, which exposes market timers to larger losses when 
errors are made. 
 
This study attempts to determine whether there are potential gains available to a 
market timer who applies a sector timing strategy on the JSE for the period from 1 
January 2002 to 31 December 2016. In addition, if there are potential gains, then 
what is the minimum level of forecasting accuracy a market timer should possess in 
order to benefit from sector timing on the JSE? Kester (1990) defines forecasting 
accuracy as the assumed proportion of correct predictions of good and bad periods 
for a given market timing strategy. Previous empirical studies such as Sharpe 
(1975), Jeffrey (1984), Chua et al. (1987), Firer et al. (1992) and De Chassart and 
Firer (2004) stated that the forecasting accuracy required by a market timer in order 
to outperform a buy and hold strategy is unattainable to most investors.  
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It is important to note that empirical studies such as Sharpe (1975), Jeffrey (1984), 
Chua et al. (1987), Kester (1990), Firer et al. (1992) and De Chassart and Firer 
(2004) generally focused on the minimum level of forecasting accuracy required by 
market timers in order to benefit from market timing strategies when switching 
between equities and Treasury bills in bull and bear markets respectively. With the 
different dimensions of sector risks offered by the JSE based on the market 
segmentation phenomenon, the performance that can be achieved by applying 
sector timing strategies could be potentially better than the results obtained in prior 
empirical studies.  
 
The ultimate objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of a sector 
timing strategy on the JSE by evaluating the likely outcomes from switching between 
sector indices for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2016. The goals 
of this study are to be achieved by accomplishing the following objectives: 
1. Evaluate the potential gains available to a market timer who possesses 
perfect forecasting accuracy when switching between the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
(ALSI) and the STEFI call deposit Index (STEFI) in bull and bear markets 
respectively. It is assumed that if a bull market is anticipated, a market timer is 
invested in the ALSI. On the other hand, if a bear market is anticipated, a 
market timer is invested in the STEFI.  
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 4-6 
 
 
2. Evaluate the potential gains available to a market timer who possesses less 
than perfect market timing ability when switching between bull and bear 
markets. Following the Monte Carlo simulation methodology originally 
designed by Chua et al. (1987), various levels of forecasting accuracies are 
assigned to a hypothetical market timer. Thus, the minimum level of 
forecasting accuracy required for an effective market timing strategy when 
switching between the ALSI and STEFI on the JSE can be established. In 
addition, the study aims at determining whether it is more effective to be able 
to forecast bull markets correctly than bear markets when applying a market 
timing strategy that switches between ALSI and STEFI. 
 
 
3. Evaluate sector performance of the JSE tradable sector indices over the 
examination period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2016. These indices 
include; the Resources 20 index (RESI), FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 index (INDI), 
FTSE/JSE Financial 15 index (FINI) and the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (ALSI). 
 
4. Evaluate the potential gains from sector timing on the JSE based on various 
levels of forecasting accuracies, by using a series of Monte Carlo simulations 
as proposed by Hsieh (2013a). The sector timing strategies are constructed 
using the JSE tradable sector indices. This process aims at identifying the 
minimum level of forecasting accuracy required by a market timer to derive 
potential gains from sector timing strategies based on the cyclical nature of 
the JSE sector indices. 
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5. Examine the sensitivity of potential gains of market timing strategies on the 
JSE to changes in transaction costs. The study assumes that a market timer 
will incur transaction costs of 1 percent and 2 percent respectively, each time 
there is a switch from one sector index to another, and vice-versa. 
 
6. Examine the sensitivity of potential gains from market timing and sector timing 
strategies on the JSE to annual, quarterly and monthly portfolio revisions. The 
impact of transaction costs and the market timer’s forecasting accuracy are 
also assessed in conjunction with different portfolio revision frequencies.    
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4.3 Research Database and Sample Selection 
Tradable indices are designed to achieve similar levels of performance to existing 
benchmark indices using a smaller number of securities in order to reduce the cost 
of replicating the index. In 2001, an agreement was made between the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and the JSE which enabled cross-dealing between the two 
exchanges. This partnership led to the implementation of the FTSE/JSE Africa Index 
series in 2002, which initiated a change in the philosophy and methodology of 
calculating indices and sector classifications on the JSE. Due to the unique nature of 
the methodology used by the FTSE, this meant that the indices on the JSE were 
tradable, liquid, free float market caps and of a relevant market size (www.jse.co.za). 
The FTSE/JSE Resources 10 index (RESI), FTSE/JSE Financial 15 index (FINI), 
FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 (INDI) and FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (ALSI) are examples of 
tradable indices on the JSE. According to the JSE website (www.jse.co.za), in 
addition to the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (ALSI), there are five other tradable indices 
which are based on the classification of companies under the Industry Classification 
Board (ICB), however, the study will only employ the following indices below. 
 
The monthly closing values of INDI, FINI and RESI, were extracted from INet BFA 
database for the examination period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2016. 
Additionally, two other indices are utilised. Firstly, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (ALSI) 
which comprises of the 40 largest companies trading on the JSE based on their 
market values. The ALSI is utilised as the benchmark for the market proxy. 
Secondly, the STEFI is utilised as the benchmark for the risk-free asset.   
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The short descriptions of the tradable indices employed by this research are 
provided as follows: 
1. FTSE/JSE Resources 10 index (J210): This index consists of the top 10 
largest resource companies on the JSE following the market value-weighting 
methodology.  
2. Industrial 25, FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 index (J211): This index consists of the 
25 largest industrial companies on the JSE following the market value-
weighting methodology.  
3. Financial 15, FTSE/JSE Financial 15 index (J212): This index consists of the 
15 largest financial companies on the JSE following the market value-
weighting methodology. 
4. FTSE/JSE Top 40 index (Market Return) (J200): This index consists of 40 of 
the largest companies on the JSE following the market value-weighting 
methodology. This index is used as a measure of the overall activity of the 
South African market. 
5. The STEFI Call Deposit Index (STFCAD): This is a proprietary index that 
measures the performance of short term fixed interest or money market 
instruments in South Africa. This index is used as the benchmark for the 
banker portfolio. For the purpose of this study, STEFI will be utilised as the 
Risk-Free Rate (Rfr) proxy.  
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4.4 Methodology 
This study consists of three primary tests in order to evaluate the potential gains 
from sector timing on the JSE. The first test’s objective is to evaluate the potential 
gains available to a hypothetical market timer with various forecasting accuracies, 
switching between equity and cash equivalents, depending on whether a bull or bear 
market is forecasted respectively. The second test’s objective is to evaluate the 
potential gains available to a hypothetical market timer with various forecasting 
accuracies, switching between various tradable sector indices on the JSE based on 
market conditions being forecasted. The third test evaluates the sensitivity of 
potential gains to the changes in two key variables, namely, transaction costs and 
frequency of portfolio revisions.    
 
The first test in the study seeks to evaluate the potential gains available to a 
hypothetical market timer who switches between the ALSI and the STEFI on the JSE 
when bull and bear market conditions are forecasted respectively; as well as to 
determine the minimum forecasting accuracy required to outperform a buy and hold 
strategy in the ALSI. In this research, a bull market is defined as the market state 
where the total return of the ALSI is greater than that of the STEFI. On the other 
hand, a bear market period is defined as the market state where the total return of 
the STEFI exceeds that of the ALSI.  
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A market timer is assumed to assess the outlook of the market at the beginning of 
each period, and then place assets under management (AUM) into the ALSI in the 
event where the ALSI is expected to outperform the STEFI. On the other hand, a 
market timer is assumed to switch into the STEFI in the event where the STEFI is 
expected to outperform the ALSI. Therefore, a market timer aims to hold the ALSI in 
a bull market and holds the STEFI in a bear market. In order to evaluate the potential 
gains from market timing when switching between the ALSI and the STEFI in bull 
and bear markets respectively, the first test evaluates the performance of four 
simulated investment strategies. In order to evaluate the potential gains from market 
timing, the Monte Carlo simulation methodology is used to evaluate the potential 
gains of a set of potential market timing scenarios.  
 
The aim of the second test seeks to evaluate potential gains available to a market 
timer, as well as determine the minimum forecasting accuracy required by a market 
timer applying a sector timing strategy in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy 
in the ALSI. Similar to the first test, the Monte Carlo simulation methodology is 
adopted to evaluate the potential gains from a set of potential sector timing 
strategies illustrated in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Sector timing strategies 
Sector Timing Strategies Index A Index B 
Sector Timing Strategy 1 FINI INDI 
Sector Timing Strategy 2 RESI INDI 
Sector Timing Strategy 3 RESI  FINI 
 
In order to evaluate the potential gains from sector timing on the JSE, assumptions 
are made regarding the method of forecasting and switching. For example, a 
hypothetical market timer is assumed to switch between Index A and Index B 
depending on whether Index A or Index B is forecasted to be the superior index for 
the coming period. A market timer is assumed to have different forecasting abilities 
when forecasting the superior indices. A market timer is assumed to move all AUM 
into Index A (in the event where index A is forecasted to be the superior index); or 
switch out of Index A and into Index B (in the event index B is forecasted to be the 
superior index).  
 
Lastly, the objective of the third test is to determine the sensitivity of potential gains 
and the required forecasting accuracy to outperform a buy and hold strategy in the 
ALSI to changes in transaction costs and frequency of portfolio revisions 
respectively. A hypothetical market timer’s strategy calls for monthly, quarterly and 
annual portfolio revisions of switches between the indices based on the predicted 
sector dominance for the upcoming period. In addition, the transaction costs of 1 
percent and 2 percent are assumed for the value of the AUM when there is a switch 
from one index to another, and vice-versa.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 4-13 
 
 
These more realistic and less restrictive assumptions evaluated in the study 
regarding the frequency of portfolio revisions and transaction costs, were first 
implemented by Droms (1989) and Kester (1990) in their studies. It is assumed that 
1 percent transaction costs represent the transaction costs that would be incurred by 
large institutional investors; and 2 percent transaction costs represent the transaction 
costs that apply to individual investors and smaller funds. Under the sensitivity 
analysis, the frequencies of portfolio revisions are fixed, with the transaction costs 
increasing from 0 percent to 1 percent; to 2 percent. By increasing transaction costs 
and keeping portfolio revisions fixed, the study determines the negative impact of an 
increase in transaction costs on potential gains. In addition, when increasing 
transaction costs and keeping portfolio revisions fixed the study also evaluates the 
required forecasting accuracy to outperform a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI. 
When a market timer revises his/her portfolio more frequently, higher transaction 
costs would be expected. Comparatively, the transaction costs incurred are fixed, 
with the portfolio revision frequencies increasing from annually to quarterly; to 
monthly. By increasing portfolio revisions and keeping transaction costs fixed, the 
study determines whether increasing portfolio revisions leads to an increase in 
potential gains taking into account the necessary increases in transaction costs. 
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4.5 Monte Carlo Simulations 
Monte Carlo simulation is named after the Monte Carlo Casino and is a 
computerised mathematical technique that generates hypothetical scenarios or 
observations from a predetermined probability distribution (Raychaudhuri, 2008). In 
order to determine the effectiveness of the sector timing strategy that switches 
between the various sectors based on a market timer’s predictions, there are several 
assumptions made regarding the method of forecasting and switching. Firstly, the 
level of forecasting accuracy is defined as the percentage of correct forecasts out of 
the total number of forecasts made by the market timer. Secondly, the market timer 
is assumed to have different abilities in predicting the various sectors in the 
upcoming period. Lastly, the market timer’s call of the various sectors depends on a 
variety of factors. These factors may include, inter alia the market timer’s views on 
the current and future state of the economy, the turning points observed from charts 
and indicators, the market timer’s experiences, heuristics and signal indicators 
generated by quantitative models (Hsieh, 2013a). 
 
Chua et al. (1987) stated that simulations of investment strategies invariably involve 
a non-optimal behaviour strategy as opposed to an optimal behaviour strategy. 
Therefore, this study is no different and does not take into account detailed multi-
period analysis required for an optimal market timing strategy. This study, as most 
simulation studies, takes into account single period forecasts.  
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A market timer engaged in market timing must forecast whether Index A will 
outperform Index B for the upcoming period. If a market timer forecasts Index A to 
outperform Index B, he/she stays invested in the index. On the contrary, if the market 
timer predicts that Index B is to outperform Index A, he/she switches out of Index A 
and switches into Index B. It is assumed that a market timer with perfect forecasting 
ability avoids every decrease in an index and switches into an index when it 
increases. However, in reality it is unlikely that a market timer would be 100 percent 
accurate in his/her forecasting performance. Thus, the performance of an actively 
managed portfolio is simulated to allow for various degrees of forecasting 
accuracies.   
 
In order to assess the efficacy of the market timing strategies, there are a series of 
index returns aside from varying degrees of assumed forecasting accuracies. The 
empirical tests in this study will not include results with less than 50 percent 
forecasting accuracies because it is considered that a market timer who achieves 
predictions correctly 50 percent of the time does not possess any forecasting ability, 
similar to tossing a coin. The Monte Carlo simulation technique is designed to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the market timing strategy for all permutations of 
prediction accuracies between the various sectors varying from 50 percent to 100 
percent, with a 10 percent incremental increase similar to the sector timing 
simulation conducted by Hsieh (2013a).  
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Using Monte Carlo simulation, the study will also determine the importance of 
predicting Index A versus Index B. The forecasting accuracy of Index A will be fixed 
at 50 percent (i.e. no forecasting ability), with the forecasting accuracy of Index B 
increasing at 10 percent increments, starting at 50 percent, and vice-versa. The 
gradual improvements in potential gains when the forecasting accuracy of Index A is 
fixed at 50 percent are compared to the gradual improvements in potential gains 
when Index B is fixed at 50 percent. Therefore, if potential gains are more sensitive 
to the increase in Index B forecasting accuracy compared to the increases in Index A 
forecasting accuracy, the results will illustrate that it is more important to forecast 
Index B than it is to forecast Index A.   
 
A series of Monte Carlo simulations using various combinations of index forecasting 
accuracies are used in order to evaluate the potential gains from perfect and less 
than perfect market timing. The use of simulated data as opposed to actual historical 
data to evaluate potential gains from market timing was first proposed by Chua et al. 
(1987). According to Chua et al. (1987), the number of observations from actual 
historical data is very limited compared to simulated data; and thus the interpretation 
of the results is restricted based on one set of historical events. On the other hand, 
simulated data allows for analysis on the potential events that may have, or yet to 
occur. Below is a detailed description of the probability distribution and the 
procedures used to generate the returns for a hypothetical market timer with various 
sector timing abilities. 
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In order to generate returns for Index A and Index B, there are two sets of 10 000 
random numbers to be generated from the standard normal distribution with a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The first set of random numbers, Z1 will be 
employed to estimate Index A’s returns and the second set of random numbers, Z2 
will be employed to estimate Index B’s returns as shown in Equation 4.1 and 
Equation 4.2 respectively.  
Index A = exp (Z1σ1 +  µ1) – 1       (4.1) 
Where σ1 is the standard deviation and µ1 is the mean 
Index B = exp (Z2 σ2.1 + µ2.1) - 1       (4.2) 
Where σ2.1 is the standard deviation and µ2.1 is the mean 
Rt = exp (Rm)          (4.3) 
Where Rm is the average market return (ALSI) 
In order to generate a market timer’s returns for the various forecasting accuracies, 
there are 10 000 random numbers selected from the (0, 1) uniform distributions. 
Forecasting accuracy is defined as the probability that a market timer forecasts 
either Index A or Index B to be the superior index for the period, given that the 
market state is either Index A or Index B (i.e. PIndexA and PIndexB). In other words, 
forecasting accuracy is a percentage of the number of correct forecasts out of the 
total number of forecasts made by the market timer. The forecasting accuracies of a 
market timer are restricted to the following ranges: 
0.5 < Index A < 1, indicating graduate improvements when Index A is outperforming 
markets and; 
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0.5 < Index B < 1, indicating graduate improvements when Index B is outperforming 
markets. 
As illustrated above, the forecasting accuracy of a market timer starts at 50 percent, 
whereby a market timer does not possess any forecasting ability and has a 50/50 
chance of making a correct prediction. However, this does not mean a market timer 
has a 50/50 chance of making a correct prediction as when flipping a coin. The latter 
case involves unconditional probability, which depends on the frequency of Index A 
markets versus Index B markets. The 50/50 chance of a market timer making the 
correct prediction is conditional on the pre-observed Index A and Index B market.   
 
Based on the comparison between the sector indices returns, each of the 10 000 
iterations is classified as either an Index A market or Index B market. A set of 10 000 
normally distributed random numbers (N1 to N10 000) between 0 percent and 100 
percent are generated to determine whether a market timer forecasts the superior 
index in each of the 10 000 iterations correctly. If there is a period where Index A 
outperforms Index B and the assigned level of prediction accuracy for Index A is 
greater than the assigned random number (N1) for the period, a hypothetical market 
timer is assumed to have a successful prediction and will invest in the superior index 
for that period. Otherwise, the market timer will invest in the inferior index that yields 
the lower return for the period. On the other hand, when Index B outperforms Index 
A in a particular period, then Index B’s timing accuracy is compared to the assigned 
number (N1) for the period. The hypothetical timer will invest in the superior index if 
the prediction accuracy for Index B is greater than the assigned random number 
(N1), and vice-versa.   
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Since N represents a normally distributed random number with a mean of 50 
percent, a market timer has a higher probability of earning a greater return in the 
iteration if he/she possesses a forecasting accuracy of greater than 50 percent in the 
superior sector.  
 
The simulation design is supported by the fact that a market timer who gets their 
prediction correct 50 percent of the time does not possess any forecasting accuracy. 
The market timer’s returns, with various forecasting abilities, are compared to the 
return from a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI. There are 10 000 iterations 
simulated for each variation of index forecasting accuracies. In each of the 10 000 
iterations simulated the forecasting accuracies, the average returns for the periods, 
standard deviation for the periods, potential gains, number of switches and the 
win/loss ratio are estimated with their average values computed to provide an 
indication of the effectiveness of the strategies under each permutation. 
The overall expected return for any given degree of predicted accuracy is simply the 
arithmetic values of the returns in the 10 000 iterations shown in equation 4.4: 
 
𝜇 (𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛) =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝜇𝑖𝑖       (4.4) 
        
Where pi = the probability of outcome i, and µi = the return for i.  
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Standard deviation is the standard deviations of the returns in the 10 000 iterations 
shown in Equation 5:      
𝜎2 =  ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖(𝜇𝑖 −  𝜇)
2
𝑖         (4.5) 
Where σ = the overall standard deviation of the return, pi = probability of the scenario 
and σi = standard deviation of return for outcome i.  
 
Potential gains are measured as the return yielded by the market timing strategy in 
excess of the ALSI returns, and the effectiveness of the market timing strategy can 
be determined by evaluating the minimum forecasting accuracy required to yield the 
potential gains. The win/loss ratio measures the number of periods that the 
simulated returns are greater than the ALSI returns relative to the number of periods 
where the simulated strategy’s returns are less than the ALSI returns. In other words, 
the win/loss ratio indicates the probability that a market timing strategy will yield 
greater returns than that of a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI.  
 
A win/loss ratio provides greater insight than a standard median estimate, as it does 
not take into account the numerous situations in which the buy and hold investor and 
the market timer are holding the ALSI. A win/loss ratio of one or more indicates that 
a market timer has a 50 percent probability or more of outperforming a buy and hold 
strategy in the ALSI. On the other hand, a win/loss ratio of less than one illustrates 
that there is less than 50 percent chance that a market timer will outperform a buy 
and hold strategy in the ALSI. Therefore, a market timing strategy is only effective 
when the win/loss ratio is greater than one. 
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4.6 Potential Biases  
The biases that may possibly influence the research outcomes include survivorship 
bias, look-ahead bias, data snooping bias and time-period bias. When the data 
availability leads to certain assets being excluded from analysis, it is called sample 
selection bias. An example of sample selection bias is called survivorship bias. 
Survivorship bias occurs when researchers use a database that has existing 
historical information and exclude data that no longer exists (Gilbert and Strugnell, 
2010). Survivorship bias is not introduced in this research since the data employed 
only includes certain indices over the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 
2016, and the index performance is calculated based on the actual membership of 
the index at each point in time.  
 
According to Baquero, Horst and Verbeek (2005), look-ahead bias refers to use of 
data in a study that was not previously available or known during the examination 
period being tested, usually resulting in an upward shift of the results. Look-ahead 
bias may lead to inaccurate results for the study. An example of look-ahead bias is 
tests of trading rules that employ security market returns and balance sheet data and 
must account for look-ahead bias. With such tests, the book value per share of a 
company is commonly used to determine the price to book (P/B) ratio. Even though 
the market price of a security is available for all market participants at the same point 
in time; the fiscal year-end book equity per share might not be available to the public 
until a later stage. This study will not be affected by look-ahead bias as the index 
data is provided timeously in the public domain. This is normally done with only a 15 
minute delay.  
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According to Barret and Brodeski (2006), research is subject to time-period bias if it 
is based on a period that may influence the results as time-period specific. A short 
time series, such as this study is likely to give period specific results that may differ 
to results when using a longer time-period. A longer time series may give a more 
accurate depiction of true investment performance. However, its disadvantage lies in 
the potential for a structural change occurring during the period that would result in 
two different return distributions. The time-period for this study is specifically used 
after the reclassification of the JSE, which occurred in March 2000.  
 
This study employs historical data for the period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 
2016, which means time-period bias could possibly influence research outcomes. 
However, the inclusion of the index performance prior to the major restructurings that 
took place before 2002 will be irrelevant in a practical sense. In addition, the 
examination period covers material structural changes such as the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the 2009 to 2012 European debt crises in order to mitigate the 
time period bias. 
 
Data mining or data snooping refers to errors that occur due to the misuse of data. 
Data mining is continuously going through the same data until there are favourable 
results (DeFusco, McLeavey, Pinto and Runkle, 2004). A typical example would 
involve determining statistical significance. A statistical significance would be set, 
which represents the probability of rejecting a hypothesis when it is in fact correct.  
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Since it is undesirable to reject the true hypothesis, a researcher may set significant 
levels that are relatively small such as 5 percent. This study will not be subject to 
data mining or data snooping as the study attempts to include an exhaustive number 
of statistical measures to evaluate the potential benefits of market timing compared 
to prior studies.  
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5 POTENTIAL GAINS FROM BULL AND 
BEAR MARKET TIMING 
5.1 Introduction 
Empirical evidence from previous studies conducted on global markets such as 
Sharpe (1975); Chua, Woodward and To (1987); Kester (1990); Dichtl, Drobetz and 
Kryzanowski (2016); Khoklov (2016) as well as studies conducted on local markets 
such as Firer, Sandler and Ward (1992), and De Chassart and Firer (2004) suggest 
that very few market timers yield greater average returns than that of a buy and hold 
strategy when switching between bull and bear markets.  
 
Empirical studies also illustrated that a market timer switching between bull and bear 
markets requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 70 percent or above, should not 
even attempt to time the market. Moreover, the empirical evidence provided by Chua 
et al. (1987), Khokhlov (2016) in developed markets and De Chassart and Firer 
(2004) in developing illustrates that it is more important to possess the ability of 
forecasting bull markets correctly than it is to forecast bear markets correctly.  
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The empirical studies which evaluated the potential gains available to market timers 
were based on hypothetical market timing strategies. This chapter illustrates the 
potential gains available to a market timer who possesses perfect forecasting 
accuracy when switching between the ALSI and the STEFI in bull and bear markets 
on the JSE. This chapter also provides results for a market timer who attempts to 
time the market but at times fail, also known as imperfect market timing.  
 
It is important to note that this study looks at the potential gains, therefore the 
objective of the chapter is to assess the probability of a market timing strategy 
outperforming a buy and hold strategy, based on simulated results, as opposed to 
evaluating actual gains from a particular market timing strategy.  This chapter also 
seeks to determine the sensitivity of potential gains to changes in various transaction 
costs and portfolio revision frequencies. It is also important to note that the quarterly 
and monthly results, for both perfect market timing and less than perfect market 
timing, have been annualised for comparative purposes.  
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5.2 Potential Gains from Perfect Market Timing 
In order to assess the potential gains available to a market timer who possesses 
perfect foresight, a market timer is assumed to have perfect forecasting accuracy 
when switching between two different markets. It is assumed that if a bull market is 
anticipated, a market timer is invested in the FTSE/JSE Top 40 (ALSI). On the other 
hand, if a bear market is anticipated, a market timer is invested in the STEFI Call 
Deposit Index (STEFI). The hypothetical market timer is assumed to call every 
market turn with perfect forecasting accuracy. When a market timer sees a change in 
the market great enough to cover transaction costs, he/she will move all assets 
under management (AUM) into the ALSI in the event where the ALSI is expected to 
outperform the STEFI, or switch into the STEFI in the event where the STEFI is 
expected to outperform the ALSI.  
 
A market timer is assumed to assess the outlook of the market at the beginning of 
each period, and then place AUM either in the ALSI or in the STEFI (risk free asset) 
for the remainder of the period. Each period can be categorised as either a bull or 
bear market period. For a bull market period, the total return of the ALSI is greater 
than that of the STEFI. To the contrary, a bear market period is one where the STEFI 
returns exceed that of the ALSI. Therefore, successful market timing implies holding 
the ALSI in a bull market and holding the STEFI in a bear market. 
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In order to evaluate the potential gains from perfect market timing when switching 
between bull and bear markets, the study looks at three simulated investment 
strategies. The first simulated strategy involves holding cash equivalents, whereby 
an investor solely invests in the STEFI. The second simulated strategy involves 
solely investing in the ALSI. The third simulated strategy involves market timing 
between bull and bear markets, where a market timer possesses perfect forecasting 
accuracy. For each period, a perfect market timer is assumed to have the ability to 
place capital in the highest investment medium (ALSI or STEFI) for the period.  
 
The market timing strategy assumes no withdrawals or additions into the investment. 
In order to assess the returns for the strategies, there are two performance 
measures used for each strategy, namely the average return and standard deviation. 
The average return is simply the arithmetic average of the periodic returns. The 
standard deviation of the return measures the extent to which actual returns deviate 
from the average. 
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5.2.1 Simulated Buy and Hold Strategies 
Table 5.1 below shows the historical monthly, quarterly and annual returns and 
standard deviations of the ALSI versus the STEFI over the period from 31 January 
2002 to 31 December 2016. As illustrated in Table 5.1 below, the ALSI generates 
greater annual returns than that of the STEFI over the examination period. The 
historical results illustrate that the annual return for an investor holding the STEFI is 
8.26 percent with a standard deviation of 2.54 percent. On the contrary, an investor 
holding the ALSI yields an annual return of 17.04 percent with a standard deviation 
of 20.59 percent. Table 5.1 below illustrates that an investor holding the ALSI yields 
more than twice the annual return of an investor holding the STEFI, however, with 
much greater variability of returns.  
 
Table 5.1: Historical Buy and Hold Performance: STEFI and ALSI 
 
 
 
Asset Classes 
STEFI ALSI 
Monthly 
  Average Returns 0.61% 0.94% 
Standard Deviation   0.20% 4.90% 
Quarterly   
Average Returns 2.04% 3.39% 
Standard Deviation   0.59% 9.86% 
Annual   
Average Returns 8.26% 17.04% 
Standard Deviation   2.54% 20.59% 
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Table 5.2 below illustrates the simulated buy and hold returns, based on Equation 5 
in Section 4.4.1.2 for the ALSI versus the STEFI as opposed to Table 5.1, which 
illustrates the actual (historical) returns. Furthermore, Table 5.2 also illustrates the 
standard deviations of returns, which are calculated using Equation 6 in Section 
4.4.1.2. As illustrated by both Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, the simulated results do not 
differ much from the actual returns and standard deviations generated by the ALSI 
and the STEFI. As expected, the results in both Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 illustrates 
that an investor solely invested in the STEFI, yielded the lowest average return with 
the lowest variability of return, as indicated by the standard deviations. The second 
strategy solely invested in the ALSI yields a greater return on average, however, with 
much greater variability of return.  
 
Table 5.2: Overall Simulated Buy and Hold Performance: STEFI and ALSI 
 
 
 
 
Asset Classes 
STEFI ALSI 
Monthly 
  Average Returns 0.61% 0.99% 
Standard Deviation   0.20% 4.87% 
Quarterly   
Average Returns 2.05% 3.43% 
Standard Deviation   0.58% 9.95% 
Annual   
Average Returns 8.21% 16.93% 
Standard Deviation   2.52% 20.80% 
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5.2.2 Simulated Perfect Market Timing Strategy 
Table 5.3 below summarises the simulated results for a hypothetical market timer 
with perfect forecasting accuracy who revises his/her strategy on a monthly, 
quarterly and annual basis with different assumptions for the transaction costs 
incurred (2 percent, 1 percent and 0 percent) respectively. It is important to note that 
the simulated buy and hold strategy does not rebalance; therefore the table only 
indicates the annual average return and standard deviation of return. In order to 
demonstrate the effect transaction costs have on average returns and the standard 
deviation of returns when switching between markets, it is assumed that a market 
timer incurs a cost of 2 percent or 1 percent respectively of the value of the AUM, 
every time there is a switch from the ALSI to the STEFI and vice versa.  
 
In addition to the average returns and standard deviations to the perfect market 
timing strategies, Table 5.3 below illustrates the simulated potential gains available 
to a hypothetical market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy who revises their 
strategy on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis with different assumptions for the 
transaction costs incurred (2 percent, 1 percent and 0 percent) respectively. As 
previously mentioned in Section 3.1, potential gains from market timing is defined as 
the incremental returns of the market timing strategy in excess of a buy and hold 
strategy in the ALSI.  
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Table 5.3: Overall Simulated Performances: Perfect Market Timing Strategy 
Note: The quarterly and monthly results in Table 5.3 above have been annualised for comparative purposes 
 
As illustrated in Table 5.3 above, a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI yielded an 
annual return of 16.93 percent and a standard deviation of 20.80 percent. 
Comparatively, a perfect market timer who revised his/her portfolio annually and did 
not incur transaction costs would have yielded an average return of 22.68 percent 
with a standard deviation of 14.94 percent. Moreover, the overall simulated results 
reveal that if a market timer had perfect forecasting accuracy when switching 
between bull and bear markets, he/she would have significantly improved on the buy 
and hold returns in the ALSI. Section 5.2.2.1 below will evaluate the sensitivity of 
potential gains to monthly, quarterly and annual portfolio revision frequencies. On the 
other hand, Section 5.2.2.2 will evaluate the sensitivity of potential gains to various 
transaction costs (0 percent, 1 percent and 2 percent).  
Frequency of portfolio revisions 
 Perfect Market Timing with the various 
Transaction Costs 
Simulated Buy 
and Hold strategy 0% 1% 2% 
Monthly  
 Average Returns - 41.09% 34.53% 27.35% 
Standard Deviation - 10.14% 10.36% 10.84% 
Potential Gains - 24.16% 17.60% 10.42% 
Quarterly  
 Average Returns - 30.05% 27.61% 25.81% 
Standard Deviation - 12.38% 12.48% 12.66% 
Potential Gains - 13.12% 10.68% 8.88% 
Annual  
 Average returns 16.93% 22.68% 22.33% 21.78% 
Standard Deviation 20.80% 14.94% 15.05% 15.17% 
Potential gains - 5.75% 5.40% 4.85% 
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 Sensitivity analysis: the effect of portfolio revision frequency 
As illustrated in Table 5.3 above, if a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy 
had revised their portfolio annually with no transaction costs, he/she would have 
yielded an average annual return of 22.68 percent with a standard deviation of 14.94 
percent. This implies that the market timer would have yielded potential gains of 5.75 
percent above that of a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI, with a lower standard 
deviation. The standard deviations for the perfect timing strategy and buy and hold 
strategy are 14.94 percent and 20.80 percent respectively.  
 
The results also indicate that if a market timer had revised their portfolio on a 
monthly basis, ignoring transaction costs, he/she would have realised an annual 
mean return of 41.09 percent with a standard deviation of 10.14 percent. On the 
other hand, a perfect market timing strategy with least rebalancing frequency 
(annual), a market timer would have only yielded a return of 22.68 percent and with a 
standard deviation of 14.94 percent, as previously illustrated. This implies that a 
market timer, who revises his/her portfolio on a monthly basis, would have yielded 
almost twice the return of a market timer who revises his/her portfolio annually, with 
less variability of return. Additionally, a market timer who revised his/her portfolio on 
a monthly basis and incurred no transaction costs would have improved upon a buy 
and hold strategy’s average returns by an impressive 24.16 percent per annum.  
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Results reveal that if a market timer revises his/her portfolio more often, ignoring 
transaction costs, he/she will yield greater potential gains. These results concur with 
Droms (1987); Kester’s (1990); Hsieh (2013a); Dichtl et al. (2016), and Khokhlov 
(2016) in developed markets; as well as Ward and Terblanche (2009) in developing 
markets findings regarding portfolio revisions which state that if a market timer 
revises his/her portfolio more often, they will yield greater potential gains. It is evident 
that a market timer, who possesses perfect forecasting accuracy when switching 
between the ALSI and the STEFI on the JSE, would have earned substantial returns 
with less variability than that of a buy and hold strategy.  
 
In respect to global markets, the results also concur with Shape’s (1975), Shilling 
(1992), Hsieh (2013a) and Khoklov (2016) studies. According to Sharpe (1975), a 
perfect market timing strategy has two advantages; firstly, the strategy yields greater 
returns on average, and secondly has less risk compared to that of a buy and hold 
strategy. These results are further supported by De Chassart and Firer (2004) and 
Ward and Terblanche (2009) studies in the local market. De Chassart and Firer 
(2004) and Ward and Terblanche (2009) stated that a market timer who switched 
between bull and bear markets received significant returns relative to a buy and hold 
strategy, provided that the market timer had perfect forecasting accuracy. However, 
it is important to note that transaction costs have not been taken into account thus 
far.  
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Sensitivity analysis: the effect of transaction costs 
When taking into account transaction costs, a market timer who perfectly switched 
between the ALSI and the STEFI annually and incurred transaction costs of 1 
percent would have yielded on average an annual return of 22.33 percent with a 
standard deviation of 15.05 percent. Additionally, if a market timer incurred 2 percent 
transaction costs their average return would have reduced to 21.78 percent per 
annum with a standard deviation of 15.17 percent. As previously illustrated, a perfect 
market timer who switched between the ALSI and the STEFI would have yielded an 
annual average return of 5.75 percent more than a buy and hold strategy, provided 
that the market timer revised their portfolio annually and did not incur transaction 
costs. However, a 1 percent transaction cost would have decreased the potential 
gains to 5.40 percent per annum and a 2 percent transaction cost would have further 
decreased the potential gains to 4.85 percent per annum. 
 
When taking into account transaction costs of 1 percent or 2 percent for a perfect 
market timer who revised their portfolio quarterly, his/her annual average returns 
would have been 27.61 percent and 25.81 percent respectively. A market timer who 
revised their portfolio on a quarterly basis, without any transaction costs being 
incurred, he/she would have outperformed a buy and hold strategy by 13.12 percent 
with a standard deviation of 12.38 percent. However, if a market timer incurred 
transaction costs of 1 percent and 2 percent, he/she would have yielded potential 
gains of 10.68 percent and 8.88 percent respectively. 
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A market timer who revised their portfolio monthly and incurred transaction costs of 1 
percent or 2 percent would have reduced their average returns to 34.53 percent and 
27.35 percent respectively, from 41.09 percent (no transaction costs). Similarly, 1 
percent and 2 percent transaction costs incurred by a market timer who revises their 
portfolio on a monthly basis would have decreased the market timer’s potential gains 
to 17.60 percent and 10.42 percent respectively, from 24.16 percent (no transaction 
costs).  
 
In summary, when comparing the loss of potential gains due to increases in 
transaction costs; the results reveal that for monthly market timers, an increase in 
transaction costs from 0 percent to the maximum assumption of 2 percent, the 
potential gains decreases from 24.16 percent to 10.42 percent. On the other hand, 
increasing transaction costs from 0 percent to 2 percent for a quarterly market timer, 
the potential gains decrease from 13.12 percent to 8.88 percent. Furthermore, when 
increasing the transaction costs from 0 percent to 2 percent for an annual market 
timer, the potential gains decreases from 5.75 percent to 4.85 percent. The negative 
impact of transaction costs on potential gains is greater for market timers that revise 
their portfolio more frequently as more transaction costs are incurred. Even though 
the potential gains are greater for a market timer who increases their portfolio 
frequency, the potential for loss is also greater due to the transaction costs that may 
be incurred. Therefore, there is greater risk of a market timer to underperform a buy 
and hold strategy if he/she incurs transaction costs of 2 percent and revises their 
portfolio more frequently, even if he/she possesses perfect forecasting accuracy.  
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The above results support developed markets findings by Droms (1989); Kester 
(1990); Hsieh (2013a); Dichtl et al. (2016) and Khokhlov (2016) in that a market timer 
achieves greater returns with lower transaction costs when switching between 
markets, and the more frequently he/she revises their portfolio. It is evident that 
under all three portfolio revision periods, a market timer with perfect forecasting 
accuracy yields a greater return with less variability than that of an investor who 
buys-and-holds the ALSI even when taking into account transaction costs of 1 and 2 
percent respectively. According to Sharpe (1975), when the value of stocks decrease 
in prolonged bear markets, investors use market timing strategies to avoid further 
losses in the value of their stocks and portfolios. Therefore, market timers who had 
superior forecasting accuracy by moving into the STEFI during the real estate 
bubble, which subsequently led to the 2008 global financial crisis, avoided losses 
while other investors may have seen declines in the market values of their stocks 
and portfolios. 
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5.3 Potential Gains from Less than Perfect Timing 
As stated in previous empirical studies, it is not possible for a market timer to 
possess perfect forecasting ability. Therefore, this study evaluates the potential 
gains for market timers who attempt to time the market when switching between bull 
and bear markets and occasionally fail, using the bivariate normal distribution model 
described in Section 4.4.5. At the beginning of each period, a market timer is 
assumed to forecast a bull or bear market, leaving his/her funds unchanged or move 
his/her funds to an alternative investment medium, depending on his/her forecast. 
Similarly to perfect timing, funds are assumed to be invested in either the ALSI or the 
STEFI. 
 
A series of Monte Carlo simulations are implemented, using various combinations of 
the ALSI and the STEFI forecasting accuracies in order to evaluate the potential 
gains from less than perfect market timing strategies. Due to the fact that market 
timers do not have perfect foresight, it is more appropriate to make use of simulation 
results that assume imperfect forecasts, (Chua et al., 1987 and Hsieh, 2013a).  
Similar to perfect timing accuracy, the potential gains of market timers with various 
forecasting accuracies are evaluated by comparing them to the return of a buy and 
hold strategy in the ALSI. It is important to note that a negative mean return does not 
necessarily imply that a market timer has zero probability of outperforming a buy and 
hold strategy. This however does imply that the probability of outperforming a buy 
and hold strategy is highly unlikely. 
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5.3.1 Annual Revision Frequency 
As previously illustrated, no market timer has perfect forecasting accuracy when 
timing the market; therefore, simulation results assuming imperfect forecasts are 
more relevant. Table 5.4 below summarises results of a market timer who revises 
his/her portfolio annually and incurs no transaction costs, when switching between 
bull and bear markets on the JSE.  The rows in Table 5.4 represent the potential 
gains available to a market timer with the same accuracy in forecasting bear markets 
(i.e. 50 percent bear forecasting accuracy) but with differing accuracies in forecasting 
bull markets, from 50 percent to 100 percent. Similarly, each column represents the 
potential gains available to a market timer with the same accuracy in forecasting bull 
markets but with differing accuracies in forecasting bear markets, from 50 percent to 
100 percent.  
Table 5.4: Imperfect Annual Market Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -2.87% -1.67% -0.26% 0.48% 1.79% 2.86% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.31% 14.59% 13.09% 11.86% 9.85% 8.02% 
  Win/Loss 0.67 0.78 1.09 1.66 3.06 ∞ 
60 Mean(%) -2.16% -1.02% -0.04% 1.55% 2.54% 3.55% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.18% 14.94% 13.51% 12.16% 10.62% 8.51% 
  Win/Loss 0.77 1.58 2.69 3.74 4.11 ∞ 
70 Mean(%) -1.53% -0.53% 0.84% 1.74% 3.14% 4.02% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.05% 15.19% 14.36% 12.79% 11.46% 9.18% 
  Win/Loss 0.96 2.12 3.54 4.69 5.10 ∞ 
80 Mean(%) -0.95% 0.02% 1.07% 2.54% 3.69% 4.75% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.86% 15.70% 14.62% 13.07% 11.73% 9.56% 
  Win/Loss 1.03 2.63 3.47 0.89 5.21 ∞ 
90 Mean(%) -0.49% 0.63% 1.93% 2.99% 4.08% 5.29% 
  Std Dev (%) 17.15% 15.93% 15.08% 13.58% 12.27% 10.12% 
  Win/Loss 1.19 2.87 3.64 4.87 5.67 ∞ 
100 Mean(%) 0.29% 1.22% 2.75% 3.63% 4.73% 5.75% 
  Std Dev (%) 17.66% 16.35% 15.44% 13.93% 12.21% 10.45% 
  Win/Loss 1.31 1.70 2.17 3.15 6.54 ∞ 
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It is important to note that a market timer who possesses a forecasting accuracy of 
50 percent has no predictive ability and will make a bad prediction as often as a 
good prediction. Moreover, Sharpe (1975) stated that a market timer with 50 percent 
forecasting accuracy will not only make mistakes, but will predict bad periods too 
often. There are three measures for measuring the performance of a market timer 
which include the potential gains, standard deviation of the potential gains and the 
win/loss ratio. The win/loss ratio shows the number of successful switches (resulting 
in higher returns as compared to that of a buy and hold strategy) to unsuccessful 
switches (resulting in negative potential gains). In other words, the win/loss ratio 
indicates the probability a market timing strategy will outperform a buy and hold 
strategy. 
 
Chua, et al. (1987) and Hsieh (2013a) stated that the ratio produces more useful 
information than a standard median estimate, as it ignores the numerous situations 
in which the buy and hold investor and the market timer are holding the ALSI. A 
win/loss ratio of less than one illustrates that there is less than 50 percent chance 
that a market timer will outperform a buy and hold strategy. Similarly, a win/loss ratio 
of greater than one indicates that there is a greater than 50 percent chance that a 
market timer will outperform a buy and hold strategy.  
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The first cell in Table 5.4 indicates how much a market timer with no forecasting 
accuracy in both bull and bear markets (i.e. 50 percent predictive ability in both the 
ALSI and the STEFI) would gain or lose from following a market timing strategy. The 
simulated results illustrate that a market timer with no forecasting ability who revised 
their portfolio annually, ignoring transaction costs, would have decreased their 
returns by an average of 2.87 percent per annum.  Additionally, the win/loss ratio of 
0.67 indicates that the probability of a market timer benefitting from market timing 
activities is approximately 40 percent (0.67/ (1+0.67)). The last cell (i.e. 100 percent 
predictive ability in both the ALSI and the STEFI) shows the potential gains for a 
market timer who has perfect forecasting accuracy. Simulation results show that a 
market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy would have yielded potential gains of 
5.75 percent above that of a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI, with a standard 
deviation of 10.45 percent. 
 
A market timer who revises their portfolio annually requires a joint forecasting 
accuracy of 70 percent in both the ALSI and the STEFI in order to yield potential 
gains similar to Sharpe’s (1975) study in the U.S. market and Ward’s and 
Terblanche’s (2009) study in the South African market. However, Hallerbach (2014) 
and Dichtl et al. (2016) studies conducted on global markets stated that a market 
timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of approximately 60 percent. A market 
timer who revises their portfolio on an annual basis may also possess the following 
accuracies in order to yield potential gains; 80 percent bull market accuracy and 50 
percent bear market accuracy, 60 percent bull market accuracy and 80 percent bear 
market accuracy and 50 percent bull market accuracy and 100 percent bear market 
accuracy.  
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Assuming a market timer has no bear forecasting accuracy (i.e. 50 percent bear 
forecasting accuracy), the win/loss ratio rises to more than 1 when the accuracy in 
forecasting bull markets is greater than or equal to 70 percent. This implies that the 
market timer who has no bear forecasting accuracy and a bull market forecasting 
accuracy of greater than or equal to 70 percent, has a 50 percent probability (or 
more) of outperforming the returns yielded by a buy and hold strategy every time 
he/she switches (Chua et al., 1987 and Hsieh, 2013a). On the other hand, assuming 
that a market timer has no bull forecasting accuracy (i.e. 50 percent bull forecasting 
accuracy), the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when the accuracy in forecasting bear 
markets is greater than or equal to 80 percent. This implies that a market timer who 
possesses a bull market forecasting accuracy of 50 percent and a bear market 
forecasting accuracy of greater than or equal to 80 percent, has a 50 percent 
probability (or more) of outperforming a buy and hold strategy.   
 
In order to illustrate the negative impact of transaction costs on potential gains, the 
potential gains of a market timer who revises their portfolio annually and does not 
incur transaction costs are compared to the potential gains derived under the 
maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction costs. The assumptions of 1 percent 
transaction costs are not included in this chapter; however, they are illustrated in 
Appendix A. Table 5.5 below illustrates the results for a market timer who revises 
their portfolio annually and incurs transaction costs of 2 percent.  
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The yellow highlighted blocks illustrate the potential gains that were available to a 
market timer when transaction costs are not taken into account as illustrated in Table 
5.4. The red blocks indicate the potential gains available to a market timer when 2 
percent transaction costs are taken into account. As illustrated in Table 5.5, the 
forecasting accuracy required to yield potential gains increases roughly by 10 
percentage points when moving from 0 percent to 2 percent transaction costs when 
compared to Table 5.4. Results also reveal that when taking into account transaction 
costs of 2 percent, the potential gains available to a market timer decreases on 
average by 1 percentage point.  
Table 5.5: Imperfect Annual Market Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -3.98% -2.59% -1.57% -0.24% 0.64% 1.95% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.21% 14.04% 13.04% 12.11% 10.05% 7.85% 
  Win/Loss 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.47 0.65 
60 Mean(%) -3.22% -2.03% -0.71% 0.25% 1.47% 2.58% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.54% 14.85% 13.52% 12.36% 10.46% 8.52% 
  Win/Loss 0.42 0.46 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.82 
70 Mean(%) -2.54% -1.22% -0.30% 0.84% 2.04% 3.21% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.21% 15.32% 13.85% 12.62% 10.97% 9.11% 
  Win/Loss 0.51 0.57 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.91 
80 Mean(%) -1.99% -0.92% 0.38% 1.45% 2.55% 3.62% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.93% 15.59% 14.65% 13.28% 11.69% 9.69% 
  Win/Loss 0.58 0.62 0.67 0.74 0.87 1.03 
90 Mean(%) -1.38% -0.11% 0.84% 1.94% 3.19% 4.39% 
  Std Dev (%) 17.07% 15.99% 15.10% 13.47% 12.17% 10.03% 
  Win/Loss 0.72 0.78 0.85 0.99 1.07 1.25 
100 Mean(%) -0.95% 0.48% 1.45% 2.75% 3.91% 4.85% 
  Std Dev (%) 17.59% 16.82% 15.17% 14.01% 12.48% 10.19% 
  Win/Loss 0.85 0.89 1.01 1.12 1.23 1.43 
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As illustrated in Table 5.5 above, the joint forecasting accuracy required when 
switching between the ALSI and the STEFI increases to 80 percent in order to yield 
positive gains. Additionally, the other forecasting accuracies required to yield 
potential gains are; 90 percent bull market accuracy and 50 percent bear market 
accuracy, 80 percent bull market accuracy and 70 percent bear market accuracy and 
60 percent bull market accuracy and 100 percent bear market accuracy. It is evident 
that just by evaluating annual portfolio revisions and taking into account transaction 
costs of 2 percent, a market timer requires greater forecasting accuracy to yield 
potential gains. 
 
If a market timer does not possess any bear forecasting ability, it is impossible to 
raise the win/loss ratio above 1, as the highest attainable win/loss ratio is 0.65 (100 
percent bull forecasting accuracy and 50 percent bear forecasting accuracy). 
Similarly, if a market timer does not possess any bull forecasting ability, the highest 
attainable win/loss ratio is 0.85. This implies that the probability of yielding potential 
gains is low when a market timer does not possess any bear forecasting ability and 
100 percent bull forecasting accuracy and vice versa. In order to obtain an above 
average probability of outperforming a buy and hold strategy, a market timer requires 
an extremely high forecasting accuracy in both bull and bear markets. Results in 
Table 5.5 reveal that the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when a market a joint 
forecasting accuracy of 90 percent in both the ALSI and the STEFI. In addition, the 
win/loss ratio is also greater than 1 when a market timer has a 100 percent bull 
forecasting accuracy and 100 percent bear forecasting accuracy; or a 100 percent 
bear forecasting accuracy and 70 percent bull forecasting accuracy.  
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The results in Table 5.5 also illustrate that it is more important to forecast bull 
markets than bear markets. This is indicated by the negative potential gains along 
the rows in Table 5.5. Assuming no bear forecasting ability, a market timer who 
possesses 50 percent bull forecasting accuracy underperforms a buy and hold 
strategy by 3.98 percent and a market timer who possesses 100 percent bull 
forecasting accuracy yields potential gains of 1.95 percent. Comparatively, assuming 
no bull forecasting ability, a market timer who possesses 50 percent bear forecasting 
accuracy underperforms a buy and hold strategy by 3.98 percent and a market timer 
possesses 100 percent bear forecasting accuracy underperforms a buy and hold 
strategy by 0.95 percent.  
 
When examining Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, it is evident that transaction costs have a 
direct relationship with forecasting accuracy. On the other hand, transaction costs 
have an indirect relationship with potential gains and the probability of outperforming 
a buy and hold strategy. This implies that, an increase in transaction costs increases 
the forecasting accuracy required to achieve potential gains. Moreover, an increase 
in transaction costs reduces potential gains available to a market timer and 
decreases the probability that a market timer will outperform a buy and hold strategy.  
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5.3.2 Quarterly Revision Frequency 
The results for a market timer who revises their portfolio quarterly and incurs no 
transaction costs are illustrated in Table 5.6 below. Results indicate that a market 
timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 60 percent in both the ALSI and the 
STEFI as opposed to 70 percent joint forecasting accuracy required for annual timing 
to yield potential gains, when transaction costs are not taken into account. The 
win/loss ratio increases to above 1 when a market timer has a joint forecasting 
accuracy of 60 percent in both the ALSI and the STEFI. If a market timer does not 
have any forecasting ability in either the STEFI or the ALSI, the win/loss ratio is 
greater than 1 when a market timer has a forecasting accuracy of 70 percent in 
either the ALSI or the STEFI, respectively. 
Table 5.6: Imperfect Quarterly Market Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -2.50% -0.72% 0.84% 2.63% 4.39% 6.26% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.16% 12.00% 11.20% 10.38% 9.18% 7.48% 
  Win/Loss 0.82 0.96 1.05 1.97 2.06 ∞ 
60 Mean(%) -1.21% 0.68% 2.10% 3.69% 5.72% 7.69% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.64% 12.80% 12.00% 10.74% 9.82% 8.42% 
  Win/Loss 0.95 1.56 2.67 3.97 4.88 ∞ 
70 Mean(%) 0.04% 1.17% 3.61% 5.39% 6.68% 8.67% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.32% 13.18% 12.48% 11.26% 10.40% 8.84% 
  Win/Loss 1.14 2.55 3.89 4.57 5.44 ∞ 
80 Mean(%) 1.25% 3.12% 4.97% 6.64% 8.41% 9.95% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.50% 13.84% 12.80% 11.66% 10.60% 9.06% 
  Win/Loss 1.28 2.39 4.28 5.37 6.70 ∞ 
90 Mean(%) 2.26% 3.81% 5.97% 7.73% 9.31% 11.29% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.04% 14.12% 13.28% 12.20% 10.92% 9.54% 
  Win/Loss 1.39 2.88 4.54 5.63 6.90 ∞ 
100 Mean(%) 3.81% 5.59% 7.06% 9.05% 10.86% 13.12% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.10% 14.50% 13.32% 12.36% 11.30% 9.72% 
  Win/Loss 1.65 1.97 2.71 4.14 7.90 ∞ 
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In Appendix A, Table 2 illustrates that when taking into account transaction costs of 1 
percent and revises are made to the portfolio on a quarterly basis, the joint 
forecasting accuracy in both the ALSI and the STEFI increases to 70 percent. It is 
evident that by increasing the frequency of portfolio revisions from annually to 
quarterly, the forecasting accuracy required to yield potential gains decreased, 
however, increasing transaction costs does not only decrease potential gains but 
also increases the forecasting accuracy required.   
 
Table 5.7 below illustrates the results for a market timer who revises their portfolio on 
a quarterly basis and incurs 2 percent transaction costs. The results show that a 
market timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 80 percent in both the ALSI and 
the STEFI to yield potential gains, which is similar to the joint forecasting accuracy 
required by a market timer who revises his/her portfolio annually with 2 percent 
transaction costs. The win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when the joint forecasting 
accuracy is 90 percent in both the ALSI and the STEFI, which is also similar to that 
of annual market timing with 2 percent transaction costs. The results from Table 5.7 
are similar to that of Table 5.5, with the only difference being that a market timer 
yields greater potential gains if he/she revises his/her portfolio quarterly rather than 
annually, when taking into account transaction costs of 2 percent. 
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Table 5.7: Imperfect Quarterly Market Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -6.60% -4.97% -3.07% -1.33% 0.24% 2.22% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.38% 12.20% 11.50% 10.14% 9.14% 7.64% 
  Win/Loss 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.51 
60 Mean(%) -5.09% -3.48% -1.57% 0.20% 1.69% 3.24% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.38% 13.00% 11.74% 10.78% 9.60% 8.20% 
  Win/Loss 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.52 
70 Mean(%) -4.23% -2.02% -0.72% 0.72% 2.83% 4.68% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.96% 13.12% 12.28% 11.20% 10.10% 8.96% 
  Win/Loss 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.72 
80 Mean(%) -2.99% -1.29% 0.68% 2.54% 4.23% 6.05% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.44% 13.66% 13.02% 11.58% 10.50% 9.12% 
  Win/Loss 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.74 0.75 0.78 
90 Mean(%) -1.41% -0.28% 2.14% 2.99% 5.47% 7.14% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.58% 13.94% 12.92% 12.16% 10.70% 9.72% 
  Win/Loss 0.77 0.85 0.90 0.93 1.05 1.16 
100 Mean(%) -0.44% 1.49% 3.07% 4.80% 6.64% 8.88% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.22% 14.52% 13.42% 12.50% 11.02% 9.54% 
  Win/Loss 0.89 0.98 1.06 1.13 1.02 1.39 
 
The results reveal that the potential gains available to a market timer with a joint 
forecasting accuracy of 80 percent in both the ALSI and the STEFI and who revises 
their portfolio on an annual basis, incurring 2 percent transaction costs, is on 
average 1.45 percent per annum. On the contrary, a market timer with 80 percent 
joint forecasting accuracy in both the ALSI and the STEFI revising their portfolio on a 
quarterly basis and incurring transaction costs of 2 percent would yield potential 
gains on average of 2.54 percent per annum. The greater potential gains may be 
attributed to a market timer revising their portfolio more frequently, allowing them to 
capture more of the bull markets whilst simultaneously allowing the market timer to 
avoid the bear markets. 
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When taking into account transaction costs of 2 percent and quarterly portfolio 
revisions, the results also reveal that the forecasting accuracy required by a market 
timer to yield potential gains increases on average by 30 percentage points. On the 
contrary, increasing transaction costs by 2 percent for an annual market timer would 
increase the forecasting accuracy by 10 percentage points on average. This implies 
that with greater revision frequency, transaction costs are incurred on a greater 
number of transactions, thus reducing the overall portfolio return. Consequently, this 
causes the required forecasting accuracy to outperform a buy and hold strategy to 
increase.  
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5.3.3 Monthly Revision Frequency 
Table 5.8 below summarises the simulation results for a market timer who revises 
their portfolio on a monthly basis, without incurring any transaction costs. A market 
timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 60 percent in both the ALSI and the 
STEFI to yield potential gains. Additionally, the potential gains available to a market 
timer with a 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy are 2.06 percent per annum on 
average.  
 
Results reveal that a market timer may also possess the following bull and bear 
forecasting accuracies in order to yield potential gains: 70 percent bull accuracy and 
50 percent bear accuracy or 50 percent bull accuracy 70 percent bear accuracy. The 
results also indicate that the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when a market timer 
possesses 60 percent bull accuracy and 50 percent bear accuracy or vice versa, 
even though the results indicate that the market timer yields negative returns. In 
addition, the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when a market timer possesses a 60 
percent joint forecasting accuracy in both the ALSI and the STEFI. The probability 
that a market timer will outperform a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI when he/she 
has a 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy is (2.06/ (1+2.06)) 67.32 percent.  
 
 
 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
POTENTIAL GAINS FROM BULL AND BEAR MARKET TIMING 5-27 
 
 
Table 5.8: Imperfect Monthly Market Timing (no transaction costs) 
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -1.81% -0.12% 3.17% 6.17% 8.99% 12.68% 
  Std Dev (%) 12.92% 12.30% 11.64% 10.57% 9.35% 7.79% 
  Win/Loss 0.88 1.11 1.43 2.21 4.2 ∞ 
60 Mean(%) -0.72% 2.06% 5.16% 8.47% 11.88% 14.57% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.75% 12.89% 12.09% 11.19% 10,01% 8.69% 
  Win/Loss 1.09 2.06 3.42 4.69 5.28 ∞ 
70 Mean(%) 1.94% 5.66% 8.21% 10.43% 14.03% 17.32% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.31% 13.23% 12.37% 11.57% 10.32% 9.04% 
  Win/Loss 1.25 2.62 3.87 4.25 5.94 ∞ 
80 Mean(%) 4.66% 7.70% 10.43% 12.95% 16.90% 19.99% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.55% 13.79% 12.82% 12.02% 10.95% 9.53% 
  Win/Loss 1.43 2.65 4.02 6.34 7.3 ∞ 
90 Mean(%) 6.93% 10.43% 12.42% 16.49% 19.99% 23.29% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.86% 14.38% 13.41% 12.40% 11.40% 9.98% 
  Win/Loss 1.55 3.45 5.89 7.21 8.51 ∞ 
100 Mean(%) 9.90% 12.28% 15.66% 19.00% 22.28% 24.16% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.38% 14.62% 13.72% 12.75% 11.33% 10,01% 
  Win/Loss 1.78 2.13 2.28 4.26 8.82 ∞ 
 
Table 5.9 below takes into account transaction costs of 2 percent every time a 
market timer switches in and out of the ALSI and the STEFI, with monthly portfolio 
revisions. Results reveal that a market timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 
80 percent in both the ALSI and the STEFI to yield potential gains, as opposed to the 
60 percent required for monthly portfolio revisions when there are no transaction 
costs taken into account. A market timer with 80 percent joint forecasting accuracy 
may yield on average potential gains of 0.60 percent per annum. When taking into 
account transaction costs of 2 percent, the win loss ratio is greater than 1 when the 
bull forecasting accuracy is 100 percent and the bear forecasting accuracy is 90 
percent. Similarly, the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when the bear forecasting 
accuracy is 100 percent and the bull forecasting accuracy is 80 percent. 
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Table 5.9: Imperfect Monthly Market Timing (2 percent transaction costs) 
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -16.08% -13.49% -9.38% -6.17% -3.78% -0.36% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.37% 12.57% 11.74% 10.98% 9.84% 8.63% 
  Win/Loss 0.36 0.39 0.4 0.43 0.45 0.5 
60 Mean(%) -13.35% -9.77% -6.80% -3.29% -0.72% 2.30% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.13% 13.20% 12.37% 11.47% 10.32% 9.32% 
  Win/Loss 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.58 
70 Mean(%) -10.43% -7.06% -4.91% -1.33% 1.45% 4.66% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.58% 13.86% 12.85% 11.99% 10.77% 9.66% 
  Win/Loss 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.72 
80 Mean(%) -8.34% -5.28% -1.45% 0.60% 3.66% 6.68% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.76% 14.03% 13.51% 12.33% 11.36% 10.25% 
  Win/Loss 0.63 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.88 
90 Mean(%) -5.54% -1.94% 1.57% 3.04% 5.66% 8.73% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.42% 14.48% 13.75% 12.78% 11.81% 10.39% 
  Win/Loss 0.71 0.76 0.84 0.89 0.99 1.02 
100 Mean(%) -2.92% 0.12% 1.57% 5.79% 8.47% 10.42% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.55% 15.00% 13.86% 13.09% 12.02% 10.88% 
  Win/Loss 0.84 0.89 0.97 1 1.13 1.17 
 
Overall the results concur with the findings made by Chua et al. (1987), Shilling 
(1992), Khokhlov (2016) in developed markets and De Chassart and Firer (2004) in 
developing markets which state that it is more important to forecast bull markets 
correctly than bear markets. Additionally, if a market timer can only forecast bull 
markets accurately 50 percent of the time, then he/she should not participate in 
market timing (Chua et al., 1987). This is to say, failing to predict bull markets 
accurately by more than 50 percent, a market timer’s mean return will be less than 
that of a buy and hold strategy even if he/she can forecast bear markets perfectly. 
This can be seen by the greater negative potential gains in the first columns of Table 
5.4, Table 5.5, Table 5.6, Table 5.7, Table 5.9 and Table 2 and Table 4 in Appendix 
A.  
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As illustrated in Table 5.9 above, assuming a market timer has no forecasting ability 
(i.e. 50 percent bull and bear forecasting accuracy); he/she will underperform a buy 
and hold strategy by 16.08 percent. Moreover, if a market timer does has no bull 
forecasting and 100 percent bear forecasting accuracy, he/she underperforms a buy 
and hold strategy by 2.92 percent. On the other hand, assuming a market timer does 
not possess any bear forecasting accuracy and 100 percent bull forecasting 
accuracy, he/she underperforms a buy and hold strategy by 0.36 percent. According 
to Chua et al. (1987) and Hsieh (2013a), it is important to note that the negative 
average incremental returns from market timing do not imply that every market timer 
who cannot forecast bull markets will lose from market timing. However, the negative 
average incremental returns do imply that the probability a market timer will 
outperform a buy and hold strategy is low.  
 
The results in the tables above illustrate that the standard deviations are large 
relative to the potential gains. According to Chua et al. (1987), the fact that the 
volatility of the returns are large when compared to the returns, suggest that investor 
experience will vary i.e. some will be losers and some will be winners. However, a 
market timer cannot base his/her market timing strategy on the large standard 
deviations unless he/she believes that he/she will be consistently luckier than others. 
The results greatly suggest that market timers with good bull market timing skills will 
perform better than market timers with good bear market timing skills relative to a 
buy and hold strategy in the ALSI.  
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The win/loss ratio is generally greater than 1 even when the market timer has a 
forecasting accuracy of 80 percent or more in bear markets. This implies that it is 
likely that a market timer who possesses 50 percent forecasting accuracy in bull 
markets and 80 percent forecasting accuracy in bear markets will stay in the STEFI 
too long and miss too many bull markets, which will result in his/her mean return 
being less than that of a buy and hold strategy. The losses a market timer manages 
to avoid in bear markets are not enough to cover the large returns he/she misses in 
bull markets. The significance of not missing bull markets versus avoiding bear 
markets can be clearly seen by the win/loss ratios in the third column. These figures 
indicate that if a market timer’s bull market forecasting accuracy is greater than or 
equal to 80 percent, his/her potential gains will most likely be positive even if he/she 
is unable to forecast bear markets at all (i.e. 50 percent bear forecasting accuracy), 
(Chua et al., 1987 and De Chassart and Firer, 2004). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
It is evident that under all three portfolio revision periods (annual, quarterly and 
monthly), a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy yields a greater return 
with less variability than that of an investor who buys and holds the ALSI even when 
taking into account transaction costs of 1 percent and 2 percent respectively. On the 
contrary, the results from less than perfect timing demonstrate that the benefits of 
timing the market by switching between bull and bear markets are unattractive. In 
order to evaluate the potential gains from less than perfect timing, a series of Monte 
Carlo simulations using various combinations of bull and bear market forecasting 
accuracies from 50 percent (no forecasting accuracy) to 100 percent (perfect 
forecasting accuracy). These were used to generate the possible potential gains 
available to a market timer who switches between the ALSI and the STEFI indices 
on the JSE.  
 
The benefits of market timing are considerably greater when less restrictive 
assumptions are made about the frequency of portfolio revisions and level of 
transaction costs as implemented by Droms (1989), Kester (1990), Hsieh (2013a), 
Dichtl et al. (2016) and Khokhlov (2016) done in the developed markets and Ward 
and Terblanche (2009) done in the developing markets. This is clearly demonstrated 
by the results in this chapter, which demonstrates that better performance is 
obtained when reviewing the portfolio more frequently and that increasing 
transaction costs reduces potential gains and increases the forecasting accuracy 
required by a market timer under all revision periods.  
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When taking into account the maximum transaction costs of 2 percent, the potential 
gains available to a market timer drastically decreases across all portfolio revisions. 
Moreover, when taking into account transaction costs of 2 percent, the required joint 
forecasting accuracy in both the ALSI and the STEFI is 80 percent across all the 
portfolio revision periods. The results overall concur with that of Sharpe’s (1975) 
study in the U.S. stock market, Chua et al. (1989) study in the Canadian stock 
market, Firer, Sandler and Ward (1992) and De Chassart and Firer (2004) whereby 
both the latter were done on the JSE, which found that potential gains are realised 
when a market timer has a great degree of predictive accuracy in either of the 
markets. However, studies done in the U.S. market such as Hallerbach (2014) and 
Dichtl et al. (2016) state that a market timer requires a moderate level of forecasting 
accuracy (i.e. 60 percent forecasting accuracy). Furthermore, a market timer with 
great bull forecasting accuracy will do better on average than those market timers 
who have greater bear forecasting accuracy.  
 
Overall, the potential gains from market timing between securities and cash on the 
JSE are likely to be modest at best when compared to that of a buy and hold 
strategy, as a market timer requires superior forecasting accuracy in order to 
outperform a buy and hold strategy. Additionally, the forecasting accuracy required 
to achieve great potential gains and to outperform a buy and hold strategy is 
unattainable to most market timers. Results also reveal that when 2 percent 
transaction costs are taken into account, the win/loss is generally greater than 1 
when a market timer has a 90 percent joint forecasting accuracy in both the ALSI 
and the STEFI. 
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As stated by Sharpe (1975), weak-form market efficiency implies that it is as difficult 
to predict shifts in the market as it is to identify which securities will do well or poorly. 
Transaction costs are incurred each time a market timer predicts a shift in the market 
and switches to another market. These transaction costs are not recoverable and 
expose a market timer to large losses when errors are made. Empirical studies have 
argued that potential gains from market timing are too small to justify the costs 
associated with attempting to take advantage of any inefficiency in the security 
market.  
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6  POTENTIAL GAINS FROM SECTOR 
TIMING ON THE JSE 
6.1 Introduction 
Hsieh (2013a) provided evidence of market timers who possess significant 
forecasting ability, and are able to trade at low transaction costs, have greater 
access to gains from sector timing strategies. Hsieh (2013a) evaluated the potential 
gains from sector timing when switching between the electronic and financial indices 
on the Taiwanese Stock Exchange, from 16 December 1999 to 19 December 2012. 
Results revealed that when transaction costs are taken into account, higher 
forecasting accuracies are required by market timers when switching between the 
electronic and financial indices in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy. 
Moreover, results illustrated that it is more important to forecast financial dominant 
markets correctly than electronic dominant markets, irrespective of which index is 
used as the benchmark.  
 
The number of empirical studies conducted on sector timing is limited; particularly in 
South Africa. Therefore, the results in this chapter expand on earlier studies by 
examining data over a more recent period; subsequent to the reclassification of the 
sectors on the JSE. The primary objective of this chapter is to determine whether the 
market segmentation phenomenon on the JSE provides potential opportunities for 
profitable sector timing strategies.  
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This chapter first evaluates the potential gains from perfect sector timing using three 
simulated sector timing strategies. Additionally, this chapter evaluates the potential 
gains from less than perfect sector timing, using the three simulated sector timing 
strategies. The chapter also evaluates the sensitivity of potential gains from sector 
timing to changes in transaction costs and portfolio revision frequencies. It is 
important to note that the quarterly and monthly simulated results have been 
annualised for comparative purposes. In addition, the assumptions of 1 percent 
transaction costs for all three less than perfect sector timing strategies are excluded 
in this chapter; however, they are illustrated in the Appendices. 
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6.2 Potential Gains from Perfect Sector Timing 
In order to evaluate the potential gains from perfect sector timing, the study looks at 
three simulated sector timing strategies as illustrated in Table 6.1 below. The first 
simulated strategy involves switching between the Financial (FINI) and Industrial 
(INDI) indices. The second simulated strategy involves switching between Resource 
(RESI) and INDI and the third simulated strategy involves switching between RESI 
and FINI.  
 
A hypothetical market timer is assumed to call every market turn with perfect 
forecasting accuracy. For example, if a market timer is switching between RESI and 
FINI and foresees a change in the market great enough to cover transaction costs, 
he/she will move all assets under management (AUM) into RESI in the case of a 
resource dominant market (RESI outperforms FINI); or switch into FINI in the case of 
a financial dominant market (FINI outperforms RESI). For each period a perfect 
market timer is assumed to have the ability to place capital in the sector which yields 
the greater return for the period.  
 
Table 6.1: Sector Timing Strategies 
Sector Timing Strategies Index A Index B 
Sector Timing Strategy 1 FINI INDI 
Sector Timing Strategy 2 RESI INDI 
Sector Timing Strategy 3 RESI FINI 
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6.2.1 Simulated Buy and Hold Strategies 
Table 6.2 below provides the monthly, quarterly and annual historical returns and 
standard deviations for a buy and hold strategy in the sector indices as well as for 
the All Share index (ALSI) and the STEFI Call Deposit index (STEFI) over the period 
from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2016. As illustrated in Table 6.2 below, out of 
all the asset classes, INDI yields the greatest annual return over the examination 
period. The results show that INDI yields an annual return of 21.56 percent with a 
standard deviation of 19.78 percent. Comparatively, RESI yields an annual return of 
15.19 percent with a standard deviation of 27.91 percent. RESI yields the lowest 
return out of the sector indices and the ALSI, with much greater variability of returns.  
 
Table 6.2: Historical Buy and Hold Performance: RESI, INDI, FINI, Stocks and Cash 
Equivalents 
 
 
Asset Classes 
RESI INDI FINI STEFI FTSE/ALSI Top 40 Stocks 
Monthly  
Mean Returns 0.52% 1.34% 0.90% 0.61% 0.94% 
Std. Dev. 7.39% 4.58% 4.99% 0.20% 4.90% 
Quarterly  
Mean  Returns 3.33% 4.37% 2.70% 2.04% 3.39% 
Std. Dev. 13.27% 9.70% 10.38% 0.59% 9.86% 
Annual  
Mean returns 15.19% 21.56% 16.16% 8.26% 17.04% 
Std. Dev. 27.91% 19.78% 22.29% 2.54% 20.59% 
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Table 6.3 below provides the simulated buy and hold returns and standard 
deviations for RESI, INDI, FINI, ALSI and the STEFI; as opposed to Table 6.2 which 
illustrates the actual returns and standard deviations. As illustrated below, the 
simulated results of the sector indices, ALSI and STEFI do not differ much from the 
actual returns and standard deviations in Table 6.2. As mentioned in Section 5.2.1, 
an investor solely invested in the STEFI yielded the lowest mean return with the 
lowest variability of return. The strategy solely invested in the ALSI yields a greater 
return than STEFI, on average, however, with much greater variability when 
compared to STEFI as indicated by the standard deviations. The results also reveal 
that a buy and hold strategy solely invested INDI yields the greatest return with the 
least variability, when compared to RESI, FINI and the ALSI. Moreover, results 
illustrate that RESI yields the lowest return out of the sector indices, with the greatest 
variability of returns.    
Table 6.3: Overall Simulated Buy and Hold Performance: RESI, INDI, FINI, Stocks 
and Cash Equivalents 
 
Asset Classes 
RESI INDI FINI STEFI 
FTSE/ALSI Top 40 
Stocks 
Monthly  
Mean Returns 0.61% 1.46% 0.96% 0.61% 0.99% 
Std. Dev. 7.42% 4.56% 4.98% 0.20% 4.87% 
Quarterly  
Mean  Returns 3.34% 4.44% 2.90% 2.05% 3.43% 
Std. Dev. 13.19% 9.58% 10.39% 0.58% 9.95% 
Annual  
Mean returns 15.09% 21.69% 16.09% 8.27% 16.93% 
Std. Dev. 27.87% 20.15% 22.53% 2.52% 20.80% 
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6.2.2 Simulated Perfect Sector Timing Strategy 
Table 6.4 below summarises the simulated results for a hypothetical market timer, 
with perfect forecasting accuracy, who revises his/her portfolio on a monthly, 
quarterly and annual basis assuming various transaction costs incurred (2 percent, 1 
percent and 0 percent) respectively. The mean returns and standard deviation of 
returns from perfect sector timing for the three sector timing strategies, namely: 
financial and industrial indices (FINI_INDI), resource and industrial indices 
(RESI_INDI) and resource and financial indices (RESI_FINI) are illustrated in Table 
6.4 below. To demonstrate the effect transaction costs have on mean returns and 
standard deviations, it is assumed transaction costs of 2 percent or 1 percent are 
incurred, respectively, of the value of AUM every time there is a switch from one 
index to another. The sector timing strategies assume no withdrawals or additions 
into the investment. 
 
In addition to the average returns and standard deviations to the perfect sector 
timing strategies, Table 6.4 below also illustrates the simulated potential gains 
available to a hypothetical market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy who 
revises the strategy on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis with different 
assumptions for the transaction costs incurred (2 percent, 1 percent and 0 percent) 
respectively. As previously mentioned in Section 4.1, potential gains from sector 
timing is defined as the incremental returns of a sector timing strategy in excess of a 
buy and hold strategy in the ALSI.  
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Table 6.4: Overall Performance: Perfect Sector Timing Strategy 
 
Note: The quarterly and monthly results in Table 6.4 above have been annualised for comparative purposes 
Results in Table 6.4 above reveal that if a market timer possesses perfect 
forecasting accuracy when applying any of the three sector timing strategies, he/she 
would have significantly outperformed a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI, even 
when taking into account the maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction costs. 
As illustrated in Table 6.3 above, an investor who applied a buy and hold strategy in 
the ALSI would have yielded an annual return of only 16.93 percent and a standard 
deviation of 20.80 percent. Additionally, an investor may also apply a buy and hold 
strategy in the sector indices. A perfect timing strategy could also be compared to a 
buy and hold strategy in any of the sector indices. For example, if an investor applied 
a buy and hold strategy in RESI, INDI or FINI, he/she would have yielded an annual 
return of 15.09 percent. 21.69 percent or 16.09 percent, as illustrated in Table 6.3.  
Portfolio 
revisions 
Switching between Asset Classes with various Transaction Costs 
FINI_INDI RESI_INDI RESI_FINI 
 
0% 1% 2% 0% 1% 2% 0% 1% 2% 
Monthly 
 
Mean Returns 57.72% 49.02% 40.60% 69.59% 60.10% 51.28% 65.54% 56.27% 47.47% 
Std. Dev. 13.82% 13.93% 14.24% 17.25% 17.29% 17.53% 18.05% 18.12% 18.39% 
Potential Gains 40.79% 32.09% 23.67% 52.66% 43.17% 34.53% 48.61% 39.34% 30.54% 
Quarterly 
 
Mean Returns 43.19% 40.64% 38.13% 48.34% 45.67% 43.08% 42.40% 39.69% 37.41% 
Std. Dev. 16.68% 16.72% 16.82% 19.12% 19.14% 19.18% 25.47% 22.76% 20.48% 
Potential Gains 26.26% 23.71% 21.20% 31.41% 28.74% 26.15% 12.30% 9.89% 7.67% 
Annually 
 
Mean Returns 31.09% 30.60% 30.11% 32.20% 31.72% 31.23% 29.62% 29.11% 28.60% 
Std. Dev. 17.07% 17.08% 17.11% 19.16% 19.16% 19.18% 20.89% 20.89% 20.91% 
Potential Gains 14.16% 13.67% 13.18% 15.27% 14.79% 14.30% 12.69% 12.18% 11.67% 
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Results also reveal that for all three perfect sector timing strategies, the more 
frequently a market timer revises his/her portfolio, the greater the returns. In addition, 
out of all three perfect sector timing strategies, under all portfolio revisions, a market 
timer switching between RESI and INDI yields the greatest return with the least 
variability of returns. Results in Table 6.4 overall reveal that if  market timer who 
possesses perfect forecasting accuracy when switching between the sector indices 
would have substantially improved upon the returns of a buy and hold strategy in the 
ALSI, under all portfolio revision frequencies, even when the maximum assumption 
of 2 percent transaction costs are taken into account. However, if any of the three 
perfect sector timing strategies are compared to a buy and hold strategy in INDI 
which yields an annual return of 21.69 percent, the potential gains available to a 
market timer would have decreased substantially. Section 6.2.2.1 and Section 
6.2.2.2 below discuss the sensitivity of potential gains to portfolio frequency revisions 
and various transaction costs respectively, when compared to a buy and hold 
strategy in the ALSI, based on the results provided in Table 6.4 above. 
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Sensitivity Analysis: the effect of portfolio revision frequency 
Results in Table 6.4 above reveal the average returns when no transaction costs are 
taken into account for the perfect sector timing strategies, FINI and INDI, RESI and 
INDI and RESI and FINI are 31.09 percent, 32.20 percent and 29.62 percent 
respectively. The standard deviations of returns for the three perfect sector timing 
strategies are 17.07 percent, 19.16 percent and 20.89 percent respectively. In 
addition, the potential gains for the three sector timing strategies are 14.16 percent, 
15.27 percent and 12.69 percent respectively. The results suggest that when no 
transaction costs are taken into account and annual portfolio revisions, a market 
timer would yield the greatest potential gains when switching between RESI and 
INDI.  
 
Results also indicate that if a market timer had revised his/her portfolio on a monthly 
basis, ignoring transaction costs when switching between, FINI and INDI, RESI and 
INDI and RESI and FINI, he/she would yield mean returns of 57.72 percent, 69.59 
percent and 65.54 percent respectively. The standard deviations for the three perfect 
sector timing strategies are 13.82 percent, 17.25 percent and 18.05 percent 
respectively. Moreover, the potential gains for a hypothetical market timer applying 
the three strategies are 40.79 percent, 52.66 percent and 48.61 percent respectively.  
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In summary, across all the sector timing strategies, results reveal that when 
increasing the frequency of portfolio revisions from annually to monthly, ignoring 
transaction costs, the mean returns increase and the standard deviations decrease. 
The results distinctly illustrate that the advantages of perfect sector timing on the 
JSE are certainly attractive. It is evident that a market timer who possesses perfect 
forecasting accuracy when switching between the sector indices would have 
substantially improved upon the returns of a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI, under 
all portfolio revision frequencies. Similar to the perfect bull and bear market timing 
results in Chapter 5, Table 6.4 also demonstrates that if a market timer revises 
his/her portfolio more frequently, ignoring transaction costs, he/she will yield greater 
potential gains with less variability of returns. The results imply that a perfect sector 
timing strategy yields vastly greater returns, on average, with less risk compared to 
that of a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI. However, transaction costs have not 
been taken into account thus far.  
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Sensitivity Analysis: the effect of transaction costs 
A market timer who perfectly switched annually between FINI and INDI, RESI and 
INDI and RESI and FINI would have yielded potential gains of 13.67 percent, 14.79 
percent and 12.18 percent respectively, when incurring 1 percent transaction costs. 
Comparatively, the potential gains for the three perfect sector timing strategies when 
taking into account the maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction costs are 
13.18 percent, 14.30 percent and 11.67 percent respectively. Results in Table 6.4 
above show that when taking into account transaction costs of 1 percent and 2 
percent, both the annual average returns and potential gains decrease. However, 
when increasing transaction costs, standard deviations of returns increase for all 
three sector timing strategies.  
 
On the other hand, if a market timer had revised his/her portfolio on a monthly basis 
when switching between FINI and INDI, RESI and INDI and RESI and FINI with 1 
percent transaction costs, he/she would have yielded potential gains of 32.09 
percent, 43.17 percent and 39.34 percent respectively. Comparatively, when taking 
into account a maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction costs and monthly 
portfolio revisions for the three sector timing strategies, the potential gains decrease 
to 23.67 percent, 34.53 percent and 30.54 percent respectively. When evaluating all 
three sector timing strategies, results illustrate that switching between RESI and INDI 
offers greater opportunities for outperforming a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI.  
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Similar to results found in Chapter 5, the results suggest that the advantages of 
timing the market are substantially greater if more realistic assumptions are made 
about the level of transaction costs and the frequency of portfolio revisions. As 
illustrated in Table 6.4, increasing transaction costs from 0 percent to 2 percent for 
annual portfolio revisions whilst switching between RESI and INDI for example, the 
potential gains from sector timing decreases from 52.66 percent to 34.53 percent. 
However, when increasing transaction costs from 0 percent to 2 percent for quarterly 
portfolio revisions, the potential gains decrease from 31.41 percent to 26.15 percent. 
Moreover, when increasing the transaction costs for an annual market timer from 0 
percent to 2 percent, the potential gains decrease from 15.27 percent to 14.30 
percent.  
 
Similar to the results found in Chapter 5, the larger decreases in potential gains 
when increasing portfolio revisions are due to the fact that a market timer incurs 
more transaction costs as he/she revises their portfolio more often, as illustrated 
across all three sector timing strategies. The above results concur with that of 
Hsieh’s (2013a) study in the Taiwanese market; a market timer applying a sector 
timing strategy achieves greater returns with lower switching costs and the more 
frequently he/she revises their portfolio. It is evident that under all three portfolio 
revision periods, a perfect market timer with perfect switching between the sector 
indices yields greater returns with less variability than that of an investor who buys 
and holds the ALSI, even when taking into account transaction costs of 1 percent 
and 2 percent respectively. However, the results are based on the unrealistic 
assumption that a market timer is able to engage in perfect sector timing.  
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6.3 Potential Gains from Less than Perfect Sector Timing on the JSE 
In order to evaluate the potential gains from less than perfect sector timing on the 
JSE, assumptions are made regarding forecasting accuracies and switching 
between the sector indices. A hypothetical market timer is assumed to switch 
between the sector indices depending on his/her prediction for the upcoming period. 
For example, when evaluating the third sector timing strategy, a hypothetical market 
timer is assumed to switch between RESI and FINI; dependent on whether a 
resource dominant market or a financial dominant market is forecasted for the 
upcoming period.  A resource dominant market is defined as the period in which 
RESI yields greater returns than FINI, and vice-versa for a financial dominant 
market. Following the assumption originally proposed by Chua et al. (1987), a 
market timer is assumed to have various forecasting accuracies in different sectors.  
 
Similar to perfect sector timing, potential gains from less than perfect sector timing 
for a hypothetical market timer is evaluated on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis 
with different assumptions for the transaction costs incurred (2 percent, 1 percent 
and 0 percent). Potential gains from the sector timing strategies are defined as the 
return of the strategy in excess of a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI. The results 
from this chapter do not include any results obtained from a market timer that 
possesses less than 50 percent forecasting accuracy; as a market timer that holds 
predictions less or equal to 50 percent does not possess any forecasting ability. 
Therefore, similar to Chapter 5, permutations start at 50 percent (i.e. no forecasting 
accuracy in both sectors), with the level of forecasting accuracies increasing by 10 
percent increments to 100 percent (perfect forecasting accuracy). 
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6.3.1 Annual Revision Frequency 
A series of Monte Carlo simulations are implemented using various combinations of 
FINI and INDI forecasting accuracies in order to evaluate the potential gains from 
less than perfect sector timing strategies. The simulated potential gains, standard 
deviations of potential gains and win/loss ratios for each permutation of forecasting 
accuracies in FINI and INDI sectors are shown in Table 6.5 below.  
 
Each row in Table 6.5 represents the potential gains from sector timing for a market 
timer with the same accuracy in forecasting the industrial dominant market with 
differing accuracies in forecasting the financial dominant sector, from 50 percent to 
100 percent. Similarly, each column shows the sensitivity of potential gains from 
sector timing for a market timer with the same accuracy in forecasting the financial 
dominant sector with differing accuracies in forecasting the industrial dominant 
sector, from 50 percent to 100 percent. Table 6.5 below illustrates the simulated 
results for a market timer who revises his/her portfolio on an annual basis when 
switching between FINI and INDI sectors on the JSE without incurring transaction 
costs.  
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Table 6.5: Imperfect Annual Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
INDI FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 2.21% 2.92% 4.30% 4.87% 6.11% 6.54% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.86% 29.36% 28.50% 27.65% 27.55% 27.46% 
  Win/Loss 1.11 1.19 1.25 1.32 1.38 1.42 
60% Mean(%) 3.73% 4.62% 4.78% 6.53% 7.10% 8.10% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.77% 29.15% 28.32% 27.50% 27.43% 27.30% 
  Win/Loss 1.22 1.28 1.34 1.4 1.49 1.56 
70% Mean(%) 5.20% 6.60% 7.01% 7.85% 9.05% 9.45% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.70% 28.62% 28.51% 27.45% 27.32% 27.24% 
  Win/Loss 1.38 1.42 1.54 1.61 1.67 1.75 
80% Mean(%) 7.01% 8.23% 8.43% 9.31% 10.11% 11.57% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.45% 28.32% 28.25% 27.17% 27.11% 27.15% 
  Win/Loss 1.48 1.54 1.63 1.75 1.83 1.9 
90% Mean(%) 9.03% 9.41% 9.61% 10.47% 11.87% 13.86% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.18% 28.22% 27.70% 27.46% 27.15% 27.10% 
  Win/Loss 1.61 1.76 1.82 1.95 2.05 2.14 
100% Mean(%) 9.89% 11.04% 11.75% 12.42% 13.45% 14.16% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.89% 28.67% 27.56% 27.38% 27.10% 27.05% 
  Win/Loss 1.74 1.79 1.97 1.99 2.24 2.42 
 
The simulated results in Table 6.5 above reveal that if a market timer has no 
forecasting accuracy in either financial or industrial dominant market (i.e. 50 percent 
joint forecasting accuracy), ignoring transactions, he/she may yield an average 
return of 2.21 percent per annum above a buy and hold strategy in ALSI with a 
standard deviation of potential gains equals to 29.86 percent. The results reveal that 
even if a market timer does not possess any forecasting accuracy, he/she will yield 
potential gains. The standard deviation indicates that switching between FINI and 
INDI is substantially high relative to the potential gains; therefore suggesting that 
switching between these two sectors is risky. The win/loss ratio is 1.11 when a 
market timer has a joint forecasting accuracy of 50 percent. The win/loss ratio 
indicates that the probability of a market timer benefiting from sector timing is 
approximately (1.11/ (1+1.11)) 52.61 percent.  
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The simulated results also reveal that a market timer with perfect forecasting 
accuracy will outperform a buy and hold strategy by 14.16 percent per annum with a 
standard deviation of potential gains equals to 27.05 percent. The results in Table 
6.5 strongly indicate that even if a market timer has no forecasting accuracy when 
switching between FINI and INDI, he/she could still outperform a buy and hold 
strategy in the ALSI. This is due to the fact that INDI has a substantially higher return 
than the ALSI as illustrated in Table 6.3 above. Therefore, results in Table 6.5 show 
that improvements in the forecasting ability in the industrial dominant market result in 
potential gains drastically increasing.  
 
Results also reveal that as the market timer’s forecasting accuracy increases, so do 
the potential gains and win/loss ratios. On the contrary, as the forecasting accuracy 
increases the standard deviation decreases. This indicates that as a market timer’s 
forecasting accuracy increases, the risk associated with the sector timing strategy 
decreases.  
 
Table 6.6 below illustrates the results for a market timer who switches between FINI 
and INDI on an annual basis, incurring the maximum assumption of 2 percent 
transaction costs. Results reveal that even when taking into account transaction 
costs of 2 percent, a market timer who does not possess any forecasting accuracy 
(i.e. a joint forecasting accuracy of 50 percent in both FINI and INDI) will yield 
potential gains of 0.16 percent with a standard deviation of potential gains equals to 
30.15 percent. 
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Moreover, the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 indicating that even if a market timer 
does not possess forecasting accuracy and assuming maximum transaction costs of 
2 percent, he/she has a greater than 50 percent probability of outperforming a buy 
and hold strategy in the ALSI. The win/loss ratio is 1.06 when a market timer has a 
joint forecasting accuracy of 50 percent in both FINI and INDI. The win/loss ratio 
indicates that the probability of a market timer benefiting from sector timing is 
approximately (1.06/ (1+1.06)) 51.46 percent. However, the probabilities are close to 
50 percent, which implies that a market timer has a 50/50 chance of outperforming a 
buy and hold strategy in the ALSI. Results also reveal that when taking into account 
transaction costs of 2 percent, the potential gains decrease on average by 
approximately 1 percent per annum.  
Table 6.6: Imperfect Annual Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
INDI 
FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 0.16% 1.90% 2.79% 4.06% 3.84% 5.72% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.15% 30.04% 29.95% 29.86% 29.75% 29.68% 
  Win/Loss 1.06 1.12 1.19 1.25 1.3 1.35 
60% Mean(%) 2.14% 3.89% 4.20% 5.31% 6.16% 8.00% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.98% 29.90% 29.83% 29.75% 29.66% 29.52% 
  Win/Loss 1.16 1.21 1.27 1.35 1.39 1.46 
70% Mean(%) 4.12% 4.95% 6.33% 7.60% 7.60% 8.66% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.77% 29.69% 29.64% 29.55% 29.48% 29.38% 
  Win/Loss 1.3 1.38 1.45 1.53 1.62 1.67 
80% Mean(%) 6.23% 6.65% 7.32% 8.08% 10.09% 10.44% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.57% 29.49% 29.30% 29.18% 29.10% 28.98% 
  Win/Loss 1.41 1.46 1.53 1.62 1.69 1.78 
90% Mean(%) 7.44% 7.59% 10.21% 9.46% 11.05% 11.60% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.11% 28.98% 28.90% 28.40% 28.28% 28.11% 
  Win/Loss 1.53 1.62 1.75 1.86 1.98 2.04 
100% Mean(%) 8.94% 9.76% 10.21% 11.84% 12.62% 13.18% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.02% 28.75% 28.28% 28.20% 27.74% 27.65% 
  Win/Loss 1.64 1.69 1.81 1.89 2.13 2.25 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
POTENTIAL GAINS FROM SECTOR TIMING ON THE JSE 6-18 
 
 
Table 6.7 below show the results for a market timer who switches between RESI and 
INDI sectors on an annual basis, without any transaction costs being incurred. 
Results indicate that a market timer with no forecasting accuracy will yield potential 
gains of 1.47 percent with a standard deviation of 32.50 percent. When taking into 
account 0 percent transaction costs, a market timer switching between RESI and 
INDI with no forecasting accuracy yields approximately 50 percent less potential 
gains when compared to Table 6.5; whereby a market timer switching between FINI 
and INDI yields 2.21 percent, as well as incurring greater risk as indicated by the 
standard deviations. However, when a market timer possesses perfect forecasting 
accuracy, he/she will yield potential gains of 15.27 percent compared to 14.16 
percent in Table 6.5. Moreover, a market timer switching between RESI and INDI 
starts to yield greater potential gains than a market timer switching between FINI and 
INDI when he/she possesses a joint forecasting accuracy 70 percent or more. 
Table 6.7: Imperfect Annual Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 1.47% 1.83% 4.01% 4.37% 5.85% 6.43% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.50% 32.42% 32.29% 32.21% 32.16% 32.07% 
  Win/Loss 1.07 1.15 1.23 1.29 1.36 1.45 
60% Mean(%) 3.19% 4.41% 5.10% 6.47% 7.76% 8.49% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.11% 32.04% 31.90% 31.83% 31.69% 31.55% 
  Win/Loss 1.19 1.23 1.35 1.48 1.55 1.6 
70% Mean(%) 5.15% 6.52% 7.58% 8.10% 9.35% 10.28% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.92% 31.80% 31.70% 31.55% 31.42% 31.26% 
  Win/Loss 1.34 1.4 1.53 1.58 1.64 1.77 
80% Mean(%) 6.82% 7.91% 9.03% 9.81% 10.33% 12.42% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.96% 30.75% 30.60% 30.47% 30.31% 31.22% 
  Win/Loss 1.47 1.57 1.64 1.78 1.86 1.92 
90% Mean(%) 8.71% 9.78% 10.40% 11.44% 13.00% 14.55% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.15% 30.05% 29.92% 29.76% 29.55% 29.39% 
  Win/Loss 1.62 1.75 1.87 1.92 2.07 2.18 
100% Mean(%) 10.70% 11.73% 12.27% 13.52% 14.57% 15.27% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.54% 29.32% 29.18% 29.00% 28.93% 29.83% 
  Win/Loss 1.82 1.9 2.04 2.18 2.19 2.34 
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Table 6.8 below looks at a market timer who switches between RESI and INDI on an 
annual basis, incurring transaction costs of 2 percent. The potential gains available 
to a market timer with no forecasting accuracy decreases 1.47 percent as illustrated 
in Table 6.7 to 0.15 percent with a standard deviation of potential gains equal to 
32.51 percent. The win/loss ratio is 1.02 when a market timer has no forecasting 
accuracy, indicating that a market timer switching between RESI and INDI has a (1/ 
(1+1.02)) 50.50 percent chance of outperforming a buy and hold strategy compared 
to (1/ (1+1.07)) 51.69 percent when no transaction costs are incurred. Results reveal 
that even when taking into account transaction costs of 2 percent, when switching 
between FINI and INDI or RESI and INDI, a market timer does not require 
forecasting accuracy in order to yield potential gains. Additionally, the probability of a 
market timer outperforming a buy and hold strategy is above 50 percent even when 
transaction costs are 2 percent.  
Table 6.8: Imperfect Annual Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 0.15% 1.69% 2.74% 3.53% 4.55% 5.75% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.51% 32.40% 32.32% 32.26% 32.14% 32.06% 
  Win/Loss 1.02 1.10 1.18 1.23 1.30 1.39 
60% Mean(%) 2.47% 3.32% 4.20% 4.96% 6.69% 7.17% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.43% 32.28% 32.14% 31.96% 31.85% 31.72% 
  Win/Loss 1.13 1.22 1.34 1.41 1.48 1.53 
70% Mean(%) 4.45% 5.20% 5.54% 7.16% 8.29% 9.15% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.99% 31.89% 31.84% 31.48% 31.24% 31.15% 
  Win/Loss 1.38 1.43 1.47 1.52 1.63 1.69 
80% Mean(%) 6.37% 7.21% 7.90% 8.88% 10.23% 11.26% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.02% 30.91% 30.77% 30.51% 30.33% 30.04% 
  Win/Loss 1.40 1.47 1.56 1.64 1.78 1.82 
90% Mean(%) 7.69% 9.06% 9.89% 10.56% 11.88% 12.20% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.17% 30.02% 29.75% 29.64% 29.52% 29.31% 
  Win/Loss 1.54 1.63 1.75 1.88 1.97 2.06 
100% Mean(%) 9.64% 10.66% 11.19% 12.47% 13.86% 14.30% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.03% 29.74% 29.59% 29.43% 29.13% 28.85% 
  Win/Loss 1.72 1.79 1.93 2.05 2.07 2.20 
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Table 6.9 below shows the results for a market timer who switches between RESI 
and FINI on an annual basis, and does not incur any transaction costs. A market 
timer with a 50 percent joint forecasting accuracy in both RESI and FINI would have 
underperformed a buy and hold strategy by an average of 1.96 percent per annum. 
On the other hand, a market timer requires a 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy in 
both RESI and FINI to yield potential gains. A market timer may also possess the 
following forecasting accuracies: 70 percent accuracy in RESI and 50 percent in FINI 
or 50 percent accuracy in RESI and 70 percent in FINI. The win/loss ratio is greater 
than 1 when a market timer possesses a 60 percent forecasting accuracy in RESI 
and 50 percent in FINI, 50 percent in RESI and 70 percent in FINI or a joint 
forecasting accuracy of 60 percent in both RESI and FINI. The simulated results also 
illustrate that a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy will yield potential 
gains of 12.69 percent per annum with a standard deviation 29.69 percent. 
Table 6.9: Imperfect Annual Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -1.96% -0.69% 0.02% 1.93% 3.28% 5.10% 
  Std Dev (%) 33.44% 33.32% 33.16% 33.01% 32.82% 32.68% 
  Win/Loss 0.98 1.02 1.11 1.19 1.29 1.33 
60% Mean(%) -0.35% 1.02% 2.46% 3.64% 5.34% 6.59% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.70% 32.59% 32.38% 32.29% 32.13% 32.01% 
  Win/Loss 1.03 1.12 1.23 1.35 1.46 1.51 
70% Mean(%) 0.96% 2.66% 4.23% 5.76% 6.60% 7.54% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.13% 32.01% 31.92% 31.78% 31.64% 31.45% 
  Win/Loss 1.21 1.29 1.34 1.41 1.52 1.58 
80% Mean(%) 2.65% 4.01% 6.08% 6.76% 7.92% 9.94% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.78% 31.47% 31.78% 31.55% 31.15% 31.03% 
  Win/Loss 1.30 1.39 1.45 1.56 1.66 1.74 
90% Mean(%) 4.80% 5.81% 6.22% 8.55% 9.60% 11.12% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.38% 31.15% 31.06% 30.87% 30.64% 30.54% 
  Win/Loss 1.40 1.51 1.64 1.78 1.85 1.98 
100% Mean(%) 5.38% 7.56% 8.45% 10.17% 11.26% 12.69% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.89% 30.56% 30.42% 30.36% 29.80% 29.69% 
  Win/Loss 1.53 1.63 1.8 1.87 1.94 2.19 
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Table 6.10 below illustrates the results for a market timer who revises his/her 
portfolio annually when switching between RESI and FINI, incurring 2 percent 
transaction costs. The green highlighted blocks illustrate the potential gains that 
were available to a market timer when transaction costs are not taken into account 
as previously illustrated in Table 6.9 above. The red blocks indicate the potential 
gains available to a market timer when the maximum assumption of 2 percent 
transaction costs is taken into account. Similar to Table 6.9, a market timer requires 
a joint forecasting accuracy of 60 percent in both RESI and FINI to outperform a buy 
and hold strategy. However, even though the joint forecasting accuracy required is 
the same when taking into account transaction costs of 2 percent, the potential gains 
available to a market timer decreases by approximately 1 percent per annum with a 
market timer exposed to greater risk as illustrated by the standard deviation of 
potential gains.  
Table 6.10: Imperfect Annual Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -2.77% -0.89% -0.18% 1.79% 3.33% 4.17% 
  Std Dev (%) 33.86% 33.56% 33.38% 32.98% 33.92% 33.82% 
  Win/Loss 0.93 0.99 1.03 1.09 1.18 1.24 
60% Mean(%) -1.04% 0.05% 1.84% 2.89% 4.37% 5.99% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.95% 32.62% 32.52% 32.56% 33.53% 32.98% 
  Win/Loss 0.98 1.10 1.20 1.29 1.37 1.44 
70% Mean(%) 0.44% 1.96% 3.56% 3.95% 6.14% 7.81% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.53% 32.50% 32.47% 32.17% 32.16% 32.30% 
  Win/Loss 1.12 1.21 1.32 1.39 1.46 1.5 
80% Mean(%) 1.88% 3.91% 4.26% 5.91% 7.76% 9.20% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.09% 31.88% 31.72% 31.68% 31.382% 31.02% 
  Win/Loss 1.19 1.34 1.42 1.51 1.59 1.66 
90% Mean(%) 3.70% 5.06% 5.96% 6.94% 8.73% 10.70% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.45% 31.31% 31.19% 30.93% 30.84% 30.64% 
  Win/Loss 1.29 1.42 1.55 1.63 1.78 1.86 
100% Mean(%) 5.08% 6.59% 7.88% 9.54% 10.79% 11.67% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.97% 30.76% 30.76% 30.42% 29.93% 29.70% 
  Win/Loss 1.38 1.54 1.7 1.77 1.85 2.08 
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A market timer may also possess forecasting accuracies of 80 percent in RESI and 
50 percent in FINI or 50 percent in RESI and 70 percent in FINI to yield potential 
gains. The win loss ratio is greater than 1 when a market timer possesses 
forecasting accuracies of 70 percent in RESI and 50 percent in FINI, 50 percent in 
RESI and 70 percent in FINI or a joint forecasting accuracy of 60 percent in both 
RESI and FINI. Similar to the results of Chapter 5, transaction costs have a direct 
relationship with forecasting accuracy. This implies that an increase in transaction 
costs increases the forecasting accuracy required to achieve potential gains. On the 
other hand, transaction costs have an indirect relationship with potential gains and 
the win/loss ratio.  
 
Results overall reveal that by evaluating annual portfolio revisions, even when taking 
into account the maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction costs, a market timer 
switching between FINI and INDI, and RESI and INDI does not require any 
forecasting accuracy to benefit from potential gains. However, as illustrated in Table 
6.9, Table 6.10 and Table 6 in Appendix B, when switching between RESI and FINI, 
a market timer requires some degree of forecasting accuracy (i.e. 60 percent joint 
forecasting accuracy in both RESI and FINI) even when transaction costs are not 
taken into account. Additionally, the results illustrate that across all sector timing 
strategies; an increase in transaction costs reduces potential gains available to a 
market timer and decreases the probability that a market timer will outperform a buy 
and hold strategy in ALSI. 
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Results from annual portfolio revisions also reveal that the win/loss ratio is greater 
than 1 for a market timer switching between RESI and INDI, and FINI and INDI when 
there is a 50 percent joint forecasting in the sectors, even when the maximum 
transaction costs of 2 percent are taken into account. However, a market timer who 
switches between RESI and FINI, the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when the 
forecasting accuracy in the sectors is equal to 70 percent in either of the sectors. In 
other words, assuming that market timer switches between RESI and FINI on an 
annual basis and does not have any RESI forecasting ability, the win/loss ratio is 
greater than 1 when the accuracy in forecasting FINI is greater than or equal to 70 
percent. Similarly, assuming that a market timer does not possess any FINI 
forecasting ability when switching between RESI and FINI, the win/loss ratio is 
greater than 1 when the accuracy in forecasting RESI is greater than or equal to 70 
percent. Results overall illustrate that a market timer revising his/her portfolio 
annually when switching between RESI and INDI will yield the greatest potential 
gains out of all sector timing strategies when a market timer possesses a 70 percent 
joint forecasting accuracy or more.  
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6.3.2 Quarterly Revision Frequency 
Table 6.11 below shows the simulated results for a market timer who revises his/her 
portfolio on a quarterly basis switching between FINI and INDI, and does not incur 
any transaction costs. Results reveal that a market timer requires 50 percent joint 
forecasting accuracy in both FINI and INDI in order to benefit from potential gains. 
The potential gains available to a market timer are on average 2.46 percent annually 
compared to 2.21 percent as illustrated in Table 6.5. Results also reveal the 
probability of outperforming a buy and hold strategy is (1.03/ (1 + 1.03)) 50.74 
percent compared to 52.61 percent as shown in Table 6.5. Even though the win/loss 
ratios are similar, by revising a portfolio quarterly as opposed to annually, the 
probability of outperforming a buy and hold strategy in ALSI slightly decreases. 
However, potential gains increase as we increase the portfolio revision from annually 
to quarterly, when no transaction costs are incurred. 
Table 6.11: Imperfect Quarterly Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
INDI 
FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 2.46% 3.81% 5.30% 7.27% 9.87% 11.59% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.28% 26.16% 26.01% 25.88% 25.70% 25.51% 
  Win/Loss 1.03 1.14 1.17 1.3 1.34 1.44 
60% Mean(%) 4.35% 6.51% 8.33% 9.78% 12.20% 14.53% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.02% 25.86% 25.67% 25.52% 25.36% 25.20% 
  Win/Loss 1.16 1.24 1.35 1.42 1.48 1.53 
70% Mean(%) 7.27 % 9.35% 11.25% 12.73% 15.69% 17.53% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.80% 26.12% 26.4 % 25.56% 25.58 % 25.02 % 
  Win/Loss 1.19 1.25 1.36 1.48 1.54 1.62 
80% Mean(%) 8.97% 11.07% 13.82 % 15.82% 17.80% 18.48% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.63% 25.46% 25.32% 25.25% 25.16% 25.06% 
  Win/Loss 1.30 1.44 1.52 1.63 1.76 1.84 
90% Mean(%) 10.81% 14.75% 16.36% 18.07% 20.54% 24.64% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.50% 25.40% 25.34% 25.16% 24.98% 24.50% 
  Win/Loss 1.47 1.52 1.63 1.78 1.85 1.97 
100% Mean(%) 15.64% 16.49% 19.57% 21.41% 23.65% 26.26% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.44% 25.26% 25.05% 24.72% 24.30% 24.12% 
  Win/Loss 1.60 1.73 1.82 1.89 2.09 2.12 
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Table 6.12 below illustrates the results for a market timer who revises his/her 
portfolio on a quarterly basis, incurring transaction costs of 2 percent. Results reveal 
that a market timer requires a 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy in both FINI and 
INDI to yield potential gains, compared to 50 percent joint forecasting accuracy in 
Table 6.11. The results also reveal that a market timer with a 60 percent joint 
forecasting accuracy in both FINI and INDI yields potential gains of 2.42 percent per 
annum as opposed to 6.51 percent per annum when no transaction costs are taken 
into account.  
 
A market timer may also possess forecasting accuracies of 70 percent in FINI and 
50 percent in INDI or 50 percent in FINI and 60 percent in INDI. The win/loss ratio is 
greater than 1 when a market timer has a 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy in 
both FINI and INDI, 50 percent in FINI and 60 percent in INDI or 70 percent in FINI 
and 50 percent in INDI. When taking into account 2 percent transaction costs and 
quarterly portfolio revisions, the potential gains decrease substantially due to a 
market timer switching more often between the indices and thus incurring more 
transaction costs. 
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Table 6.12: Imperfect Quarterly Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
INDI 
FINI 
    50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -2.06% -0.60% 1.25% 4.47% 5.09% 7.61% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.76% 26.60% 26.52% 26.28% 26.20% 26.12% 
  Win/Loss 0.92 1.02 1.03 1.15 1.19 1.24 
60% Mean(%) 0.96% 2.42% 3.44% 6.64% 8.84% 10.30% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.58% 26.32% 26.20% 26.10% 26.08% 25.92% 
  Win/Loss 1.03 1.10 1.15 1.21 1.26 1.36 
70% Mean(%) 2.83% 5.39% 6.05% 8.37% 10.60% 12.81% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.40% 26.12% 26.02% 25.90% 25.74% 25.28% 
  Win/Loss 1.06 1.17 1.25 1.31 1.38 1.43 
80% Mean(%) 5.09% 8.20% 10.08% 12.29% 13.56% 15.87% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.30% 26.34% 26.14% 26.00% 25.42% 25.22% 
  Win/Loss 1.16 1.24 1.35 1.48 1.55 1.61 
90% Mean(%) 8.24% 9.65% 12.16% 14.09% 17.26% 17.89% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.96% 25.76% 25.58% 25.52% 24.94% 24.82% 
  Win/Loss 1.30 1.47 1.56 1.66 1.72 1.74 
100% Mean(%) 10.94% 13.25% 15.42% 16.54% 18.57% 21.20% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.88% 25.38% 25.10% 24.99% 24.72% 24.42% 
  Win/Loss 1.42 1.55 1.60 1.64 1.81 1.86 
 
The results for a market timer who switches between RESI and INDI and revises 
his/her portfolio quarterly and incurs no transaction costs are shown in Table 6.13 
below. Results indicate that a market timer requires a 50 percent joint forecasting 
accuracy in both RESI and FINI in order to benefit from potential gains. Results also 
reveal that a market timer with 50 percent joint forecasting accuracy in RESI and 
INDI will outperform a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI on average by 2.10 percent 
per annum.  
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The win/loss ratio of 1.05 indicates that a market timer has a probability of (1.05/ 
(1.05 + 1)*100) 51.22 percent of outperforming a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI. 
Results also reveal that a market timer, who possesses perfect forecasting accuracy 
when switching between RESI and INDI, will yield on average potential gains of 
31.41 percent with a standard deviation of potential gains equal to 25.80 percent. 
Similar to annual sector timing, a market timer switching between RESI and INDI 
starts to yield greater potential gains than a market timer switching between FINI and 
INDI when they possess 70 percent joint forecasting accuracy or more. 
Table 6.13: Imperfect Quarterly Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 2.10% 2.95% 6.60% 7.31% 10.64% 13.96% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.66% 28.47% 28.33% 28.28% 28.18% 28.09% 
  Win/Loss 1.05 1.13 1.19 1.32 1.41 1.43 
60% Mean(%) 4.80% 6.22% 9.48 % 11.25 % 14.04 % 17.12 % 
  Std Dev (%) 28.56% 28.38% 28.24% 28.09% 27.93% 27.76% 
  Win/Loss 1.16 1.23 1.37 1.49 1.52 1.56 
70% Mean(%) 7.78% 9.35% 11.46% 14.04% 18.39% 19.02% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.26% 28.00% 27.85% 27.70% 27.51% 27.38% 
  Win/Loss 1.27 1.35 1.47 1.59 1.68 1.72 
80% Mean(%) 10.94% 12.77% 16.00% 17.26% 21.41% 22.34% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.94% 27.64% 27.36% 27.22% 27.07% 27.90% 
  Win/Loss 1.39 1.44 1.58 1.62 1.76 1.88 
90% Mean(%) 14.44% 14.84% 16.49% 20.44% 24.64% 25.63% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.26% 27.08% 26.78% 26.52% 26.40% 26.30% 
  Win/Loss 1.47 1.62 1.75 1.89 1.97 2.09 
100% Mean(%) 17.39% 20.17% 21.88% 25.11% 25.77% 31.41% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.98% 26.32% 26.26% 26.10% 25.97% 25.80% 
  Win/Loss 1.64 1.74 1.78 1.95 2.10 2.39 
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Table 6.14 below illustrates the results for a market timer who revises his/her 
portfolio on a quarterly basis when switching between RESI and INDI and incurs 2 
percent transaction costs. When taking into account transaction costs of 2 percent, 
the joint forecasting accuracy required increases from 50 percent as illustrated in 
Table 6.13, to 60 percent. Additionally, the other forecasting accuracies required by 
a market timer to yield potential gains are 70 percent in RESI and 50 percent in INDI 
or 50 percent in RESI and 60 percent in INDI. Assuming either no RESI or INDI 
forecasting ability, the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when a market timer has 60 
percent forecasting accuracy in either RESI or INDI respectively.  Results also reveal 
that when taking into account the maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction 
costs, the potential gains available to a market timer decreases on average by 
approximately 4 percent per annum, in comparison to Table 6.13. Moreover, the 
standard deviation overall increases, when 2 percent transaction costs are incurred. 
Table 6.14: Imperfect Quarterly Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -2.02% -0.64% 1.97% 4.18% 7.19% 9.39% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.84% 28.76% 28.66% 28.56% 28.48% 28.38% 
  Win/Loss 0.92 1.01 1.07 1.17 1.26 1.29 
60% Mean(%) 0.56% 2.22% 6.30% 7.61% 10.55% 12.07% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.70% 28.62% 28.56% 28.46% 28.36% 28.30% 
  Win/Loss 1.03 1.12 1.19 1.25 1.32 1.38 
70% Mean(%) 3.36% 6.01% 8.41% 9.82% 12.46% 15.06% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.52% 28.40% 28.24% 28.16% 28.02% 27.90% 
  Win/Loss 1.15 1.23 1.36 1.47 1.51 1.54 
80% Mean(%) 6.47% 8.24% 10.99% 13.60% 16.45% 18.52% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.74% 27.70% 27.58% 27.44% 27.30% 27.18% 
  Win/Loss 1.23 1.32 1.45 1.51 1.62 1.66 
90% Mean(%) 9.01% 12.03% 13.87% 15.55% 19.66% 21.88% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.46% 27.30% 26.90% 26.78% 26.64% 26.58% 
  Win/Loss 1.30 1.43 1.58 1.65 1.77 1.86 
100% Mean(%) 11.68% 14.62% 16.54% 18.93% 22.95% 26.15% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.14% 26.02% 25.88% 25.74% 25.62% 25.42% 
  Win/Loss 1.46 1.53 1.56 1.73 1.85 2.08 
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Table 6.15 below shows the results for a market timer switching between RESI and 
FINI on a quarterly basis, without taking transaction costs into account. Results 
reveal that a market timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 60 percent in both 
RESI and FINI in order to yield potential gains. Additionally, the other forecasting 
accuracies required by a market timer to yield potential gains are 60 percent FINI 
and 50 percent RESI or 50 percent FINI and 60 percent RESI. The win/loss ratio is 
greater than 1 when a market timer has 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy in both 
FINI and RESI. Moreover, when a market timer has a joint forecasting accuracy of 
60 percent, the win/loss ratio is 1.11, indicating that they have a probability of (1.11/ 
(1 + 1.11)*100) 52.61 percent of outperforming a buy and hold strategy. Results also 
reveal that a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy may yield potential gains 
of 29.42 percent per annum on average, when transaction costs are not taken into 
account. 
Table 6.15: Imperfect Quarterly Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -2.47% 2.18% 3.73% 6.65% 10.02% 11.78% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.14% 31.02% 30.87% 30.75% 30.62% 30.53% 
  Win/Loss 0.96 1.03 1.13 1.19 1.30 1.41 
60% Mean(%) 0.61% 3.51% 6.64% 10.60% 12.06% 16.96% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.93% 30.71% 30.54% 30.33% 30.22% 30.15% 
  Win/Loss 1.01 1.11 1.21 1.28 1.41 1.51 
70% Mean(%) 3.15% 6.56% 10.15% 12.28% 16.27% 18.73% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.75% 30.67% 30.44% 30.31% 30.15% 30.09% 
  Win/Loss 1.09 1.18 1.30 1.42 1.49 1.62 
80% Mean(%) 6.66% 9.22% 12.31% 14.56% 19.48% 22.39% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.47% 30.39% 30.29% 30.18% 30.10% 29.98% 
  Win/Loss 1.21 1.31 1.38 1.53 1.61 1.73 
90% Mean(%) 7.59% 12.69% 15.86% 17.41% 22.32% 24.88% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.91% 29.89% 29.78% 29.65% 29.55% 29.46% 
  Win/Loss 1.26 1.39 1.47 1.64 1.75 1.84 
100% Mean(%) 11.91% 15.28% 18.39% 21.57% 24.54% 25.47% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.49% 29.38% 29.29% 29.19% 29.08% 28.90% 
  Win/Loss 1.38 1.51 1.65 1.78 1.91 2.02 
 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
POTENTIAL GAINS FROM SECTOR TIMING ON THE JSE 6-30 
 
 
Table 6.16 below illustrates the results for a market timer who switches between 
RESI and FINI on a quarterly basis, incurring 2 percent transaction costs. Similar to 
that of Table 6.13, a market timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 60 percent 
in both RESI and FINI. However, when taking into account transaction costs of 2 
percent and quarterly portfolio revisions, the potential gains available to a market 
timer are on average 0.24 percent annually compared to 3.51 percent as illustrated 
in Table 6.15. Similarly to Table 6.15, the win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when a 
market timer has a joint forecasting of 60 percent in both RESI and FINI. Results 
reveal that when a market timer has a joint forecasting accuracy of 60 percent, the 
win/loss ratio is 1.01, indicating that they have a probability of (1.01/ (1 + 1.01)*100) 
50.25 percent of outperforming a buy and hold strategy. Comparatively, a market 
timer who revises his/her portfolio quarterly and does not incur transaction costs, has 
a 52.61 percent probability of outperforming a buy and hold strategy.  
Table 6.16: Imperfect Quarterly Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -6.02% -2.05% 0.47% 3.09% 5.37% 8.17% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.39% 31.21% 31.10% 30.99% 30.90% 30.82% 
  Win/Loss 0.86 0.92 1.02 1.08 1.18 1.28 
60% Mean(%) -2.88% 0.24% 2.94% 4.88% 9.99% 13.55% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.24% 31.09% 30.97% 30.85% 30.72% 30.60% 
  Win/Loss 0.91 1.01 1.09 1.14 1.26 1.36 
70% Mean(%) -0.13% 1.92% 5.01% 8.48% 11.13% 13.58% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.03% 30.93% 30.80% 30.74% 30.61% 30.55% 
  Win/Loss 0.99 1.07 1.17 1.22 1.29 1.45 
80% Mean(%) 0.47% 4.70% 8.27% 11.61% 13.27% 17.17% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.90% 30.77% 30.68% 30.57% 30.48% 30.37% 
  Win/Loss 1.09 1.15 1.23 1.30 1.38 1.47 
90% Mean(%) 5.39% 8.96% 10.92% 13.97% 16.57% 18.56% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.78% 30.67% 30.54% 30.40% 30.26% 30.11% 
  Win/Loss 1.13 1.2 1.27 1.36 1.45 1.57 
100% Mean(%) 6.73% 11.02% 12.92% 16.51% 18.01% 20.48% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.30% 30.17% 30.02% 29.94% 29.79% 29.63% 
  Win/Loss 1.23 1.26 1.31 1.39 1.49 1.60 
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6.3.3 Monthly Revision Frequency 
Table 6.17 below summarises the results for a market timer who revises his/her 
portfolio monthly with no transaction costs being incurred, when switching between 
FINI and INDI. Simulated results reveal that a market timer requires a joint 
forecasting accuracy of 60 percent to yield potential gains as opposed to 50 percent 
joint forecasting accuracy required for annual and quarterly portfolio revisions, when 
no transaction costs are incurred. Additionally, the potential gains available to a 
market timer with a 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy is on average 6.93 percent 
per annum. Results also reveal that even though a market timer’s returns are below 
that of a buy and hold strategy when a market timer has a joint forecasting accuracy 
of 50 percent in both FINI and INDI, the win/loss ratio is still greater than 1. A market 
timer who possesses perfect forecasting accuracy when switching between FINI and 
INDI may yield on average potential gains of 40.79 percent per annum.  
Table 6.17: Imperfect Monthly Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
INDI 
FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -0.48% 3.41% 8.60% 12.55% 16.77% 17.60% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.53% 25.36% 25.25% 25.15% 25.11% 25.01% 
  Win/Loss 1.07 1.11 1.19 1.23 1.35 1.45 
60% Mean(%) 4.66% 6.93% 12.68% 15.39% 20.27% 21.56% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.22% 25.05% 24.94% 24.84% 24.73% 24.60% 
  Win/Loss 1.12 1.21 1.23 1.34 1.41 1.51 
70% Mean(%) 10.69% 12.95% 15.80% 20.13% 24.46% 28.02% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.05% 24.91% 24.80% 24.66% 24.56% 24.42% 
  Win/Loss 1.24 1.25 1.32 1.43 1.51 1.61 
80% Mean(%) 14.44% 17.88% 21.27% 24.02% 29.84% 33.86% 
  Std Dev (%) 24.91% 24.80% 24.73% 24.60% 24.49% 24.42% 
  Win/Loss 1.28 1.32 1.45 1.53 1.59 1.69 
90% Mean(%) 19.56% 24.16% 24.75% 29.99% 32.61% 37.03% 
  Std Dev (%) 24.80% 24.66% 24.56% 24.42% 24.32% 24.18% 
  Win/Loss 1.31 1.42 1.55 1.69 1.85 1.91 
100% Mean(%) 23.29% 26.08% 27.87% 32.46% 37.35% 40.79% 
  Std Dev (%) 24.39% 24.18% 24.04% 23.87% 23.73% 23.56% 
  Win/Loss 1.48 1.55 1.63 1.78 1.89 2.00 
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Table 6.18 below illustrates a market timer who switches between FINI and INDI on 
a monthly basis, incurring 2 percent transaction costs. The simulated results reveal 
that a market timer requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 70 percent in both FINI 
and INDI as opposed to 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy illustrated in Table 
6.17, when no transaction costs are taken into account. Additionally, a market timer 
may also require the following forecasting accuracies: 90 percent in FINI and 50 
percent in INDI, 80 percent in FINI and 60 percent in INDI, 60 percent in FINI and 70 
percent in INDI or 50 percent in FINI and 80 percent in INDI. The win/loss ratio is 
greater than 1 when a market timer has a 70 percent joint forecasting accuracy in 
both FINI and INDI. Results reveal that a market timer with no forecasting accuracy 
and incurs 2 percent transaction costs underperforms a buy and hold strategy by 
9.77 percent per annum as opposed to underperforming a buy and hold strategy by 
0.48 when no transaction costs are incurred. 
Table 6.18: Imperfect Monthly Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
INDI 
FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -9.77% -7.06% -3.54% -1.69% 2.43% 5.41% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.88% 25.70% 25.60% 25.46% 25.36% 25.25% 
  Win/Loss 0.84 0.87 0.97 0.99 1.07 1.18 
60% Mean(%) -5.03% -3.91% -1.69% 4.16% 5.91% 9.25% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.60% 25.46% 25.36% 25.25% 25.11% 24.94% 
  Win/Loss 0.91 0.96 0.99 1.08 1.13 1.18 
70% Mean(%) -3.41% 0.36% 3.29% 7.31% 12.28% 14.57% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.60% 25.25% 25.08% 24.87% 24.77% 24.60% 
  Win/Loss 0.98 1.02 1.04 1.15 1.2 1.29 
80% Mean(%) 0.84% 4.16% 7.44% 9.77% 14.03% 16.08% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.43% 25.18% 24.94% 24.80% 24.66% 24.56% 
  Win/Loss 1.02 1.1 1.19 1.22 1.3 1.34 
90% Mean(%) 6.82% 8.73% 11.75% 16.49% 20.98% 22.87% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.11% 24.94% 24.77% 24.60% 24.32% 24.18% 
  Win/Loss 1.07 1.15 1.26 1.35 1.46 1.51 
100% Mean(%) 7.70% 12.55% 15.53% 18.30% 21.85% 23.67% 
  Std Dev (%) 7.28% 7.18% 7.09% 7.04% 6.97% 6.84% 
  Win/Loss 1.18 1.23 1.31 1.38 1.47 1.55 
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Table 6.19 below shows the simulated results for a market timer who switches 
between RESI and INDI on a monthly basis, without incurring transaction costs. 
Results reveal that a market timer with a 50 percent joint forecasting accuracy in 
both RESI and INDI outperforms a buy and hold strategy by 1.21 percent per annum 
with a standard deviation of 28.61 percent. Moreover, the win/loss ratio indicates that 
a market timer with no forecasting accuracy has a (1.01/ (1 + 1.01)) 50.25 percent 
probability of outperforming a buy and hold strategy. Results also reveal that a 
market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy will yield potential gains of 52.66 
percent per annum on average with a standard deviation of potential gains equal to 
24.74 percent.  
Table 6.19: Imperfect Monthly Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 1.21% 3.54% 9.51% 14.03% 17.46% 23.00% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.61 % 28.47% 28.38% 28.16% 28.03% 27.91% 
  Win/Loss 1.01 1.06 1.99 1.28 1.33 1.5 
60% Mean(%) 6.04% 11.75% 12.28% 17.46% 22.85% 27.57% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.89% 27.41% 28.41% 28.51 % 28.68 % 28.79 % 
  Win/Loss 1.1 1.16 1.25 1.36 1.43 1.56 
70% Mean(%) 12.55% 13.49% 21.27% 23.58% 28.32% 33.55% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.47% 27.34% 27.16% 27.06% 26.88% 26.62% 
  Win/Loss 1.19 1.28 1.34 1.44 1.57 1.69 
80% Mean(%) 18.02% 19.00% 25.78% 29.69% 37.19% 41.42% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.29% 27.03% 26.87% 26.64% 26.36% 26.19% 
  Win/Loss 1.27 1.32 1.46 1.55 1.63 1.78 
90% Mean(%) 21.41% 27.42% 29.99% 36.55% 40.92% 45.93% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.50% 26.36 % 26.09% 25.87% 25.70% 26.54% 
  Win/Loss 1.4 1.51 1.63 1.78 1.85 1.98 
100% Mean(%) 26.68% 33.70% 35.75% 42.74% 48.84% 52.66% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.91% 25.68% 25.40% 25.22% 25.06% 24.74% 
  Win/Loss 1.5 1.62 1.78 1.84 1.99 2.17 
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Table 6.20 below illustrates the simulated results for a market timer who revises 
his/her portfolio on a monthly basis when switching between RESI and INDI, taking 
into account the maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction costs. Results reveal 
that when taking into account the maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction 
costs, the joint forecasting accuracy required yielding potential gains increases to 70 
percent from 50 percent when no transaction costs incurred as illustrated in Table 
6.19. Additionally, the other forecasting accuracies required for a market timer is 80 
percent in RESI and 50 percent in INDI, 70 percent in RESI and 60 percent in INDI, 
60 percent RESI and 70 percent in INDI and 50 percent in RESI and 80 percent in 
INDI. The win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when a market timer has a 70 percent joint 
forecasting accuracy in both RESI and INDI. Results overall reveal that 2 percent 
transaction costs increases the required forecasting accuracy by approximately 20 
percentage points and drastically decreases potential gains. 
Table 6.20: Imperfect Monthly Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -10.30% -8.34% -2.67% 1.94% 4.78% 10.30% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.54% 28.41% 28.30% 28.16% 27.99% 27.89% 
  Win/Loss 0.84 0.88 0.99 1.05 1.11 1.21 
60% Mean(%) -6.29% -0.72% 3.41% 6.04% 8.08% 13.76% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.23% 28.09% 27.96% 27.78% 27.61% 27.50% 
  Win/Loss 0.90 0.94 1.04 1.11 1.2 1.28 
70% Mean(%) -2.30% 3.66% 5.28% 10.16% 14.30% 19.14% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.61% 27.50% 27.33% 27.16% 27.02% 26.81% 
  Win/Loss 0.97 1.06 1.13 1.24 1.32 1.36 
80% Mean(%) 2.80% 5.54% 12.28% 15.15% 20.13% 26.08% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.16% 26.99% 26.85% 26.67% 26.47% 26.26% 
  Win/Loss 1.04 1.17 1.22 1.29 1.37 1.43 
90% Mean(%) 8.99% 12.42% 15.66% 19.56% 23.14% 29.99% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.92% 26.74% 26.57% 26.36% 26.19% 25.98% 
  Win/Loss 1.12 1.23 1.34 1.45 1.53 1.59 
100% Mean(%) 13.89% 19.00% 20.13% 27.57% 29.69% 34.53% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.19% 25.95% 25.81% 25.63% 25.50% 25.29% 
  Win/Loss 1.22 1.36 1.41 1.57 1.65 1.71 
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The results in Table 6.7, Table 6.8, Table 6.13, Table 6.14, 6.19 and Table 6.20  
overall reveal that the potential gains available to a market timer are more sensitive 
to an increase in forecasting accuracy in an industrial dominant market as indicated 
by all portfolio revisions. This is evident in that the potential gains increase more 
along the columns than across the rows. As illustrated in Table 6.20 above, 
assuming that a market timer has no forecasting ability (i.e. 50 percent forecasting 
accuracy in both RESI and INDI, he/she underperforms a buy and hold strategy by 
10.30 percent. However, assuming that a market timer has no forecasting ability in 
the INDI market and 100 percent forecasting accuracy in the RESI market, he/she 
yields potential gains of 10.30 percent per annum. On the other hand, assuming that 
a market timer has no forecasting ability in the RESI market and 100 percent 
forecasting accuracy in the INDI market, he/she yields potential gains of 13.89 
percent per annum. This result is expected due to the fact that the industrial index is 
a better performing index than the resource index. Therefore, improving the 
forecasting accuracy for the industrial dominant market is a more effective way of 
improving the performance of the sector timing strategy. 
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Table 6.21 below shows the simulated results for a market timer switching between 
RESI and FINI on a monthly basis, without any transaction costs incurred. Results 
illustrate that a market timer requires a 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy in both 
RESI and FINI in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy. A market timer with a 
60 percent joint forecasting accuracy in both RESI and FINI yields potential gains of 
6.04 percent per annum on average. Results also reveal that a market timer with 60 
percent joint forecasting accuracy has a (1.12/ (1+1.12)) 52.83 percent probability of 
outperforming a buy and hold strategy. Similar to results in Table 6.17 (FINI_INDI), a 
market timer who revises his/her portfolio monthly and does not incur transaction 
costs requires 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy. However, a market timer with a 
60 percent joint forecasting accuracy in both FINI and INDI yields potential gains of 
6.93 percent as opposed 6.04 percent potential gains yielded by a market timer 
switching between RESI and FINI.  
Table 6.21: Imperfect Monthly Sector Timing Results (no transaction costs) 
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -3.54% -0.36% 6.93% 9.77% 13.35% 19.28% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.41%  28.29% 28.03% 27.91% 27.77% 7.55% 
  Win/Loss 0.98 1.02 1.12 1.21 1.30 1.39 
60% Mean(%) 0.96% 6.04% 10.56% 14.71% 20.70% 24.90% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.02% 27.84% 28.64% 28.54% 28.31% 29.13% 
  Win/Loss 1.05 1.12 1.23 1.30 1.40 1.48 
70% Mean(%) 7.19% 10.30% 14.71% 21.99% 26.38% 30.30% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.68% 27.43% 27.22% 27.06% 26.86% 26.66% 
  Win/Loss 1.15 1.21 1.30 1.36 1.43 1.5 
80% Mean(%) 10.69% 16.90% 19.99% 26.23% 30.30% 34.96% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.23% 27.06% 26.82% 26.54% 26.31% 26.12% 
  Win/Loss 1.26 1.28 1.37 1.45 1.52 1.59 
90% Mean(%) 17.18% 21.13% 25.34% 29.84% 34.49% 44.41% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.92% 26.75% 26.56% 26.31% 26.19% 26.02% 
  Win/Loss 1.33 1.39 1.44 1.54 1.6 1.68 
100% Mean(%) 20.70% 27.27% 33.23% 38.32% 42.58% 48.61% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.26% 26.08% 25.95% 25.80% 25.66% 25.51% 
  Win/Loss 1.45 1.52 1.59 1.63 1.70 1.77 
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Table 6.22 shows the simulated results for a market timer who switches between 
RESI and FINI on a monthly basis, incurring 2 percent transaction costs. Results 
reveal that a market timer with no forecasting accuracy underperforms a buy and 
hold strategy by 14.84 percent per annum. Results also illustrate that a market timer 
requires a joint forecasting accuracy of 70 percent in both RESI and FINI to 
outperform a buy and hold strategy. Additionally, the other forecasting accuracies 
required are: 90 percent in RESI and 50 percent in FINI, 80 percent in RESI and 60 
percent in FINI, 60 percent in RESI and 80 percent in FINI, 50 percent in RESI and 
80 percent in FINI. The win/loss ratio is greater than 1 when a market timer has a 70 
percent joint forecasting accuracy in both RESI and FINI. On average, when taking 
into account monthly portfolio revisions and the maximum assumption of 2 percent 
transaction costs, the forecasting accuracy required by a market timer when 
switching between RESI and FINI increases on average by 20 percentage points. 
Table 6.22: Imperfect Monthly Sector Timing Results (2 percent transaction costs) 
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -14.84% -11.25% -6.97% -2.61% 0.36% 5.41% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.68% 28.51% 28.34% 28.20% 27.99% 27.82% 
  Win/Loss 0.85 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.13 1.15 
60% Mean(%) -9.85% -5.50% -1.19% 2.43% 6.55% 10.03% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.41% 28.27% 28.06% 27.89% 27.64% 27.50% 
  Win/Loss 0.91 0.95 0.99 1.09 1.16 1.20 
70% Mean(%) -4.93% -1.90% 2.18% 6.42% 9.90% 13.89% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.16% 28.02% 27.89% 27.71% 27.50% 27.37% 
  Win/Loss 0.94 0.99 1.11 1.21 1.29 1.28 
80% Mean(%) 0.42% 1.94% 7.31% 12.01% 15.12% 21.27% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.82% 27.75% 27.64% 27.50% 27.30% 27.09% 
  Win/Loss 1.03 1.10 1.24 1.28 1.32 1.39 
90% Mean(%) 3.66% 7.44% 13.35% 18.30% 21.84% 28.02% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.57% 27.37% 27.02% 26.85% 26.67% 26.57% 
  Win/Loss 1.12 1.22 1.27 1.32 1.378 1.44 
100% Mean(%) 8.86% 11.88% 16.08% 21.43% 26.08% 30.54% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.60% 26.33% 26.15% 25.98% 25.88% 25.70% 
  Win/Loss 1.20 1.24 1.34 1.43 1.54 1.68 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
POTENTIAL GAINS FROM SECTOR TIMING ON THE JSE 6-38 
 
 
As illustrated by Table 6.9, Table 6.10, Table 6.21, Table 6.22, Table 6 in Appendix 
C and Table 13 in Appendix D, when switching between RESI and FINI, the potential 
gains are more sensitive to increases in the forecasting accuracy in the financial 
dominant market as opposed to the resource dominant market. This is indicated by 
potential gains increasing more along the columns than across the rows. As 
illustrated in Table 6.22 above, assuming that a market timer does not possess any 
RESI and FINI forecasting ability, he /she underperforms a buy and hold strategy by 
14.84 percent. However, assuming that a market timer has no forecasting ability in 
the FINI market and 100 percent forecasting accuracy in the RESI market, he/she 
yields potential gains of 5.41 percent per annum. On the other hand, assuming that a 
market timer has no forecasting ability in the RESI market and 100 percent 
forecasting accuracy in the FINI market, he/she yields potential gains of 8.86 percent 
per annum. This result is expected due to the fact that the financial index is a better 
performing index than the resource index. Therefore, improving the forecasting 
accuracy for the financial dominant market is a more effective way of improving the 
performance of the sector timing strategy. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
It is evident that under all three portfolio revision periods for all sector timing 
strategies, a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy yields much greater 
returns with less variability than that of an investor who buys and holds the ALSI, 
even when taking into account transaction costs of 1 percent and 2 percent 
respectively. Moreover, results overall reveal that a market timer possessing perfect 
forecasting accuracy when switching between RESI and INDI yields the greatest 
return out of the three sector timing strategies, under all three portfolio revisions. A 
market timer switching between FINI and INDI yields the second greatest return and 
a sector timing strategy when switching between RESI and FINI yields the lowest 
return with the greatest variability.  
 
The results from less-than perfect timing overall demonstrate, for both annual and 
quarterly portfolio revisions and assuming transaction costs of 2 percent, that a 
market timer who switches between the indices requires a moderate level of 
accuracy (i.e. 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy) in order to outperform a buy and 
hold strategy in the ALSI. Additionally, results reveal that a market timer with a 
moderate level of forecasting accuracy has a greater than 50 percent probability of 
outperforming a buy and hold strategy. However, when taking into account 
transaction costs and monthly portfolio revisions, a market timer requires significant 
forecasting accuracy (i.e. 70 percent joint forecasting accuracy) in order to 
outperform a buy and hold strategy in ALSI for all sector timing strategies. This may 
be due to the fact that a market timer is required to switch more often between sector 
indices, thus, incurring more transaction costs.   
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Based on the market segmentation phenomenon by Van Rensburg and Slaney 
(1997) and Van Rensburg (2002), results reveal that even when transaction costs 
are taken into account, there are potential gains available to a market timer who has 
significant forecasting accuracy when switching between RESI and INDI. Moreover, 
results illustrate that it is more important to improve on the forecasting accuracy in 
the industrial dominant market than it is to forecast the resource dominant market. 
This is illustrated by the negative potential gains across the rows, which indicates 
that it is more important to forecast INDI than it is to forecast RESI. Additionally, 
results indicate that if a market timer can only forecast a resource dominant market 
accurately 50 percent of the time, then he/she should not participate in sector timing. 
Therefore, the easiest way to outperform a buy and hold strategy is improving the 
market timing ability in the industrial dominant market. Overall, the potential gains 
from sector timing on the JSE are likely to be modest at best, and a market timer 
requires superior forecasting accuracy in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy 
in ALSI.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
Traditional finance theories such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) assume 
that investors are rational and that the market is efficient; whereby all relevant 
information is reflected in asset prices (Fama, 1965, 1970 and 1991). An efficient 
market is defined as a market with a large number of rational investors who actively 
compete but fail to outperform their rivals by consistently generating risk adjusted 
returns (Fama, 1965). Additionally, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) are of the 
belief that investors tend to be risk averse and rational in their decision making.  
 
The EMH divides an efficient market into three forms; each form has a unique 
characteristic that rules out the possibility that an investor is able to consistently 
outperform the market. The first is the weak-form EMH which states that an investor 
cannot use historical prices and volume data to determine future probable prices of 
assets. The weak-form EMH concurs with the random walk hypothesis, which states 
that a series of price changes have no memory, therefore, past prices cannot be 
used to predict future prices, as they are already incorporated in the current asset 
prices. Secondly, semi-strong form EMH is where an investor cannot use publicly 
available information to outperform the market in a consistent manner. Lastly, strong-
form EMH is where an investor cannot use private information to outperform the 
market in a consistent manner. Private information is information that is not publically 
available, and if used it would be illegal and known as insider trading. 
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Contrary to traditional finance theories, behavioural finance assumes that investors 
are irrational and make investment decisions based on their emotions and are 
subject to behavioural biases. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory’s 
outcomes are considered to have contributed to the major developments in 
behavioural finance, and the behavioural biases are considered as outcomes of the 
prospect theory. The cognitive biases outlined by prospect theory include: loss 
aversion, the disposition effect, the certainty effect, the reflection effect, mental 
accounting and heuristic simplification. These biases lead investors to violate the 
assumptions of traditional finance theories; thus causing a drift in their decisions 
from rationality towards irrationality.  
 
The presence of market segmentation between the resource sector and the financial 
sector as well as the  industrial sector on the JSE, as motivated by Van Rensburg 
and Slaney (1997) and Van Rensburg (2002), prompts this research to examine the 
potential gains from sector timing on the JSE. The primary objective of this study is 
to determine whether the market segmentation phenomenon on the JSE provides 
opportunities for profitable sector timing strategies. Defining potential gains as the 
incremental returns from a market timing strategy in excess of that of a buy and hold 
strategy in the ALSI, this study evaluates the potential gains available to a 
hypothetical market timer applying pre-specified sector timing strategies on the JSE 
over the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2016, taking into account 
different portfolio revision frequencies and transaction costs.  
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7.1 Summary of Results 
The first test in the study evaluated the potential gains available to a hypothetical 
market timer who switches between the ALSI and the STEFI in bull and bear 
markets respectively, on the JSE. The simulated buy and hold results revealed that 
an investor who applied a buy and hold strategy in the STEFI yields an annual 
average return of 8.21 percent with a standard deviation of returns of 2.52 percent. 
On the contrary, an investor holding the ALSI yields an annual average return of 
16.93 percent with a standard deviation of returns of 20.80 percent. The simulated 
buy and hold results revealed that the returns of an investor solely invested in the 
ALSI yields more than twice the return generated by an investor solely invested in 
the STEFI, however with much greater variability of returns as illustrated by the 
standard deviations.  
 
The simulated results from perfect timing overall illustrate that under all three 
portfolio revision periods, a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy yields a 
greater return with less variability than that of a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI 
even when taking into account the maximum assumption of 2 percent transaction 
costs. These results concur with that of Shape (1975), Chua, Woodward and To 
(1987) and Hsieh (2013a) studies conducted in the U.S. market, Canada and Taiwan 
respectively. This result is expected as the timing strategy assumes perfect foresight 
from the market timer hypothetically.  
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Results from less than perfect timing reveal that when taking into account 2 percent 
transaction costs, the general required joint forecasting accuracy in both the ALSI 
and the STEFI is 80 percent to yield potential gains, across all the portfolio revision 
periods. The results concur with that of Sharpe’s (1975) study in the U.S. stock 
market, Chua et al. (1987) study in the Canadian stock market, Firer, Sandler and 
Ward (1992), De Chassart and Firer (2004) and Ward and Terblanche’s (2009).  The 
latter three were conducted on the JSE, which found that potential gains are realised 
when a market timer has a great degree of predictive accuracy that is almost 
unattainable to most investors. In addition, the win/loss ratio is generally greater than 
1 when a market timer possesses 90 percent joint forecasting or more, in both the 
ALSI and the STEFI. This implies that a market timer is required to have a 90 
percent joint forecasting accuracy or more, in both the ALSI and the STEFI to 
achieve a greater probability to outperform a buy and hold strategy in the ALSI.  
 
The results obtained in this research also concur with the findings made by Chua et 
al. (1987), Shilling (1992), Khokhlov (2016) in developed markets and De Chassart 
and Firer (2004) in developing markets in that it is more important to forecast bull 
markets correctly than bear markets. If a market timer possesses no ability to predict 
an upcoming bull market (i.e. bull market forecasting accuracy of 50 percent), a 
market timer’s mean return will be less than that of a buy and hold strategy in the 
ALSI even if he/she can forecast bear markets perfectly (i.e. 100 percent bear 
forecasting accuracy). On the other hand, if a market timer’s bull market forecasting 
accuracy is greater than or equal to 80 percent, his/her potential gains will most likely 
be positive even if he/she is unable to predict the upcoming bear market at all (i.e. 50 
percent bear forecasting accuracy). 
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Overall, the results from the first test reveal that the potential gains from market 
timing between bull and bear markets on the JSE are likely to be modest at best, as 
a market timer requires superior forecasting accuracy (i.e. 80 percent joint 
forecasting accuracy or more) in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy in the 
ALSI. In addition, the forecasting accuracy required to outperform a buy and hold 
strategy in the ALSI is unattainable to most market timers. 
 
The second test evaluated the potential gains available to a hypothetical market 
timer switching between the sector indices on the JSE. The simulated buy and hold 
strategy results for an investor solely invested in INDI yields the greatest return with 
the least variability of returns compared to the other sector indices and the ALSI. An 
investor applying a buy and hold strategy in INDI yields an annual return of 21.69 
percent with a standard deviation of returns of 20.15 percent. Comparatively, an 
investor applying a buy and hold strategy in RESI generates the lowest returns with 
the greatest variability of returns out of all the sector indices and the ALSI. An 
investor applying a buy and hold strategy in RESI yields an annual return of 16.09 
percent with a standard deviation of returns of 27.87 percent.  
 
The simulated results from the sector timing simulations revealed that under all three 
portfolio revision periods, a market timer with perfect forecasting accuracy when 
switching between the sector indices, yields greater returns with less variability than 
that of an investor who buys and holds the ALSI, even when taking into account 2 
percent transaction costs.  
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These results from perfect sector timing concur with that of Hsieh’s (2013a) sector 
timing study in the Taiwanese market. In addition, when evaluating all three perfect 
sector timing strategies, results illustrate that switching between RESI and INDI 
offers the greatest opportunities for outperforming a buy and hold strategy in the 
ALSI.   
 
Based on the market segmentation phenomenon observed by Van Rensburg and 
Slaney (1997) and Van Rensburg (2002), the results from less than perfect sector 
timing simulations revealed that when transaction costs are not taken into account, a 
market timer switching between the RESI and INDI and FINI and INDI generally do 
not require any forecasting accuracy to outperform a buy and hold strategy in the 
ALSI. This could be attributed to the time-diversification benefit derived from the 
sector timing strategies. However, when transaction costs are not taken into account, 
a market timer switching between RESI and FINI generally requires moderate 
forecasting accuracy (i.e. 60 percent joint forecasting accuracy) to outperform a buy 
and hold strategy in the ALSI.  
 
For both annual and quarterly portfolio revisions with an assumption of 2 percent 
transaction costs, a market timer switching between the sector indices generally 
requires a moderate level of accuracy in order to outperform a buy and hold strategy 
in the ALSI. However, when taking into account 2 percent transaction costs and 
monthly portfolio revisions, results illustrate that a market timer requires 70 percent 
joint forecasting accuracy across all sector timing strategies.  
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The greater forecasting accuracy required by a market when increasing to monthly 
portfolio revisions are due to the fact that a market timer incurs more transaction 
costs as he/she revises their portfolio more often, as illustrated across all three 
sector timing strategies. In addition, results reveal that as portfolio revision 
frequencies increase; the joint forecasting accuracy and reducing transaction costs 
are crucial for improvements in the win/loss ratios. Thus, according to the win/loss 
ratio results, when taking into account 2 percent transaction costs and the more a 
market timer revises his/her portfolio, the likelihood of benefitting from sector timing 
requires significant forecasting accuracy (i.e. 70 percent joint forecasting accuracy or 
more).  
 
The results from less than perfect sector timing also illustrate that a market timer 
switching between RESI and INDI will generally yield the greatest potential gains out 
of all sector timing strategies when a market timer possesses a 70 percent joint 
forecasting accuracy or more in both RESI and INDI. Moreover, results illustrate that 
it is more important to improve on the forecasting accuracy in the industrial dominant 
market than it is to forecast the resource dominant market. Additionally, the results 
indicate that if a market timer can only forecast a resource dominant market 
accurately 50 percent of the time, then he/she should not participate in sector timing. 
Therefore, the most effective way to outperform a buy and hold strategy is by 
improving the market timing ability in forecasting the industrial dominant market. This 
result is expected due to the fact that the industrial index is the best performing index 
out of the three sector indices. 
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In conclusion, the results overall indicate that the benefits of market timing on the 
JSE are considerably greater when less restrictive assumptions are made about the 
frequency of portfolio revisions and the level of transaction costs. Similar results 
were obtained by Droms (1989), Kester (1990), Hsieh (2013a), Dichtl, Drobertz and 
Kryzanowski (2016) and Khokhlov (2016) in the developed markets and Ward and 
Terblanche (2009) in the developing markets. Therefore, an effective market timing 
strategy is characterised by high forecasting accuracies, frequent portfolio revisions 
and low transaction costs. 
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7.2 Recommendations 
The first recommendation is that the research can be extended to examine returns 
over different business cycles of the South African economy, as this study did not 
explicitly discuss. In particular the potential gains of sector timing on the JSE should 
be specifically studied during the downward phase of the South African business 
cycle from December 2007 to August 2009. This will assist in identifying how the 
sectors on the JSE performed during the market downturn, caused by global 
financial crisis. Furthermore, the potential gains should be compared to that 
achieved by investors in the subsequent recovery of the South African economy from 
September 2009. The other area that demands further attention to aid in the 
development of potential gains available to market timers, is the use of sector indices 
as benchmarks (RESI, INDI, FINI) to ascertain whether returns achieved by 
investors are outperforming or underperforming a specific benchmark. In addition, 
while the transaction costs and portfolio revisions are incorporated in the analysis of 
the potential gains of sector timing, the study did not take into account 0.25 percent 
and 0.50 percent transaction costs. By taking into account 0.25 percent and 0.50 
percent, we get a more accurate representation of transaction costs incurred today. 
Lastly, by extending the research period, the time specific bias will be removed and 
the results will be more relevant to investors practicing market timing today. 
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A. APPENDIX A 
The tables in Appendix A illustrate the potential gains available to a market timer 
switching between bull and bear markets on the JSE. Table A-1 below illustrates the 
potential gains available to a market timer switching between the ALSI and the 
STEFI on a monthly basis, incurring 1 percent transaction costs. Table A-2 below 
illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching between the ALSI 
and the STEFI on a quarterly basis, incurring 1 percent transaction costs. Table A-3 
below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching between 
the ALSI and the STEFI on an annual basis, incurring 1 percent transaction costs.  
Appendix A-1: Imperfect Monthly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -8.64% -6.18% -3.19% 0.36% 2.43% 5.91% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.16% 12.44% 11.60% 10.67% 9.46% 8.14% 
  Win/Loss 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.56 
60 Mean(%) -6.18% -2.84% -1.43% 2.18% 5.54% 8.08% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.41% 12.99% 12.33% 11.19% 10.29% 8.63% 
  Win/Loss 0.51 0.53 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.67 
70 Mean(%) -3.77% -1.31% 1.69% 4.53% 7.70% 11.22% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.06% 13.51% 12.89% 11.43% 10.57% 9.25% 
  Win/Loss 0.61 0.68 0.7 0.74 0.76 0.86 
80 Mean(%) -1.67% 0.72% 3.66% 6.93% 10.03% 13.76% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.48% 13.93% 12.89% 12.30% 11.05% 9.60% 
  Win/Loss 0.73 0.78 0.89 0.95 1 1.06 
90 Mean(%) 1.33% 3.91% 6.29% 9.38% 12.28% 16.08% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.10% 14.34% 13.51% 12.57% 11.47% 10.01% 
  Win/Loss 0.83 0.87 0.94 0.98 1.15 1.25 
100 Mean(%) 2.18% 6.42% 8.08% 11.48% 15.66% 17.60% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.28% 14.79% 13.65% 12.89% 11.64% 10.39% 
  Win/Loss 0.97 1.04 1.19 1.24 1.38 1.46 
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Appendix A-2: Imperfect Quarterly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -4.25% -2.69% -1.08% 0.60% 2.34% 4.02% 
  Std Dev (%) 12.90% 12.04% 11.42% 10.26% 8.88% 7.68% 
  Win/Loss 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.55 
60 Mean(%) -2.89% -1.91% 0.12% 1.73% 3.44% 5.30% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.58% 12.70% 11.94% 10.96% 9.66% 8.20% 
  Win/Loss 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.65 0.68 
70 Mean(%) -2.46% -0.24% 1.61% 3.20% 5.26% 6.60% 
  Std Dev (%) 13.76% 13.26% 12.46% 11.32% 10.18% 8.58% 
  Win/Loss 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.79 
80 Mean(%) -1.35% 1.53% 3.12% 4.06% 6.35% 8.07% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.24% 13.76% 12.60% 11.72% 10.42% 9.04% 
  Win/Loss 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.83 
90 Mean(%) -0.04% 2.38% 4.02% 5.59% 6.93% 8.88% 
  Std Dev (%) 14.80% 14.12% 13.08% 12.10% 10.84% 9.36% 
  Win/Loss 0.85 0.87 0.95 0.98 1.19 1.32 
100 Mean(%) 1.49% 3.16% 5.30% 6.85% 8.92% 10.68% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.14% 14.28% 13.44% 12.12% 11.12% 9.98% 
  Win/Loss 1.00 1.09 1.18 1.23 1.25 1.59 
 
Appendix A-3: Imperfect Annual Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
Bear Market 
Accuracy (%) 
Bull Market Accuracy (%) 
  50 60 70 80 90 100 
50 Mean(%) -3.21% -2.28% -0.91% 0.39% 1.39% 2.34% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.08% 14.18% 13.08% 12.28% 10.14% 7.84% 
  Win/Loss 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.68 
60 Mean(%) -2.81% -1.48% -0.23% 0.94% 1.84% 3.06% 
  Std Dev (%) 15.81% 14.74% 13.52% 12.17% 10.62% 8.50% 
  Win/Loss 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.58 0.60 0.86 
70 Mean(%) -2.06% -1.07% 0.26% 1.47% 2.69% 3.63% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.24% 15.41% 14.28% 13.04% 11.20% 9.21% 
  Win/Loss 0.53 0.58 0.62 0.67 0.76 0.89 
80 Mean(%) -1.26% -0.52% 0.73% 1.96% 2.83% 4.25% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.64% 15.53% 14.37% 13.27% 11.72% 9.47% 
  Win/Loss 0.66 0.75 0.79 0.86 0.92 1.07 
90 Mean(%) -0.67% 0.15% 1.54% 2.44% 3.65% 4.96% 
  Std Dev (%) 16.86% 16.04% 15.12% 13.66% 11.90% 9.83% 
  Win/Loss 0.75 0.84 0.95 1.02 1.12 1.33 
100 Mean(%) -0.30% 0.56% 1.74% 3.03% 4.30% 5.46% 
  Std Dev (%) 17.56% 16.83% 15.55% 13.94% 12.40% 10.35% 
  Win/Loss 0.89 0.97 1.07 1.18 1.34 1.54 
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B. APPENDIX B 
Appendix B illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer who revises 
his/her portfolio on an annual basis, for all three sector timing strategies. Table B-1 
below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching between 
the FINI and the INDI on an annual basis, incurring 1 percent transaction costs. 
Table B-2 below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching 
between the RESI and the INDI on an annual basis, incurring 1 percent transaction 
costs. Table B-3 below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer 
switching between the RESI and the FINI on an annual basis, incurring 1 percent 
transaction costs. 
Appendix B-1: Imperfect Annual Market Timing Results (1percent transaction costs) 
INDI 
FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 1.27% 2.45% 3.15% 4.59% 4.67% 5.79% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.30% 30.62% 30.06% 30.37% 29.92% 29.67% 
  Win/Loss 1.09 1.12 1.21 1.28 1.32 1.38 
60% Mean(%) 3.57% 4.10% 5.41% 6.39% 6.81% 8.05% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.30% 29.94% 29.77% 29.90% 30.03% 29.89% 
  Win/Loss 1.19 1.24 1.35 1.4 1.48 1.51 
70% Mean(%) 5.09% 5.09% 6.49% 7.54% 8.96% 9.03% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.62% 30.14% 29.65% 29.49% 29.47% 29.28% 
  Win/Loss 1.34 1.38 1.43 1.56 1.64 1.71 
80% Mean(%) 6.93% 7.49% 8.30% 8.88% 9.87% 10.57% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.60% 29.41% 29.43% 29.71% 28.95% 28.37% 
  Win/Loss 1.44 1.52 1.64 1.7 1.78 1.84 
90% Mean(%) 7.62% 8.58% 9.36% 10.65% 11.45% 12.55% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.47% 29.47% 28.99% 29.05% 28.51% 27.98% 
  Win/Loss 1.57 1.64 1.75 1.89 1.97 2.1 
100% Mean(%) 9.89% 10.90% 11.73% 13.03% 13.53% 14.21% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.01% 28.86% 28.48% 28.18% 28.01% 27.20% 
  Win/Loss 1.69 1.74 1.84 1.94 2.19 2.33 
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Appendix B-2: Imperfect Annual Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) 0.79% 2.15% 2.65% 3.53% 5.06% 6.26% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.80% 32.74% 33.13% 33.00% 33.39% 33.83% 
  Win/Loss 1.05 1.13 1.21 1.26 1.33 1.31 
60% Mean(%) 2.62% 4.28% 4.46% 5.31% 7.30% 7.69% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.34% 32.37% 32.83% 32.74% 32.92% 32.25% 
  Win/Loss 1.16 1.24 1.29 1.35 1.47 1.56 
70% Mean(%) 4.66% 5.36% 6.70% 8.10% 8.83% 9.88% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.99% 32.45% 31.95% 31.55% 32.21% 31.84% 
  Win/Loss 1.31 1.42 1.54 1.59 1.65 1.73 
80% Mean(%) 7.09% 7.35% 8.96% 9.21% 10.35% 11.44% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.44% 31.29% 30.59% 31.37% 31.00% 30.51% 
  
90% 
Win/Loss 1.43 1.52 1.64 1.71 1.78 1.86 
Mean(%) 7.90% 9.10% 10.15% 11.08% 12.36% 13.39% 
  Std Dev (%) 30.14% 30.43% 30.27% 30.75% 30.18% 29.86% 
  
100% 
Win/Loss 1.57 1.65 1.72 1.89 1.99 2.12 
Mean(%) 10.26% 11.10% 12.26% 13.02% 14.38% 15.48% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.81% 29.43% 29.11% 29.13% 29.08% 28.60% 
  Win/Loss 1.77 1.84 1.99 2.12 2.13 2.28 
 
Appendix B-3: Imperfect Annual Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -1.66% -0.25% 0.81% 2.23% 3.73% 4.92% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.94% 33.06% 33.30% 33.23% 32.92% 33.02% 
  Win/Loss 0.92 0.97 1.03 1.10 1.22 1.27 
60% Mean(%) -0.35% 1.36% 2.37% 3.64% 5.32% 6.05% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.46% 32.91% 32.69% 32.70% 33.14% 32.75% 
  Win/Loss 0.94 1.01 1.14 1.28 1.32 1.38 
70% Mean(%) 1.14% 2.81% 3.30% 4.94% 6.56% 8.53% 
  Std Dev (%) 32.10% 32.20% 32.45% 32.14% 32.13% 32.10% 
  Win/Loss 1.04 1.14 1.25 1.31 1.37 1.48 
80% Mean(%) 2.63% 3.94% 6.04% 6.71% 8.28% 10.11% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.92% 32.06% 31.94% 31.66% 31.63% 31.13% 
  Win/Loss 1.15 1.21 1.32 1.44 1.52 1.62 
90% Mean(%) 4.18% 5.38% 7.09% 7.71% 9.78% 11.20% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.50% 31.09% 31.09% 31.20% 30.68% 30.50% 
  Win/Loss 1.19 1.26 1.37 1.49 1.69 1.77 
100% Mean(%) 5.71% 6.72% 8.26% 9.86% 10.93% 12.05% 
  Std Dev (%) 31.25% 30.75% 30.54% 30.02% 29.78% 29.71% 
  Win/Loss 1.30 1.41 1.48 1.61 1.77 1.89 
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C. APPENDIX C 
Appendix B illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer who revises 
his/her portfolio on an annual basis, for all three sector timing strategies. Table C-1 
below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching between 
the FINI and the INDI on a quarterly basis, incurring 1 percent transaction costs. 
Table C-2 below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching 
between the RESI and the INDI on a quarterly basis, incurring 1 percent transaction 
costs. Table C-3 below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer 
switching between the RESI and the FINI on a quarterly basis, incurring 1 percent 
transaction costs. 
Appendix C-1: Imperfect Quarterly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
INDI 
FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -0.56% 2.30% 4.10% 5.72% 7.90% 9.22% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.36% 26.50% 26.16% 26.50% 26.24% 25.74% 
  Win/Loss 0.97 1.08 1.1 1.23 1.27 1.36 
60% Mean(%) 2.63% 4.47% 6.77% 8.16% 10.42% 11.77% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.62% 26.64% 26.34% 26.10% 25.86% 26.28% 
  Win/Loss 1.09 1.17 1.25 1.31 1.39 1.44 
70% Mean(%) 4.14% 7.14% 9.44% 10.86% 12.86% 14.89% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.22% 26.34% 26.02% 25.92% 26.04% 25.32% 
  Win/Loss 1.12 1.24 1.37 1.44 1.49 1.51 
80% Mean(%) 7.95% 10.25% 11.55% 13.60% 15.82% 17.71% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.36% 25.92% 25.60% 25.68% 25.86% 25.16% 
  Win/Loss 1.23 1.34 1.47 1.54 1.68 1.73 
90% Mean(%) 11.03% 13.03% 14.58% 16.13% 18.07% 21.27% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.18% 26.26% 26.04% 25.30% 24.88% 24.74% 
  Win/Loss 1.38 1.42 1.57 1.66 1.78 1.86 
100% Mean(%) 13.56% 14.31% 17.80% 19.30% 21.60% 23.60% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.62% 25.34% 25.30% 24.96% 24.36% 24.54% 
  Win/Loss 1.51 1.64 1.70 1.76 1.95 1.99 
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Appendix C-2: Imperfect Quarterly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -0.20% 2.02% 4.47% 5.47% 9.65% 10.81% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.88% 28.84% 29.20% 29.08% 29.24% 29.10% 
  Win/Loss 1 1.07 1.13 1.25 1.33 1.37 
60% Mean(%) 1.37% 5.30% 7.57% 9.61% 11.29% 13.96% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.24% 28.60% 28.70% 28.88% 28.86% 28.82% 
  Win/Loss 1.10 1.19 1.26 1.31 1.39 1.47 
70% Mean(%) 4.31% 6.98% 10.21% 12.38% 15.46% 16.13% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.08% 28.18% 28.22% 28.22% 28.38% 28.32% 
  Win/Loss 1.21 1.34 1.41 1.54 1.58 1.62 
80% Mean(%) 8.37% 10.64% 12.81% 17.35% 17.98% 19.34% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.62% 28.04% 28.08% 27.74% 27.40% 27.62% 
  Win/Loss 1.31 1.40 1.49 1.56 1.67 1.76 
90% Mean(%) 10.90% 13.69% 16.22% 18.84% 21.88% 23.74% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.36% 27.08% 27.20% 26.68% 26.88% 26.76% 
  Win/Loss 1.38 1.45 1.57 1.69 1.82 1.96 
100% Mean(%) 15.95% 16.85% 19.85% 23.84% 24.21% 27.59% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.54% 26.18% 26.52% 26.82% 26.00% 25.80% 
  Win/Loss 1.55 1.64 1.67 1.84 1.98 2.24 
 
Appendix C-3: Imperfect Quarterly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -3.12% -0.48% 2.06% 4.23% 6.51% 8.97% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.00% 29.18% 29.14% 29.24% 29.38% 29.28% 
  Win/Loss 0.9 0.94 1.08 1.16 1.21 1.31 
60% Mean(%) -3.51% -0.24% 2.30% 3.12% 7.14% 9.48% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.72% 29.22% 29.04% 29.18% 29.56% 29.32% 
  Win/Loss 0.94 0.96 1.07 1.15 1.23 1.27 
70% Mean(%) -8.10% 1.00% 2.87% 4.31% 6.39% 9.35% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.68% 29.44% 29.66% 28.70% 29.50% 29.50% 
  Win/Loss 0.88 0.94 1.07 1.18 1.29 1.38 
80% Mean(%) -3.71% 1.37% 1.89% 4.51% 6.43% 9.48% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.12% 29.26% 28.74% 29.66% 29.40% 29.24% 
  Win/Loss 0.94 1.02 1.13 1.17 1.26 1.32 
90% Mean(%) -3.28% 0.84% 1.08% 4.14% 6.26% 9.14% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.60% 28.98% 29.68% 29.54% 29.26% 29.46% 
  
Win/Loss 0.90 1.05 1.16 1.24 1.28 1.30 
       
100% Mean(%) -2.81% 1.29% 1.97% 3.81% 5.51% 9.99% 
  Std Dev (%) 29.14% 29.24% 29.04% 29.36% 29.30% 29.16% 
  Win/Loss 0.91 1.09 1.15 1.16 1.24 1.35 
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D. APPENDIX D 
Appendix D illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer who revises 
his/her portfolio on an annual basis, for all three sector timing strategies. Table D-1 
below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching between 
the FINI and the INDI on a monthly basis, incurring 1 percent transaction costs. 
Table D-2 below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer switching 
between the RESI and the INDI on a monthly basis, incurring 1 percent transaction 
costs. Table D-3 below illustrates the potential gains available to a market timer 
switching between the RESI and the FINI on a monthly basis, incurring 1 percent 
transaction costs. 
Appendix D-1: Imperfect Monthly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
INDI 
FINI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -3.89% -1.07% 3.04% 4.66% 8.73% 11.22% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.67% 25.39% 25.84% 25.60% 25.74% 25.29% 
  Win/Loss 1.74 0.99 1.05 1.11 1.2 1.31 
60% Mean(%) -0.96% 2.30% 5.91% 9.90% 13.22% 16.08% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.63% 25.53% 25.63% 25.46% 25.29% 24.98% 
  Win/Loss 1.01 1.08 1.11 1.19 1.26 1.33 
70% Mean(%) 2.06% 7.44% 10.69% 14.44% 17.04% 19.70% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.67% 25.32% 25.46% 25.05% 24.87% 25.05% 
  Win/Loss 1.11 1.12 1.17 1.28 1.31 1.45 
80% Mean(%) 6.80% 10.95% 14.57% 17.46% 19.99% 25.05% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.32% 25.29% 25.11% 25.11% 24.49% 24.49% 
  Win/Loss 1.14 1.2 1.26 1.34 1.42 1.5 
90% Mean(%) 10.30% 14.98% 19.42% 23.00% 25.93% 30.15% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.22% 24.84% 24.53% 24.49% 24.28% 23.56% 
  Win/Loss 1.18 1.29 1.36 1.48 1.61 1.7 
100% Mean(%) 16.08% 19.00% 22.85% 24.90% 30.76% 34.96% 
  Std Dev (%) 24.98% 24.42% 24.32% 24.18% 24.04% 23.56% 
  Win/Loss 1.33 1.42 1.51 1.58 1.65 1.76 
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Appendix D-2: Imperfect Monthly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
INDI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -2.26% -0.96% 1.33% 7.70% 12.01% 15.80% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.27% 29.13% 29.24% 29.48% 29.41% 29.38% 
  Win/Loss 0.92 0.97 1.08 1.16 1.21 1.37 
60% Mean(%) 1.57% 3.66% 7.70% 13.08% 18.58% 19.99% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.16% 28.37% 28.44% 28.82% 28.58% 28.86% 
  Win/Loss 1.00 1.05 1.17 1.25 1.36 1.41 
70% Mean(%) 4.66% 8.73% 12.28% 16.35% 22.71% 26.08% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.37% 27.99% 27.75% 28.09% 28.06% 27.92% 
  Win/Loss 1.08 1.14 1.22 1.31 1.38 1.42 
80% Mean(%) 9.12% 12.95% 17.60% 22.13% 29.23% 32.15% 
  Std Dev (%) 27.30% 27.30% 27.05% 27.54% 27.12% 27.71% 
  Win/Loss 1.24 1.29 1.34 1.38 1.46 1.59 
90% Mean(%) 14.16% 18.86% 22.42% 29.99% 33.39% 38.96% 
  Std Dev (%) 26.29% 26.71% 26.67% 26.81% 26.88% 26.78% 
  Win/Loss 1.26 1.34 1.45 1.52 1.67 1.77 
100% Mean(%) 19.99% 25.05% 28.93% 33.70% 38.96% 44.92% 
  Std Dev (%) 25.74% 25.74% 25.77% 25.63% 25.67% 25.43% 
  Win/Loss 1.36 1.45 1.52 1.68 1.8 1.94 
 
Appendix D-3: Imperfect Monthly Market Timing Results (1 percent transaction costs)  
FINI 
RESI 
  50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
50% Mean(%) -8.53% -3.77% -0.72% 4.91% 6.55% 11.62% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.61% 28.51% 28.27% 27.54% 27.30% 26.22% 
  Win/Loss 1.02 1.03 1.18 1.4 1.56 1.89 
60% Mean(%) -5.15% -2.14% 3.78% 7.83% 10.56% 18.44% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.72% 28.58% 28.72% 27.89% 27.26% 26.08% 
  Win/Loss 0.87 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.99 1.02 
70% Mean(%) 0.72% 5.54% 8.60% 13.22% 15.53% 24.31% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.96% 28.89% 28.47% 27.71% 27.16% 25.81% 
  Win/Loss 0.87 0.89 1.94 1.97 1.09 1.16 
80% Mean(%) 5.16% 8.60% 12.95% 18.72% 24.46% 28.63% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.79% 28.72% 28.61% 27.85% 26.99% 26.22% 
  Win/Loss 0.89 0.88 1.02 1.35 0.92 0.89 
90% Mean(%) 8.99% 14.98% 18.30% 25.93% 25.93% 33.70% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.89% 28.61% 28.68% 28.37% 26.78% 25.98% 
  Win/Loss 0.85 0.92 1.12 1.25 1.43 1.59 
100% Mean(%) 14.30% 19.42% 24.60% 28.78% 34.17% 37.51% 
  Std Dev (%) 28.65% 28.54% 28.58% 28.09% 27.40% 26.02% 
  Win/Loss 0.88 1.06 1.19 1.59 1.67 1.89 
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